LESSONS OF VIETNAM

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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SHAPING AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
New Realities and New Ways of Thinking
George P. Shultz

VIETNAM: THE RETROSPECT
The Lessons of Vietnam? *David Fromkin / James Chace*
Coming to Grips with Vietnam *John Wheeler*

LEBANON: THE PROSPECTS
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Foreign Affairs is published five times annually
by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
Vol. 63, No. 4. © 1985

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Foreign Affairs is published five times annually by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Editorial Offices: 58 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021. Telephone (212) 734-0400. Telex: 239852 CFR UR.

Manuscript submissions: The Editors will consider all manuscripts received, but assume no responsibility regarding them. Materials submitted will be returned only when accompanied by appropriate postage.

Subscriptions: Price for U.S. subscriptions, $25.00 per year; foreign, $32.00. Rates for air mail delivery are available upon request. To subscribe, write *Foreign Affairs*, P.O. Box 2615, Boulder, CO 80322, or call (212) 734-0400. For subscription problems, call (800) 525-0643.

Advertising: For advertising rates and schedules, contact the Publisher's Office (212) 734-0400. *Foreign Affairs* is a member of the Audit Bureau of Circulations and the Magazine Publishers Association.

Reprints and permissions: Write *Foreign Affairs*, Reader Services, 58 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021, or call (212) 734-0400.

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George P. Shultz

NEW REALITIES AND NEW WAYS OF THINKING

Albert Einstein once observed that the advent of nuclear weapons had changed everything except our modes of thinking. If even so dramatic a development as the nuclear revolution has taken a long time to be fully understood, how much longer has it usually taken to understand the implications of the more subtle, intangible historical changes taking place around us.

The international order at the end of this century is certain to be far different from the pattern of world politics when the century began. The distribution of power and the dynamics of international relations have undergone a continuous transformation, driven by many factors—technology, economic and social changes, and the often-underestimated force of ideas. This process goes on; history never stops. As we head toward the 21st century, Einstein's observation takes on new relevance: our ways of thinking must adapt to new realities; it is imperative that we grasp the new trends and understand their implications.

The United States of America is not just an onlooker, however. We are participants and we are engaged. America is again in a position to have a major influence over the direction of events—and the traditional goals and values of the American people have *not* changed. We have a duty to help shape the trends, as they evolve, in accordance with our ideals and interests, to help construct a new pattern of international stability that will ensure peace, prosperity and freedom for coming generations.

What are the forces of change? What new "modes of thinking" are required? And what are the possible elements of a new and more secure international system?

II

The U.S.-Soviet relationship, for better or worse, remains a crucial determinant of the prospects for world peace, even

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George P. Shultz is Secretary of State.

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though the political predominance of the two superpowers is less than it was a few decades ago. How to manage this relationship as conditions change remains a major conceptual challenge for the United States.

So long as the Soviet system is driven by ideology and national ambition to seek to aggrandize its power and undermine the interests of the democracies, true friendship and cooperation will remain out of reach. The West must resist this Soviet power-drive vigorously if there is to be any hope for lasting stability. At the same time, in the thermonuclear age both sides have a common interest in survival; therefore both sides have an incentive to moderate the rivalry and to seek ways to control nuclear weapons and reduce the risks of war. We cannot know whether such a steady Western policy will, over time, lead to a mellowing of the Soviet system. Perhaps not. But the West has the same responsibility in either case: to resist Soviet encroachments firmly while holding the door open to more constructive possibilities.

Today, with the accession of Mr. Gorbachev, there may be a fresh opportunity to explore these more constructive possibilities. President Reagan is approaching this prospect in a positive spirit, as well as with a realistic appreciation that the difficulties between our countries are grounded in objective problems that we must work hard to resolve.

The democracies, unlike the Soviets, have long had difficulty maintaining consistency, coherence, discipline and a sense of strategy. Free societies are often impatient. Western attitudes have fluctuated between extremes of gloom and pessimism, on the one hand, and susceptibility to a Soviet smile on the other. Our ways of thinking have tended too often to focus either on increasing our strength or on pursuing negotiations; we have found it hard to do both simultaneously—which is clearly the most sensible course and probably the only way we can sustain either our defense programs or our ability to negotiate.

In the last four years, nevertheless, the underlying conditions that affect U.S.-Soviet relations have changed dramatically. Ten to fifteen years ago, when the United States was beset by economic difficulties, neglecting its defenses, and hesitant about its role in the world, the Soviets exploited these conditions. They relentlessly continued to build up militarily; they and their clients moved more boldly in the geopolitical arena, intervening in such places as Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, believing that the West was incapable of resisting.

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They had reason for confidence that what they call the global "correlation of forces" was shifting in their favor.

Today, our key alliances are more united than ever before. The United States is restoring its military strength and economic vigor and has regained its self-assurance; we have a President with a fresh mandate from the people for an active role of leadership. The Soviets, in contrast, face profound structural economic difficulties and restless allies; their diplomacy and their clients are on the defensive in many parts of the world. We have reason to be confident that the "correlation of forces" is shifting back in our favor.

Nevertheless, history will not do our work for us. Experience suggests that the Soviets will periodically do something, somewhere, that is abhorrent or inimical to our interests, dampening hopes for an improvement in East-West relations. Witness the examples of Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, the Korean Air Lines shootdown and Soviet human rights practices. The question is how the West should respond to such outrages. Clearly our objective should be to act in a way that could help discipline Soviet behavior; at the same time, our posture should not leave our own strategy vulnerable to periodic disruption by such shocks.

We must never let ourselves be so wedded to improving relations with the Soviets that we turn a blind eye to actions that undermine the very foundation of stable relations; symbolic responses to outrageous Soviet actions have their place, and so do penalties and sanctions. Experience also shows, however, that as a practical matter we can best deter or undo Soviet geopolitical encroachments by helping, in one way or another, those who are resisting directly on the ground. And many negotiations and endeavors we undertake with the Soviets serve mutual interests—indeed, they all should.

Thus we are left with tough choices. Whether important negotiations ought to be interrupted after some Soviet outrage will always be a complex calculation. When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner in 1983, President Reagan made sure the world knew the full unvarnished truth about the atrocity; nevertheless, he also sent our arms control negotiators back to Geneva because he believed that a reduction in nuclear weapons was a critical priority.

In short, our "mode of thinking" must seek a sustainable strategy geared to *American* goals and interests, in the light of Soviet behavior but not just in reaction to it. Such a strategy

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requires a continuing willingness to solve problems through negotiation where this serves our interests (and presumably mutual interests). Our leverage will come from creating objective realities that give the Soviets a growing stake in better relations with us across the board: by continuing to modernize our defenses, assist our friends and confront Soviet challenges. We must learn to pursue a strategy geared to long-term thinking and based on both negotiation and strength simultaneously, if we are to build a stable U.S.-Soviet relationship for the next century.

III

The intellectual challenge of a new era faces us in a related dimension, namely arms control. The continuing revolution in technology means that the strategic balance—and the requirements of deterrence—are never static. Unfortunately, conventional modes of thinking about many of these questions continue to lag behind reality.

Standard strategic doctrine in the West has ultimately relied, for decades, on the balance of terror—the confrontation of offensive arsenals by which the two sides threaten each other with mass extermination. Deterrence has worked under these conditions, and we must not let go of what has worked until we know that something better is genuinely available. Nevertheless, for political, strategic and even moral reasons, we owe it to our people to explore the possibility that we can do better than the conventional wisdom that our defense strategy *must* rely on offensive threats and *must* leave our people unprotected against attack. The Soviets, for their part, have always attached enormous doctrinal and practical importance to strategic defense, including not only air defense and civil defense but a deployed and modernized anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow—and intensive research into new defensive technologies.

Adjusting our strategic thinking to the constant advance of technology is never an easy process. The vehemence of some of the criticism of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), in my view, comes less from the debate over technical feasibility—which future research will settle one way or another in an objective manner—than from the passionate defense of orthodox doctrine in the face of changing strategic realities. We are proceeding with SDI research because we see a positive, and indeed revolutionary, potential: defensive meas-

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ures may become available that could badly disrupt any attack on us or our allies and thereby render obsolete the threat of an offensive first strike. A new strategic equilibrium based on defensive technologies and sharply reduced offensive deployments is likely to be the most stable and secure arrangement of all.

Our concept can be described as follows: during the next ten years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

IV

As the political dominance of the superpowers began to erode in the last few decades, some saw a five-power world emerging—with the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, China and Japan as the major players. After the energy crisis of the early 1970s, others emphasized the increasing importance of the North-South relationship. Some saw the U.S.-Soviet relationship as still central.

There are elements of truth in all these perceptions. Nevertheless, in the mid-1980s, in my view, the most striking trend in world politics is something else: the growing dynamism, cohesion and cooperation of like-minded nations that share an important set of positive goals.

American foreign policy is driven by positive goals—peace, democracy, liberty and human rights; racial justice; economic and social progress; the strengthening of cooperation and the rule of law. They are goals that inspire peoples and nations around the world, and they may well turn out to be the organizing principles of an international order that embraces the great majority of mankind. Already we see them reflected in new trends in many regions of the world and in many dimensions of foreign policy.

America's closest and most lasting international relation-

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ships, of course, are its alliances with its fellow democracies. This is no accident. Our ties with our democratic friends abroad have an enduring quality precisely because they rest on a moral base, not only a base of strategic interest. When George Washington advised his countrymen to steer clear of permanent alliances, his attitude was colored by the fact that there were hardly any other fellow democracies in those days. We were among the first, and we had good reason to be wary of entanglements with countries that did not share our democratic principles. In any case, we now *define* our strategic interests in terms that embrace the safety and well-being of the democratic world.

Today's conditions define the tasks of the Atlantic alliance. There is a new awareness, for example, of the importance of strengthening conventional defenses, as a way of bolstering Europe's security while reducing NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons. A strong Western deterrent posture is the most solid basis for engaging the East in constructive negotiations. For the short run, the allies are taking steps to improve NATO readiness and infrastructure. For the longer run, the alliance is looking to correct other critical deficiencies, as well as addressing the fundamental challenge of improving the efficiency of allied defense procurement.

The United States has always supported Western European unity, knowing that a strong Europe, while it would be a competitor in some ways, was in the overall interest of the free world. We wish the European Community well; we encourage our European friends to make further progress in developing a true Europe-wide market and in breaking down structural rigidities that impede both economic expansion and effective economic cooperation with us.

We also see, in Europe, new and creative thinking about the continuing pursuit of political unity, and about strengthening West European cooperation in the defense field. We support both these goals. The West can only benefit from a major European role in world affairs. And the peoples of Western Europe should see defense as an endeavor they undertake for their own future, not as a favor to the United States. With statesmanship on both sides of the Atlantic, this evolution will strengthen the common defense and heighten the sense of common political purpose among the democracies.

As we think about Europe's evolution, we cannot forget Eastern Europe. Since the days of the Marshall Plan, when the

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West invited the East to join, we have always wanted the success of Western Europe to be a beacon to *all* of Europe. The present political division of the continent is wholly artificial; it exists only because it has been imposed by brute Soviet power; the United States has never recognized it as legitimate or permanent. In certain countries, there are efforts at liberalization. But *all* the peoples of Eastern Europe are capable of, deserve and yearn for something better. In recent years we have seen the powerful aspiration for free trade unions, for economic reform, for political and religious freedom, for true peace and security, for human rights as promised by the Helsinki accords. We hope to see the day when the Soviet Union changes its mode of thinking to consider its own security in terms compatible with the freedom, security and independence of its neighbors.

In East Asia and the Pacific, another new reality is changing our perception of the world. The economic dynamism of this region is taking on increasing importance, as a factor in America's foreign trade, as an economic model for the developing world, and as a unique and attractive vision of the future. We see the countries of free East Asia growing at seven percent a year over the past decade; for the past five years, our trade with East Asia and the Pacific has been greater than our trade with any other region and its relative importance continues to grow. In 1984, U.S. trade with the region reached $165 billion—about 30 percent of total U.S. trade. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations has become an impressive example of economic development and regional political cooperation. The Republic of Korea is a spectacular economic success story. Japan is playing a larger role—responsibly, positively and cooperatively—commensurate with its growing strength. In the People's Republic of China, the hopes for economic modernization have been invested—wisely—in a bold program of reform. China's long march to the market is a truly historic event—a great nation throwing off outmoded economic doctrines and liberating the energies of its talented people.

There are, of course, problems that pose dangers to this bright economic future: the Soviet military buildup in the region; aggression by the Soviet Union and its clients in Afghanistan and Cambodia; unresolved tensions on the Korean peninsula; internal problems in various countries. East Asia has a rich heritage of civilization—and also a turbulent history of bitter conflict. The symbolism of Angkor Wat—the damage

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done by modern violence to a great ancient monument—is both a paradox and a warning.

Nevertheless, the most striking trend in the region today is the positive trend, especially the new movement toward wider collaboration. A sense of Pacific community is emerging among many nations with an extraordinary diversity of cultures, races and political systems. There is an expanding practice of regional consultation and a developing sense of common interest in regional security. In this sense, a decade after Vietnam, the United States has more than restored its position in Asia. We can be proud of the vitality of our alliances, friendships and productive ties in this promising region. If nations act with wisdom and statesmanship, we may well be at the threshold of a new era in international relations in the Pacific basin.

In Latin America, another kind of trend is apparent—the steady advance of democracy. Democracy is hardly a new idea, but this new development *is* revising some earlier assumptions in some quarters about the world's political future. Pessimists in some quarters used to maintain that the industrial democracies were doomed to permanent minority status in the world community. Today, there is mounting evidence that the ideal of liberty is alive and well. In the Western hemisphere, over 90 percent of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean today live under governments that are democratic—in contrast to only one-third in 1979. In less than six years, popularly elected democrats have replaced dictators in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Grenada, Brazil and Uruguay. Guatemala is in transition to democracy. After a long twilight of dictatorship, this hemispheric trend toward free elections and representative government is something to be applauded and supported.

The United States has always been a champion of democracy. Democratic institutions are the best guarantor of human rights, and also the best long-term guarantor of stability. On every continent, we see a trend toward democracy or else a yearning for democracy; both are vivid demonstrations that the idea of liberty is far from a culture-bound aspiration or monopoly of the industrialized West.

Today we see a significant new phenomenon. After years of guerrilla insurgencies led by communists against pro-Western governments, we now see dramatic and heartening examples of popular insurgencies *against* communist regimes. Today, in a variety of different circumstances—in Nicaragua, in Afghan-

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istan, in Cambodia, in Africa—Marxist-Leninist rulers have clearly failed to suppress the aspiration for representative government. And communist systems have proved, uniformly, to be economic disasters. The American people have a long and noble tradition of supporting the struggle of other peoples for freedom, democracy and independence. In the nineteenth century we supported Simon Bolívar, Polish patriots and others seeking freedom—reciprocating, in a way, the aid given to us in our own revolution by other nations like France. If we turned our backs on this tradition, we would be conceding the Soviet notion that communist revolutions are irreversible while everything else is up for grabs; we would be, in effect, enacting the Brezhnev Doctrine into American law. So long as communist dictatorships feel free to aid and abet insurgencies in the name of "socialist internationalism," why must the democracies—the target of this threat—be inhibited from defending their own interests and the cause of democracy itself?

The future of democracy is precisely what is at stake in Central America. With Soviet and Cuban support, the Sandinistas are seeking to consolidate a totalitarian system in Nicaragua and to promote subversion throughout the region. Our policy is to promote democracy, reform and human rights; to support economic development; to help provide a security shield against those who seek to spread tyranny by force; and to support dialogue and negotiation both within and among the countries of the region. We are backing democratic governments and democratic political forces against extremists of both the left and the right. If we abandon those seeking democracy, the extremists will gain and the forces of moderation and decency will be the victims. This is why the Administration has worked so hard, and will continue to work hard, for effective negotiations, for economic and security assistance, and for the bipartisan plan that emerged from the Kissinger commission. Our nation's vital interests *and* moral responsibility require us to stand by our friends in their struggle for freedom and against those who glorify violent revolution and repression.

In other parts of the world, as well, the United States is actively engaged in the search for peaceful solutions to regional conflicts. Such mediation is, of course, a traditional American role, but new conditions always call for new ways of thinking—on the part of all parties—about how to make progress.

In the Middle East, for example, we have seen signs of a new

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realism and a new commitment on the part of key regional actors. If pursued, this could create the conditions for progress, which will come when both sides agree to sit down together at the negotiating table. The United States remains convinced that President Reagan's initiative of September 1, 1982, is the most promising route to a solution. We are intensively engaged this year in encouraging our Israeli and Arab friends to take further steps toward peace. We will continue to support and encourage those who seek peace against those who promote violence and try to block all progress.

In southern Africa, as well, the United States has a key role to play. We must pursue the dual objectives of racial justice and regional security. These twin challenges call for serious analysis and sober thinking, not emotional responses. We have already accomplished much, but our influence is not infinite. Today there is less cross-border violence in southern Africa than at any time in more than a decade. Progress is being made toward a Namibia settlement. We have strengthened ties with Mozambique and other regional states. And South Africa itself has developed cooperative relations with many of its neighbors.

Within South Africa, a dynamic of evolution is already at work. More positive change is occurring now than in the 1970s or 1960s or 1950s. The positive influence of the American presence—our diplomacy, our companies, our assistance programs for black South Africans—is helping to build the basis for further change. Apartheid must go. But the only course consistent with American values is to engage ourselves as a force for constructive, peaceful change while there is still a chance. It cannot be our choice to cheer on, from the sidelines, the forces of polarization that could erupt in a race war; it is not our job to exacerbate hardship, which could lead to the same result.

V

In the global economy, an important shift of another kind is taking place—an intellectual shift. Reality is intruding on some long-held notions about economic policy. Lord Keynes' point about practical men being slaves to some defunct economist may be less true now than in the past. Or perhaps the views expressed by Adam Smith over two centuries ago on the creation of the "wealth of nations" are once again showing their practical validity. At any rate, recent experience has

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fueled a broad and long-overdue skepticism about statist solutions, central planning and government direction.

This intellectual shift is partly the product of the extraordinary vigor of the American recovery. The United States has revised its tax system to provide real incentives to work, to save, to invest, to take risks, to be efficient. We have reduced government regulation, intervention and control. We have opened opportunities for freer competition in transportation, finance, communication, manufacturing and distribution. Last year's real growth in the gross national product was the sharpest increase since 1951; inflation (as measured by the GNP deflator) was the lowest since 1967. The overall result has been the extraordinary creation of over seven million new jobs in two years.

Success inspires emulation. Not only in East Asia, but on every continent—Europe, Latin America, Africa and elsewhere in Asia—we see movement to decentralize, to deregulate, to denationalize, to reduce rigidity and to enlarge the scope for individual producers and consumers to cooperate freely through markets. In Africa, the American response to the food crisis includes not only a tremendous relief effort but a longer-term aid program supporting African efforts of economic reform, particularly in agriculture.

Serious challenges to the global economy remain, but the future holds promise. A worldwide revolution in economic thought and economic policy is under way.

And it is coming just in time, because it coincides with yet another revolution—a revolution in the technological base of the global economy. This is what Walter Wriston has called "the onrushing age of information technology." The combination of microchip computers, advanced telecommunications—and a continuing process of innovation—is not only transforming communication and other aspects of daily life, but is also challenging the very concepts of national sovereignty and the role of government in society.

The very existence of these new technologies is yet another testimony to the crucial importance of entrepreneurship—and government policies that give free rein to entrepreneurship—as the wellspring of technological creativity and economic growth. The closed societies of the East are likely to fall far behind in these areas—and Western societies that maintain too many restrictions on economic activity run the same risk. Moreover, any government that attempts heavy-handedly to

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control or regulate or tax the flow of electronic information will find itself stifling the growth of the world economy as well as its own progress. This is one of the reasons why the United States is pressing for a new round of trade negotiations in these service fields of data processing and transfer of information. The entire free world has a stake in building a more open system, because together we can progress faster and farther than any of us can alone.

This points to another advantage the West enjoys. The free flow of information is inherently compatible with our political system and values. The communist states, in contrast, fear this information revolution perhaps even more than they fear Western military strength. We all remember the power of the Ayatollah's message disseminated on tape cassettes in Iran; what could have a more profound impact in the Soviet bloc than similar cassettes, outside radio broadcasting, direct broadcast satellites, or photocopying machines? Totalitarian societies face a dilemma: either they try to stifle these technologies and thereby fall further behind in the new industrial revolution, or else they permit these technologies and see their totalitarian control inevitably eroded. In fact, they do not have a choice, because they will never be able entirely to block the tide of technological advance.

The revolution in global communication thus forces all nations to reconsider traditional ways of thinking about national sovereignty. We are reminded anew of the world's interdependence, and we are reminded as well that only a world of spreading freedom is compatible with human and technological progress.

VI

These broad trends I have described are mostly positive trends. However, we can also see social dislocation arising from economic change; we see urban alienation, political turbulence, and the many potential sources and forms of disorder I have mentioned. The future evolution of the international system will follow the positive trends only if we—the United States and the free world—meet our responsibility to defend our interests and shape events in accordance with our own ideals and goals.

In at least one respect, the modern world, with its spreading technology and prosperity and democratic aspirations, is ironically becoming also more and more vulnerable. I am thinking,

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of course, about terrorism. Even as the world becomes more secure from the danger of major war, paradoxically the democratic world now faces an increasing threat from this new form of warfare.

Terrorism these days is becoming less an isolated phenomenon of local fanatics, and increasingly part of a new international strategy resorted to by the enemies of freedom. It is a vicious weapon used deliberately against democracies; against the interests, policies and friends of the democracies; and against completely innocent people. There are disturbing links, as well, to international drug trafficking. Terrorism is a problem that, more than many others, is forcing us into new ways of thinking about how to safeguard our future. During the year ahead we must be prepared for serious terrorist threats in Western Europe, in the Middle East and in Latin America, much of it supported or encouraged by a handful of ruthless governments.

A counterstrategy for combatting terrorism, in my view, must encompass many things. We and our allies must work still harder to improve security, share information, coordinate police efforts and collaborate in other ways. We in this country must also think hard about the moral stakes involved. If we truly believe in our democratic values and our way of life, we must be willing to defend them. Passive measures are unlikely to suffice; means of more active defense and deterrence must be considered and given the necessary political support.

Finally, while working tirelessly to deny terrorists their opportunities and their means, we can—and must—be absolutely firm in denying them their goals. They seek to blackmail us into changing our foreign policies or to drive us out of countries and regions where we have important interests. This we cannot permit; we cannot yield position or abandon friends or responsibilities under this kind of pressure. If we allow terrorists even one such victory, we embolden them further; we demoralize all who rely on us, and we make the world an even more dangerous place.

There is, of course, a broader issue here. This is the basic question of the use of American power in the defense of our interests and the relevance of our power as the backstop to our diplomacy. It is reflected, for example, in what are often called "gray-area challenges"—the kind of regional or local conflicts and crises that are likely to persist in a turbulent world, below the threshold of major war but nonetheless affecting important

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Western interests. Most of the major conflicts since 1945, indeed, have originated in such conflicts in the developing world. The end of the colonial order has not brought universal peace and justice; much of the developing world is torn by the continuing struggle between the forces of moderation and the forces of radicalism—a struggle actively exploited and exacerbated by the Soviet Union.

It is absurd to think that America can walk away from such challenges. This is a world of great potential instability and many potential dangers. It is commonly observed that we live on a shrinking planet and in a world of increasing interdependence. It follows that the United States, as the world's strongest democracy, must meet its responsibility as a defender of freedom, democratic values and international peace, and as a nation upon whom many others rely for their security. Americans have always deeply believed in a world in which disputes were settled peacefully—a world of law, international harmony and human rights. But we have learned through hard experience that such a world cannot be created by good will and idealism alone. We have learned that to maintain peace and preserve freedom we have to be strong, and, more than that, we have to be willing to use our strength. We would not seek confrontation, but we learned the lesson of the 1930s—that appeasement of an aggressor only invites aggression and increases the danger of war.

Americans have sometimes tended to think that power and diplomacy are two distinct alternatives. The truth is, power and diplomacy must always go together, or we will accomplish very little in this world. Power must always be guided by purpose. At the same time, the hard reality is that diplomacy not backed by strength will always be ineffectual at best, dangerous at worst. Americans will always be reluctant to use our military strength; this is the mark of our decency. And clearly, the use of force must always be a last resort, when other means of influence have proven inadequate. But a great power cannot free itself so easily from the burden of choice. It must bear responsibility for the consequences of its inaction as well as for the consequences of its action. In either case, its decision will affect the fate of many other human beings in many parts of the world.

We must be wise and prudent in deciding how and where to use our power; the United States will always seek political solutions to problems. Such solutions will never succeed, how-

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ever, unless aggression is resisted and diplomacy is backed by strength. We are reasonably well prepared to deter all-out Soviet nuclear aggression—provided we continue with our strategic modernization—but we must be sure we are as well prepared, physically and psychologically, for the intermediate range of challenges that we will inevitably confront.

VII

I have touched on a wide variety of topics, but two very important, and very basic, conclusions can be drawn from them.

First, the agenda for the immediate future seems to me to be an agenda on which the American people are essentially united. These are goals that are widely shared and tasks that are likely to reinforce another important trend: namely, the reemergence of a national consensus on the main elements of our foreign policy. This, indeed, may be the most important positive trend of all, because so many of our difficulties in recent decades have been very much the product of our own domestic divisions.

Second, all the diverse topics I have touched upon are, in the end, closely interrelated. The United States seeks peace and security; we seek economic progress; we seek to promote freedom, democracy and human rights. The conventional mode of thinking is to treat these as discrete categories of activity. In fact, as we have seen, it is now more and more widely recognized that there is a crucial connection among them.

As I have already discussed, it is more and more understood that economic progress is related to a political environment of openness and freedom. It used to be thought in some quarters that socialism was the appropriate model for developing countries because central planning was better able to mobilize and allocate resources in conditions of scarcity. The historical experience of Western Europe and North America, which industrialized in an era of limited government, was not thought to be relevant. Yet the more recent experience of the Third World shows that a dominant government role in developing economies has often stifled the natural forces of production and productivity and distorted the efficient allocation of resources. The real engine of growth, in developing as well as industrialized countries, turns out to be the natural dynamism of societies that minimize central planning, open themselves to

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trade with the world, and give free rein to the talents and efforts and risk-taking and investment decisions of individuals.

Similarly, there is almost certainly also a relationship among economic progress, freedom and world peace. Andrei Sakharov declared in his Nobel lecture:

> I am convinced that international trust, mutual understanding, disarmament, and international security are inconceivable without an open society with freedom of information, freedom of conscience, the right to publish, and the right to travel and choose the country in which one wishes to live. I am also convinced that freedom of conscience, together with other civic rights, provides both the basis for scientific progress and a guarantee against its misuse to harm mankind.

The implication of all this is profound: it is that the Western values of liberty and democracy, which some have been quick to write off as culture-bound or irrelevant or passé, are not to be so easily dismissed. These values are the source of our strength, economic as well as moral, and they turn out to be more central to the world's future than many may have realized. After more than a century of fashionable Marxist mythology about economic determinism and the "crisis of capitalism," the key to human progress turns out to be those very Western concepts of political and economic freedom that Marxists claimed were obsolete. They were wrong. Today—in a supreme irony—it is the communist system that looks bankrupt, morally as well as economically. The West is resilient and resurgent.

And so, in the end, the most important new way of thinking that is called for in this decade is our way of thinking about ourselves. Civilizations thrive when they believe in themselves; they decline when they lose this faith. All civilizations confront massive problems, but a society is more likely to master its challenges, rather than be overwhelmed by them, if it retains this bedrock self-confidence that its values are worth defending. This is the essence of the Reagan revolution and of the leadership the President has sought to provide in America.

The West has been through a difficult period in the last decade or more. But now we see a new turn. The next phase of the industrial revolution—like all previous phases—comes from the democratic world, where innovation and creativity are allowed to spring from the unfettered human spirit. And on every continent—from Nicaragua to Cambodia, from Poland to South Africa to Afghanistan—we see that the yearn-

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ing for freedom is the most powerful political force all across the planet.

So, as we head toward the 21st century, it is time for the democracies to celebrate their system, their beliefs and their success. We face challenges, but we are well poised to master them. Opinions are being revised about which system is the wave of the future. The free nations, if they maintain their unity and their faith in themselves, have the advantage—economically, technologically, morally.

History is on freedom's side.

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David Fromkin
James Chace

WHAT *ARE* THE LESSONS OF VIETNAM?

When the helicopter rose in flight from the roof of the doomed U.S. embassy in Saigon a decade ago, Americans hoped they had finally left Vietnam behind them. For years afterward there was a widespread effort in the United States to put the Indochina experience out of mind. In the late 1970s, Mike Mansfield, the professor of Far Eastern studies who became U.S. Senate majority leader and then ambassador to Japan, told an English radio audience:

> It seems to me the American people want to forget Vietnam and not even remember that it happened. But the cost was 55,000 dead, 303,000 wounded, $150 billion. With some of us it will never be forgotten because it was one of the most tragic, if not *the* most tragic, episodes in American history. It was unnecessary, uncalled for, it wasn't tied to our security or a vital interest. It was just a misadventure in a part of the world which we should have kept our nose out of.[1]

Today the desire to forget Vietnam seems to have given way to a desire to learn about it—specifically to learn how to avoid getting involved in such disastrous misadventures again. The last decade has witnessed not merely a resurgence of interest in America's Indochina experience as such but also in the possible parallels that can be drawn to it in Central America, the Middle East and elsewhere. Increasingly one hears appeals to the lessons of Indochina—generally if inaccurately referred to as the lessons of Vietnam—in support of or in opposition to current foreign policy initiatives around the world. Thus, Sen-

[1] Quoted in Michael Charlton and Anthony Moncrieff, *Many Reasons Why: The American Involvement in Vietnam*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1978, p. 67.

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ator Gary Hart, when he charged in the 1984 presidential primary campaign that former Vice President Mondale misunderstood the crisis in Central America, claimed that "At the heart of the difference is, perhaps, the lesson of Vietnam . . . Mr. Mondale . . . has not learned the lesson of Vietnam." In reply, Mondale said that "Hart has learned the wrong lesson from Vietnam."

There are certain undisputed practical lessons that can be drawn from the long history of American involvement in Indochina's affairs, but most of these are of an operational character—those relating to the techniques and technologies of warfare—and as such lie outside the realm of this article. We propose to direct our attention solely to the question of whether or not the Indochina experience can provide lessons about where and in what circumstances America ought to intervene militarily in foreign conflicts.

Can one draw lessons—in this broad policy sense—from history? Some professional historians say no, and even those who say yes caution that it must be done with the utmost care. Politicians often misuse historical analogies; policymakers frequently misinterpret history and see parallels to current situations in past situations that were fundamentally different. Yet history often does offer guidance: thus, British delegates to the Versailles Conference in 1919 profited from a study prepared for them of the peace negotiations at the Congress of Vienna a century earlier.

It also serves as a warning, for history affords insights neglected at one's peril. American isolationists in the 1920s and 1930s failed to perceive that the historical circumstance that had made American isolation possible—the invincibility of the British navies guarding our ocean frontiers—had come to an end in 1916–17 during the German submarine campaign. Had members of the isolationist America First Committee understood why this country could not stay out of the First World War, they would have understood why it should not and would not stay out of the second.

The future is unpredictable, and even history is uncertain and subject to revision by successive generations of historians. Yet to the extent that we now agree as to what should have been done at junctures in the past—as we are in general agreement that England and France ought not to have appeased Hitler at Munich, that the lesson of Munich is the need to oppose totalitarian dictators—history provides us with a

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common point of departure for public discourse about policy issues facing us today. It gives us an area of agreement about the past from which to build toward agreement about the present and future.

The underlying condition for using historical episodes as a unifying metaphor enabling us to better understand new situations is that a consensus about the past must exist. Otherwise, illuminating though the past may be for each individual in arriving at a private understanding of events, it does not help in persuading others so as to arrive at a common understanding.

There is no question about what the central lesson of Munich is, only about whether or not it applies in a given situation. With increasing frequency we are told what Vietnam ought to have taught us about ourselves, about our allies and adversaries, and about the proper means and ends of American foreign policy. The assumption seems to be that Americans share a common understanding of what happened in Indochina and what we ought or ought not to have done there. But is that assumption true?

II

A difficulty that arises at the very outset is that the answers depend on what actually happened, but accounts differ on just that. Did the American government really know, for example, what it was doing in Indochina? Did it have the knowledge and the accurate information that was needed in order to make the right decisions?

In 1983, the knowledgeable George E. Reedy, once press secretary to President Lyndon Johnson, blamed the ignorance of Americans, from the President on down, for the errors that were committed in Indochina. In 1983 too, Senator Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) drew a parallel between Indochina and Central America: "The painful truth is that many of our highest officials know as little about Central America in 1983 as we knew about Indochina in 1963." The lesson is that both government officials and private citizens should in future be better informed about world affairs. Good advice; a worthy New Year's resolution. But are we likely to carry it into effect? How many of us at this moment are studying the situation in Baluchistan or some other likely flashpoint of crisis?

In any event it is by no means universally conceded that we did not know what we were doing. Barbara Tuchman is among

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those who do not agree that we lacked the knowledge to make the right decisions in Indochina. In her much-discussed recent book, *The March of Folly*, she claims that "ignorance was not a factor in the American endeavor in Vietnam." Instead, she concludes that American policy in that country was a principal illustration of governmental folly. By folly, Mrs. Tuchman means irrationality: the pursuit of policies that run contrary to self-interest by people who knew they were doing so. She writes that in Vietnam, "All the conditions and reasons precluding a successful outcome were recognized or foreseen" by American officials who willfully refused to draw conclusions or to act upon the basis of what they knew.

Support for her premise that American officials were well-informed of the realities of Vietnam is offered by Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts in their 1979 book, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked*. They assert that, throughout the various administrations involved in the Vietnam conflict, "virtually all views and recommendations were considered and virtually all important decisions were made without illusions about the odds for success." *The Pentagon Papers* confirm that on the whole the American intelligence community supplied the government with accurate information, and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff took a more realistic view of American prospects than did the National Security Council and other civilian bodies. The lesson here would seem to be that the CIA and the Joint Chiefs should have a greater role in decision-making in the future, and civilian politicians less, but that is hardly an attractive idea for a democracy.

For Barbara Tuchman, then, the lesson of Vietnam is that in the future the American electorate ought to choose candidates for high office who have more courage and character. More good advice, but experience suggests that we are unlikely to follow it. It may be more than coincidence that the senators who had the courage to oppose the Vietnam War when it was still unpopular to do so—Wayne Morse, Ernest Gruening, George McGovern, Frank Church and, later, J. William Fulbright—were defeated for reelection, and none of them was elected to public office again. To be fair to Mrs. Tuchman, it should be said that the tone of her book suggests that she does not seriously expect the American electorate to heed her sermon.

Closely related to the dispute over whether ignorance was a key factor—either in general or at one particular level of

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government—is the argument over *how* America got involved so deeply in Vietnam. Some see it as having been a gradual process in which the U.S. government ended up somewhere it did not intend to go to when it began the process. Thus Representative Henry Gonzalez (D-Tex.), in the course of the congressional debate on El Salvador in March 1983, remarked that, "Those of us who remember the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution know just how big a seemingly innocuous commitment can become." Using the same illustration, during the War Powers debate in September of the same year, Congressman Gene Snyder (D-Ky.) claimed that it was no use trying to limit a grant of power to the President. "Obviously, even after he had the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in his pocket, it was not the President's *intention* to use it to expand the American presence in Vietnam." That is why, said Mr. Snyder, it was unwise to grant powers to President Reagan in the Middle East while trying to impose limits on them. "I contend that these limitations and restrictions are nothing more than good intentions—like the ones we heard from the administration in 1964—and we must recognize that a war in the Mideast can be just as hard on good intentions as a war in Southeast Asia was." The solution he urged was to refuse the President even the limited powers for which he asked in the Middle East.

Representative Gonzalez is clearly right in observing that small commitments can develop into large ones without anyone intending for them to do so. But is the Congress then going to stop entering into commitments altogether? Clearly it cannot. And those like Representative Snyder who believe the lesson of Vietnam to be that the President must be strictly limited in his power to intervene with armed forces abroad may have achieved less than they had hoped by passing the War Powers Act. Since that time, President Reagan has surely gone much further in involving the United States in, for example, Central America than an apprehensive Congress may have desired; the act seems not to have had all that much effect. There is, therefore, a real question as to whether such legislation can—as it is intended to do—prevent new Vietnams.

But was it really the case that the Vietnam involvement was unintentional, that the chief executive was carried along by the momentum of his own actions? Certainly there is persuasive testimony to support the theory that such is what happened. Theodore Sorenson, special counsel to President John F. Kennedy, wrote to *The New York Times* in August 1983 (in the

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context of the debate over El Salvador) that, "As J.F.K. learned in Vietnam, each incremental increase in American military advisers and assistance, every escalation about 'dominoes' or 'national interest,' makes it harder for us to reverse course." Harder, presumably, because the political costs of doing so may be higher than an administration is willing to pay.

There are those, however, who believe that is not what happened at all. Frances Fitzgerald, war correspondent and author of a Pulitzer Prize-winning book about the Vietnam War, believes that several successive governments of the United States intentionally and deliberately injected America into the Indochina conflict; and that far from being drawn into it, our government had to work hard to succeed in getting itself involved. Speaking to a conference on Vietnam in 1983, she said that "Vietnam was not a quagmire, in the sense that we stumbled into it and were sucked down and unable to get out despite our own efforts; though this is the textbook, and I think probably the cinematic, version of the war. In fact, the United States created the war."[2]

Certainly with respect to the 1950s, there is much evidence to indicate that under the guidance of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles the United States deliberately involved itself in the Indochina situation. What precautionary lesson follows then, or should follow, in order to prevent a future American administration from following a similar course? Apparently none; Frances Fitzgerald told her audience that if the current Administration attempted a new adventure of the Vietnam sort, "there's very little I or perhaps anyone else can do about it."

In the Vietnam matter, Daniel Ellsberg clearly was someone who believed there was something he could do about it. Ellsberg, who passed the secret *Pentagon Papers* to the Congress and the press, said that he did so because he had lost faith in the executive branch of the government.[3] A succession of American presidents over the course of 20 years, Ellsberg said, had been supplied with information and nonetheless had chosen to disregard it. Thus it was not the government as a whole that was to blame, but one branch of it.

For Daniel Ellsberg and those who share his views, the lesson

[2] Quoted in Harrison E. Salisbury (ed.), *Vietnam Reconsidered: Lessons from a War*, New York: Harper & Row, 1984, p. 52.

[3] Charlton and Moncrieff, p. 178.

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of Indochina is that when the executive branch of the government pursues a dangerous course of action, it can and should be halted by arousing the other branches of the government and the public; and this can be done effectively through the news media. But here again one runs up against an irreconcilable conflict over the facts: according to many of those directly in charge of prosecuting the war, it was the executive branch that was pursuing the right course of action, which the news media caused to miscarry.

By such actions as publishing the *Pentagon Papers*, the news media clearly did play a role in countering the policy of the executive branch of the government in the 1970s. Indeed, many supporters of the American involvement in Indochina blame the media for stopping the war just at the point, they claim, when America had got it won. General William Westmoreland, the commander of the troops there, is only one of those who claim that the war was won militarily, but was lost because the United States no longer was willing to stay the course. As a witness in Westmoreland's law suit against CBS, Lieutenant-General Daniel O. Graham, who directed the intelligence arm of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a decade ago, told the jury that in 1968 the enemy in Vietnam was "whipped"—and that the United States lost the war later only because of political decisions and the press. Public opinion polls show that a majority of the American public also believes that the war could have been won if we had had the willpower to continue with it.

General Westmoreland and his colleagues may be right when they say they lost the war on America's television screens. But if so, what have we learned from the experience? So long as the American public is free to read the news in newspapers, hear the news on the radio and—above all—watch the news on television, can the U.S. armed forces ever wage and win a war again? Ronald Reagan apparently does not think so: during the U.S. intervention in Grenada, press coverage was limited to the point of nonexistence. But except perhaps in the case of a lightning operation such as that in Grenada, there is no way that a free society can accept such controls on its flow of information.

General Westmoreland and his colleagues may have overlooked a more fundamental problem they faced in trying to persuade the American people to persevere with the war in 1967–68. It concerns what General Graham meant when he said that the enemy was "whipped." Opponents of the war did

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not believe that "whipping" the enemy was enough, so long as the enemy refused to submit or surrender. In their view, the American army in Vietnam in 1968 was in much the same position as Napoleon's army in Moscow in 1812: it had beaten the enemy in every battle, but knew no way to go forward to bring the war to an end. The news media brought home to the American people how little effective control over the population of Vietnam had been purchased by all of General Westmoreland's victories. The media cannot be blamed for pointing out the problem, and if General Westmoreland knew the answer to it, perhaps he should have revealed it to the public.

President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger did believe that they knew the answer to the problem during their terms in office. They continue to believe that they succeeded in negotiating a satisfactory end to the war. In their view, it was the legislative rather than the executive branch of the government that was to blame for the Indochina disaster. In this respect, the role of the Congress in the final collapse of the American endeavor in Southeast Asia has recently come under strong fire. In his 1983 *Wall Street Journal* article, Nixon wrote that, "Between 1973 and 1975, Congress cut the arms budget for South Vietnam by 76 percent. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, doubled its shipment of arms to North Vietnam. It is not surprising that in 1975 the North Vietnamese . . . rolled into Saigon." Ellsworth Bunker, who was U.S. ambassador to Saigon then, said much the same thing a year later in an interview with *The New York Times*: by the end of 1972, "we had achieved our objective, made it possible for the South Vietnamese to defend themselves." But, when "Congress decided not to put up any more money," South Vietnam's defeat became "inevitable." And President Reagan has left little doubt as to what lesson he draws from this: "In this 'post-Vietnam' era, Congress hasn't yet developed capacities for coherent, responsible action needed to carry out the new foreign policy powers it has taken for itself."

It is, however, very much the president's job not merely to rally but also to sustain the Congress and the people behind his policies—and not to engage the United States in a war unless he can do so. If the Congress and the nation fail to back him, it might be his fault, not theirs.

Recently Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger took this observation—that the president cannot successfully pursue a war through to final victory if the Congress and the people

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oppose his policy—as a point of departure in outlining the lessons we should apply in the future. In a speech on November 28, 1984, he listed "six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad." Elements to be identified by these tests were: vital to our national interest, "the clear intention of winning," well-defined political and military interests, a continual willingness to reassess the "size, composition and disposition" of the forces involved, the recognition that the use of U.S. troops was a "last resort"—and then a point that hearkened back specifically to the Vietnam experience:

> Before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win but just to be there.

In a speech delivered 11 days later Secretary of State George Shultz made the evident rejoinder: "There is no such thing as guaranteed public support in advance." As pictured by Secretary Shultz, the role of the administration is to lead rather than to follow the country. The burden of statesmanship, as he termed it, was the President's responsibility for deciding when and where to use American troops abroad.

It appears, then, that whether one blames the executive for the failure in Indochina, or whether, like President Nixon, one blames the legislature, the only lesson that emerges is that the president or the Congress, or perhaps both, should use better judgment next time. That certainly is true, but as a guideline it is no help at all.

III

Where did the U.S. government go wrong? In sending American troops to fight in a foreign war, did it support the wrong government? Did it understand who our allies and adversaries really were?

At the outset, one again encounters the disagreement about whether President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger succeeded in negotiating a satisfactory solution to the Indochina conflict. On the conviction they had done so, Mr. Nixon recently wrote that, "As U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick points out, the

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most generous excuse for those who cut aid to South Vietnam . . . was that they didn't know what would happen. But now there can be no excuses."

His reference was to Ambassador Kirkpatrick's statement that the lesson we learned in Indochina—and that will keep us from making the same mistake again—concerns the nature of the enemy. In May 1983 she wrote that, "we didn't know who the Viet Cong were," but we "know now." She went on to state that, "Western public opinion was manipulated into believing that the National Liberation Front . . . was a spontaneous product of 'deeper social causes'," but that we now know that the Viet Cong were sent into the South by North Vietnam, and that the regimes they have established in Indochina are brutal, savage dictatorships. "The crucial difference between Vietnam and Central America," she wrote, "is that the Congress that cut off aid to Vietnam could say that it did not guess what would follow."[4]

Insofar as Mr. Nixon and Ambassador Kirkpatrick are distinguishing the moral difference between the Indochina regimes the United States backed and those backed by our adversaries, they are undoubtedly correct. This was particularly true in Kampuchea; corrupt and ineffective though the Lon Nol regime we supported may have been, it was angelic by comparison with the genocidal Pol Pot regime that replaced it. But the point with which Mr. Nixon and Mrs. Kirkpatrick fail to come to grips is that we are faced with not only a moral issue but also a practical one. Much as we might like to do so, it is not always feasible for us to prevent evil regimes from taking power. Nor is it always in our power to dictate what regimes foreign countries will adopt. Many longtime opponents of the war have always considered the communist enemy to be brutal and totalitarian, but continue to believe that it was not in the interest of the United States to send an army to Asia to fight it, since Vietnam itself was of only marginal strategic importance to this country. Such opponents of the war consider many regimes in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe—including those of the Soviet Union and its satellite, Poland—to be brutal and totalitarian, and in some cases bloodthirsty, yet do not propose to send American armies to all of those places to put the world to rights.

From a very different perspective, former Secretary of State

[4] *The Washington Post*, April 17, 1983, p. D8.

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Alexander Haig, like Mrs. Kirkpatrick and Mr. Nixon, takes the view that our undoing in Vietnam was in misunderstanding the nature of the enemy. The primary adversary, he believes, was Moscow, and that is where we should have gone from the very start. "If in the beginning we had been willing to go to the Soviet Union and demand an end to the aggression of Hanoi, and if Moscow had believed in our determination, there might very well have been no war," he writes in *Caveat*, his memoirs.

Yet President Lyndon Johnson, one of the most persuasive arm-twisters in the history of American politics, tried—and failed—to persuade the Soviet leaders to call off the war. Granted, this was not at the very beginning of the conflict; but there is strong evidence tending to show that Moscow did not restrain Hanoi because it could not. Early in 1965, for example, Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin tried to persuade the North Vietnamese leaders to explore a compromise solution—but was unable to do so.

Certainly the Nixon Administration, in which Haig served, consistently put pressure on the U.S.S.R. to use its presumed influence with the North Vietnamese to coerce the latter into accepting a negotiated settlement. This was especially true in the crucial year of 1972, as Henry Kissinger relates in his own memoirs. When North Vietnam launched a series of powerful assaults in early April, Kissinger responded "by moving in the direction Nixon favored, to the extent of holding Moscow responsible for Hanoi's offensive." For months thereafter, Kissinger and Nixon played an elaborate game of linkage, sometimes condemning Moscow, sometimes coaxing, and sometimes saying that the military actions of the North jeopardized "the larger interests," that is, détente, a summit and an arms control agreement. Again, there is little evidence to suggest that the Russians either took these statements lightly or failed to apply what pressure they could on Hanoi—while there is much to suggest that the North Vietnamese simply would not be pressured.

A very different picture—the mirror opposite of what General Haig and his former superiors imagine the nature of the enemy to have been—emerges from a reading of the *Pentagon Papers*. In this picture, the Viet Cong forces were an independent entity until 1959, when North Vietnamese forces infiltrated the South with the objective of bringing the Viet Cong under their control. Thereafter North Vietnam made the decisions,

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and played off its Russian and Chinese sponsors against one another so as to retain its independence. As rivals for leadership of world communism, neither the Soviet Union nor China could afford to appear less ardent than the other in supporting Hanoi. Had Moscow and Beijing been able to act in unison, they might have been able to force Hanoi to do their bidding; but since Hanoi had gained freedom of action by playing off one against the other, it was Hanoi alone that was free to stop the fighting. General Haig said we were wrong not to go to Moscow for a decision; it now appears that perhaps we were wrong not to go directly to Hanoi.

For many Americans on both sides of the political fence, however, the cardinal mistake made by the United States concerned not our assessment of our enemies, but of our allies, and specifically the nature of the various Indochinese regimes that the Congress and the American people were asked to support throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. One set of such criticisms is based on the belief that—in Saigon and elsewhere—our government locked us into opposition to the forces of change and thus allowed those forces to be captured by communism. Comparing Indochina to Central America, Robert E. White, a former ambassador to El Salvador, told a conference on Vietnam in 1983: "The basic lesson we should have learned in Vietnam" is not to "put our policy in pawn to a hard-line military that cannot afford to compromise."[5] Mr. White warned of the danger of distorting Third World realities by viewing them in an East-West context. He was sure that the forces the United States opposed in Central America were authentically and indigenously revolutionary, while the forces we supported no longer represented the region's realities—if indeed they ever did.

General Westmoreland, on the other hand, believes that the government we initially supported in Vietnam was authentically indigenous. In his opinion we were right to support it and wrong to turn against it. In the General's words, "Our country made a grievous mistake . . . in getting involved, not only in encouraging the South Vietnamese to overthrow Diem, but participating in that effort. And I think morally that pretty well locked us into Vietnam, because there was no leadership standing in the wing to take over."[6] Thus the war was Ameri-

[5] Salisbury, p. 309.
[6] Charlton and Moncrieff, p. 135.

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canized, and the Saigon government lost its indigenous roots and appeal.

Yet the late Henry Cabot Lodge, then the United States ambassador to South Vietnam, advised Washington that the war could not be won if Diem and his family remained in power. The debate still continues as to whether or not Lodge was right; but if he was, we were at least as likely to be defeated with Diem as without him. Yet it was not only the Diem government that many U.S. critics believed was impossible to sustain. Those that followed—particularly the governments of Generals Nguyen Cao Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu—also drew condemnation from American critics of the war for being corrupt, inefficient and incompetent.

This is a controversy that was renewed in the context of Central America when Representative Clarence D. Long (D-Md.), then chairman of the relevant congressional committee, attacked appropriations for current El Salvador policy in early 1983. He did so by appealing to the experience of Indochina. He said, "The similarity of Vietnam is so close it is almost uncanny. There is the unwillingness of people to fight, incompetent, corrupt leadership, and calling everyone a Communist." Two months later, supporting the very policy Mr. Long had attacked, former President Nixon wrote in *The Wall Street Journal* that, "There are chilling parallels between what is happening in El Salvador and what happened in Vietnam." One of the parallels, he wrote, was that misguided congressional critics were trying to cut off aid on the grounds that "the government is corrupt, repressive and inefficient."

Many of us would agree with Mr. Nixon that the regimes America supported in Indochina were less bad than the regimes America opposed; as a moral matter we were right to choose the lesser of two evils. But there is a practical side to the issue too, and it can be expressed simply by saying that we want to win. What was wrong in backing a weak, corrupt, inefficient regime against a brutally powerful, fanatically puritanical, ruthlessly efficient adversary was that our side was likely to lose.

It is fundamental that when we intervene abroad we should do so on behalf of a cause powerful enough so that we stand a chance of winning. If we are among those who believe that *none* of the Saigon regimes were either strong or popular enough to stand alone without massive U.S. assistance, then the only lesson would seem to be that there are regions of the world in which local communist forces cannot be countered or

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contained. But if one believes it is vital to American interests to prevent such areas from succumbing to communism, then one emerges, not with a lesson, but with an apparently hopeless dilemma.

An attractive theory that points a way out of this dilemma emerges if we redefine the problem that faced us in Indochina. In 1961 John Kenneth Galbraith, then ambassador to India, advised President Kennedy against becoming involved in Vietnam militarily but suggested that if we restricted our efforts to economic and social programs we could still strengthen the Diem government. A similar point was made in the context of Central America by Senator Gary Hart when he declared in a campaign speech that "the commitment of U.S. military force to Central America cannot be the answer to the problems in Central America, as it was not the answer in Vietnam."

The perception that military victory in Indochina was an illusory goal to pursue recurs frequently in the comments of participants and observers. They appear to overlook the need for a considerable period of time to elapse before an economic and social program can bear fruit. It can take years—even decades; in Vietnam in the 1960s, there simply was not that much time available. Once the threat became immediate and military, it is hard to see how that threat could have been blunted by other than military means.

If the threat in Vietnam was, in fact, posed by the North Vietnamese army and its Viet Cong ally, then how could economic and social aid to South Vietnam have averted that threat? Senator Hart did not claim that it would have done so. His point was that, in Central America as in Vietnam, the threat "is not Communism, but poverty." Central America aside, why was poverty in Vietnam a threat to the national security interests of the United States? World poverty in general poses a long-term threat to our interests as well as a constant challenge to our conscience, but how did the poverty of Indochina in particular, and only during the late 1950s and the 1960s, threaten America?

At the time, Indochina was of interest to American leaders only as a battlefield on which to defeat communist aggression. This may have been a mistaken objective, but if it *was* the objective, then the poverty of South Vietnam becomes germane only if it contributed significantly to the conquest of that country by North Vietnam. It then becomes relevant to point out that North Vietnam was poor too, but won the war none-

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theless. The vast amounts of money brought into South Vietnam by the American armed forces seem if anything to have demoralized the country, and to have destroyed the equilibrium of its society rather than to have strengthened it.

Far from ignoring the economic aspect of the conflict in Indochina, President Lyndon Johnson strongly believed that it provided the key to its resolution. In his vision, outlined in a speech at Johns Hopkins University in April of 1965, a Mekong River development plan, modeled on the Tennessee Valley Authority and made possible by his pledge of a billion dollars, would bring prosperity to all of Southeast Asia. This was his inducement to the other side to enter into a compromise peace, but it was not accepted. It was not relevant to the real goals and motivations of the North Vietnamese leaders who, far from giving priority to the quest for prosperity, were prepared to suffer and to impose suffering on their people in order to attain their objectives.

The value of Senator Hart's remarks about the inappropriateness of military means may lie in their negative aspect. In situations like Vietnam, it may be that we ought not to intervene militarily, not because economic and social intervention would prove more effective, but because nothing—short of unrestricted warfare—would work. If, despite all the aid the United States gives, our local ally cannot cope on its own with the local communists, then ours may be a lost cause in that country. In this connection, it is noteworthy that (excluding Afghanistan, which is on the Russian border) the Soviet Union has succeeded in expanding the ambit of its influence without sending its own armies into the Third World to do the fighting for its local allies.

Yet even this precept of policy founders on the example of Korea, where American military intervention did succeed in preserving the independence of South Korea. General Matthew B. Ridgeway, supreme commander of the U.N. forces in Korea and a long-time opponent of American involvement in Vietnam, used to point out that one salient difference was that in South Korea we were defending a government that was rooted in a strong political base in the country and that in South Vietnam we were not. Military means can accomplish only military ends; and while the armed forces of the United States can help to defend a politically healthy ally against an enemy military attack, they cannot supply that ally with political health, should it be lacking. But what about the tiny island of

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Grenada? American policy seems to have succeeded there despite the absence of a local leader whom we could support at the time of our invasion.

If close examination of both our adversaries and our local allies provides us with no useful lesson of the Indochina experience, then we are left only with the question of why we intervened in Vietnam in the first place. Indeed, the questions of why and how—of ends and means—continue to be among the most divisive issues to emerge from the war. As we have seen, there are those who believe the Indochina war in fact was won or could have been won had we persevered or had we fought the war in some other way; there are those who believe that non-military means should have been used; finally, there are those who believe that the cause was hopeless from the outset or became hopeless somewhere along the way. Surprisingly—for it is some three decades since Secretary of State Dulles moved America into France's vacated place in Indochina—there is still fierce disagreement as to why the United States felt compelled to establish a presence there at all.

IV

Why then did we intervene in Indochina?

For no evident reason, according to many. Roughly a decade ago a poll was taken of U.S. army generals that showed 70 percent of them believed that it was not clear what America had hoped to achieve in the Indochina war. The lesson, according to 91 percent of them, was that if the United States ever were to fight such a war again, it should begin by deciding what it wanted to accomplish. In fact, the United States did pursue defined objectives in Indochina; the trouble was that it kept changing its mind as to what they were. From first to last there was consistent agreement only about what our objective was not: we were not fighting to make South Vietnam into an American colony. Unfortunately, that is exactly what a great many people thought that we were doing.

John Foster Dulles was a strong opponent of British and French colonialism, which he viewed with considerable contempt, but he initiated an American policy in Indochina that was widely viewed as colonialist too. Indeed, some opponents of American policy believe that colonialism was the fatal flaw in that policy. Their view is that the Saigon regime could not draw upon ardor and devotion even from its own troops and supporters—so as to match the other side's—because the peo-

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ple of Vietnam believed the rulers of Saigon were America's representatives rather than their own.

By the middle of the 1960s, it began to appear to leaders of the Johnson Administration that we were fighting a war to impose a regime that even we found unsatisfactory upon a country of no clear importance to us. It then began to appear less evident why we were doing so.

On May 19, 1967, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara drafted a memorandum redefining the goals worth fighting for in Vietnam. Since in his expressed view the goal of containing Chinese expansionism already had been attained, he no longer believed it vital that South Vietnam should remain independent or that it should remain non-communist. The only American goal left, he claimed, was to stop the application of force by North Vietnam such that "the people of the South" were denied "the ability to determine their own future." He admitted that "the line is hard to draw" as to the form and extent of North Vietnamese influence that we should deem acceptable. But surely in the conditions of 1967 in Vietnam it was illusory to believe that the great mass of the long-suffering illiterate peasantry, with no traditions of democracy, could express a free choice or would be allowed by their own government or any other to do so. It is difficult to read Secretary McNamara's memorandum without coming to believe that he thought there was no longer any compelling reason to go on fighting; at the end of 1984, breaking his long silence about Indochina policy, he confirmed that this was so.

When Clark Clifford replaced Mr. McNamara as secretary of defense, one of the questions he supposedly forced his associates to face was what purpose would be served by sending the reinforcements General Westmoreland requested in the wake of the Tet offensive. At that time—in the late winter of 1968—General Westmoreland still sought military victory; that, as Clark Clifford saw it, would result in an American-occupied Vietnam, something that we did not desire. What, then, *did* we desire? What vital national interest were we fighting in Vietnam to protect?

James Thomson, who served in the crucial years 1964–65 as an aide to the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs and as a staff member of the National Security Council, claims that while government officials frequently asserted that the preservation of Southeast Asia was a vital American national

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interest, they never thought matters through to examine whether and why that assertion was true.[7]

Is it the case that we should intervene abroad militarily only in areas vital to our national interests? Arguably, but not necessarily; Indochina does not prove the case one way or another. It does not shed any light on the question of whether or not to intervene in situations the United States can dominate easily—in Grenada, to take an obvious example, or, in 1965, in the Dominican Republic. Vietnam only raised the question of whether the American people are prepared to take on a major fight—to undergo suffering, sacrifices and casualties—if vital national interests are not at stake. And that question was raised because leading architects of America's Vietnam policy believed that we should intervene even if *national* interests were not at stake.

Indeed, the American decision to intervene in Indochina was predicated on the view that the United States has a duty to look beyond its purely national interests. In this view, the United States has assumed global responsibilities that require it to serve the interests of mankind. That vision of America's destiny was particularly manifest during the Kennedy Administration, when British and other foreign observers remarked with admiration that while in London, Paris and other capital cities, officials concerned themselves only with the parochial interests of their own countries, in Washington statesmen addressed the needs and aspirations of the human race. The decision to intervene against perceived communist aggression in Indochina was made in Washington in the name of the whole non-communist world's need for international security and world order.

The concept of international relations upon which that decision was based derived from the failure of the League of Nations—decades before—to carry into practice its theory of collective security against aggression. By the tenets of that theory, an aggressor would back down in the face of a league united against it, and a potential aggressor would be deterred from invading its neighbor by the certainty that such a league would confront it. In the 1930s the members of the League failed to stand together in the face of one aggressive challenge after another from Mussolini and Hitler. Countries allowed themselves to be picked off one at a time. The lesson of the

[7] Salisbury, p. 15.

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1930s, which political leaders carried with them into office in the 1950s and 1960s, was that the democracies ought to make a united stand against totalitarian aggression wherever and whenever it might occur.

As former Secretary of State Dean Rusk remarked in a recent interview, "I was part of a generation that had been given heavy responsibility during and after World War II. During the 1930s we had been led down the path to a war that could have been prevented. We came out of World War II thinking that the key to preventing World War III was collective security."[8]

A parallel lesson of Munich was that certain political regimes—Nazi Germany being the prime example—are so constituted that it is a mistake to try to conciliate them. Their voracious appetite for conquest cannot be appeased; the more that is conceded to them, the more they are encouraged to demand.

This fit well with the theory of how to deal with Soviet conduct propounded by George Kennan, writing as "Mr. X," in his famous *Foreign Affairs* article which outlined the strategy of containment. William Bundy, deputy assistant and assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs (1961–64) and assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs (1964–69), said in an interview a few years ago that in the early 1960s, "the theory of containment was still the dominant way of thinking." He said that in Indochina "it was essentially what we were doing. We were seeking to prevent the Chinese version of communism from expanding into the area of East Asia."[9]

In its military version (which Ambassador Kennan often has disavowed) containment came to be a misapplication of the lesson of Munich—a lesson to which American leaders often appealed. In the 1930s, up to the time of Munich, Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy still were too weak to fight a war against the Allies; they were bluffing and would probably have backed down if their bluff had been called. But in the 1960s, the Soviet Union and China, though divided, were formidable powers. It was by no means certain that either would have backed down if confronted by an American expeditionary force, or that they would have been defeated if

[8] *The Wall Street Journal*, January 14, 1985, p. 1.
[9] Charlton and Moncrieff, p. 67.

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opposed. There were no powerful allies at our side whose strength, united to ours, necessarily would have intimidated or overwhelmed our adversaries. In these circumstances, for the United States unilaterally to send its armies into combat against communist aggression whenever and wherever it occurs was not collective and did not provide security.

It was on just such grounds that Walter Lippmann, in his book *The Cold War*, originally attacked Kennan's theory of containment. Lippmann's thesis was that the United States should select, in the light of its own interests and capabilities, the regions of the world in which it would engage itself. It should not extend itself by trying to act everywhere, and it should not allow its adversaries to dictate the time and place of confrontation.

There are those who believe that the United States *did* select Vietnam as Lippmann would have wished—as a region in which our interests were vital or as a battlefield particularly favorable to our side. If so, then those in our government who selected Vietnam on this basis were considerably wide of the mark in their judgment. Most policymakers, however, did not see us as choosing Vietnam but saw Vietnam as choosing us—we were drawn in because of communist aggression.

While opponents of the Vietnam War often assume that its outcome proved to the public that Lippmann was right—when the heaviness of the price was brought home to the American people, they refused to go on paying it because they did not deem Indochina *vitally* important—that view is still contested. Senator Robert Kasten (R-Wisc.), stressing the analogy between El Salvador and Vietnam in the spring of 1983, said:

> The Vietnam analogy is certainly popular with opponents of the administration. 'No more Vietnams' is their battle cry. By this, they mean that the United States should remain inactive in the face of blatant acts of aggression by the Soviet Union or its Cuban and Nicaraguan surrogates. But what must be remembered is that in reality Vietnam represents a successful case of Soviet aggression and the imposition of a brutal tyranny over the people of Vietnam and Kampuchea. I agree that there should be 'no more Vietnams' and that the United States must do what is necessary to prevent a repetition of that horror.[10]

What Vietnam proved, in this view, is that the consequences of communist aggression are so terrible for the people who fall

[10] Congressional Record, 98th Congress, 1st session, April 27, 1983, p. H7587.

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under communist rule as a result of it, that the United States always and everywhere must act to prevent blatant acts of aggression by the Soviet Union and its surrogates.

This view rests on the premise that we have a *moral* duty to act. The troubling aspect is that moral judgments are not always universally shared. They often are subjective matters of conscience. There are many who view it as immoral for one country, if unprovoked, to intervene in the affairs of another. There were many who judged America's Indochina war to be morally wrong. It is feasible for the United States to pursue a policy grounded in morality only if the moral issues in question are ones upon which Americans are agreed. The doctrine of global military containment—to the extent that it rests upon a moral duty—is vulnerable precisely because the moral values at issue are matters of dispute.

Closely allied with the theory of global containment is the so-called domino theory, according to which Southeast Asia was a region such that if one country fell to communism, the effect would be to knock down the countries around so that they would fall to communism too. C. L. Sulzberger of *The New York Times* employed a different metaphor and pictured America's Asian and Pacific allies as being caught in a giant nutcracker between Red China and radical Indonesia. Lyndon Johnson frequently told visitors to the White House that if we did not take our stand in Vietnam, one day we would have to make our stand in Hawaii. Opponents of the Vietnam War have assumed that this theory too—indeed, this theory above all—was fatally discredited by the results of the war. It is a decade since the war came to an end, and communist landing craft still have not been sighted off Honolulu.

Some of those most involved in sending American troops to Vietnam, however, argue that this is precisely because America won its anti-domino, anti-nutcracker victory two decades ago. Up until 1965, leaders of the domino countries—Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and even India—are said to have privately told the American government that it was vital for the United States to stay the course in Vietnam so as to save them from being crushed between China and Indonesia. In 1965–66 the arms of the nutcracker fell off: a new anti-communist government took power in Indonesia and destroyed the communist party in that country, while China withdrew from world affairs and concentrated her energies on the convulsions of the Cultural Revolution. In his 1967 mem-

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orandum, Secretary of Defense McNamara stated that, "To the extent that our original intervention and our existing actions in Vietnam were motivated by the perceived need to draw the line against Chinese expansionism in Asia, our objective has already been attained." His successor, Clark Clifford, toured Asia and found that the domino leaders were no longer vitally concerned about Vietnam, and he asked, "Was it possible that we were continuing to be guided by judgments that might once have had validity but were now obsolete?"

More recently, McGeorge Bundy, national security adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, has summarized the history of these events by stating that, while Vietnam may have seemed "vital" until 1965, "at least from the time of the anti-Communist revolution in Indonesia, late in 1965, that adjective was excessive, and so also was our effort."[11] In this view, then, President Johnson's major military commitment to the Vietnam conflict was undertaken in the very year that it began to be unnecessary.

What, then, should the President have done? Having learned in 1966 that the enlarged war to which he had just committed the United States suddenly had become unnecessary, should he have recalled the American armies and brought them home? Would that not have inflicted a damaging blow to American prestige? Would it not have destroyed the world's belief in American reliability and steadiness? It is an axiom of statecraft that a great power trapped in a difficult or ultimately untenable position ought to persevere as long as possible in order to preserve the credibility of its other international commitments. That was the position adopted by the Johnson Administration and also by the incoming Nixon Administration in 1969.

Henry Kissinger writes in his memoirs,

> For nearly a generation the security and progress of free peoples had depended on confidence in America. We could not simply walk away from an enterprise involving two administrations, five allied countries, and thirty-one thousand dead as if we were switching a television channel. . . . As the leader of democratic alliances we had to remember that scores of countries and millions of people relied for their security on our willingness to stand by allies. . . . We could not revitalize the Atlantic Alliance. . . . We would not be able to move the Soviet Union toward the imperative of mutual restraint. . . . We might not achieve our opening to China. . . .

And, Mr. Kissinger added, we might not have succeeded in

[11] Salisbury, p. 52.

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our Middle East diplomacy if world confidence in America's willingness to honor all of its international engagements were to be weakened or lost.

It is a strong case that Mr. Kissinger makes, but it is not a conclusive one. Was not confidence in American leadership deeply shaken by the spectacle of our persevering in the Vietnam War long after even the most pro-American foreigners agreed that the war was unpopular, unnecessary and unwinnable? Does it increase confidence in the intelligence of our strategists if, when we perceive a trap starting to close around us, we manfully refuse to withdraw from it? Were 31,000 deaths made more meaningful by incurring 27,000 more?

In reflecting upon recent events in Lebanon, President Johnson's undersecretary of state, George Ball, wrote in *The Washington Post* in the autumn of 1983:

> Our Vietnam experience also showed another reason for prudence: as a great power, we should avoid putting our troops in an untenable position, since we would then have to pay a political price to extricate them. Yet, as we learned to our sorrow in Vietnam, we should never let the prospect of that cost prevent us from closing out a hopeless situation. . . . Prestige, after all, is an elusive and evanescent abstraction that consists of many elements; other nations and peoples will respect us more if we demonstrate prudence, good sense and realism than if we appear abstract and foolhardy.

Looking back a decade later, the American defeat in Vietnam seems not to have destroyed the world's confidence in the willingness of the United States to honor international commitments. This may be *because* the Nixon Administration persevered in the war for five more years (as Henry Kissinger believes) or *despite* the fact that it did—which is what the authors of this article believe.

V

In every respect the Indochina war was a profound experience, not only for the men and women who fought there but for all of us who lived through it. It was also an intensely personal, subjective experience. Not only are there diverse political and historical visions of what happened, but there are also diverse moral conclusions that persist.

President Reagan may have been right when he said, at the dedication of the Vietnam War Memorial in 1982, that the nation should "debate the lessons at some other time." But his use of force to back up his own foreign policy initiatives—the

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dispatch of marines to Lebanon, the widescale troop maneuvers in the Caribbean and Honduras, the invasion of Grenada, the sending of military advisers to the government of El Salvador—makes it all the more likely that the American people will not hold off from the debate. Indeed, if the foreign policy of the second Reagan Administration proves to be as assertive militarily as that of the first, the likelihood is that the debate over Vietnam will be renewed often and angrily in the years to come.

The passage of time has not helped, as yet, to resolve the debate over Vietnam. Richard Nixon still believes that the war was won, while seminars and symposia assemble to inquire why it was lost. In late 1984 Robert McNamara testified in a New York courtroom that he had disagreed with other Johnson Administration officials and with General Westmoreland about such basic questions as whether the war could be won. He indicated that in the intervening period neither he nor they had budged from their views. He did not believe that one could establish objectively which side was right. In describing his disagreement with his colleagues, he noted that "I say this without saying I was right and they were wrong."

The common theme running through most of the retrospective judgments about Indochina is the assumption that, once the lesson of Vietnam is pointed out, readers or listeners will see it for themselves. That basic assumption proves to be an illusion. The truth about Indochina is not self-evident; we all have our own views, but they are evident only to ourselves. The authors of this article also hold strong views about the Vietnam War, but no longer believe they can prove they are right to someone who holds contrary views. It is not because of any doubt as to the truth of the matter; it is for lack of objective evidence that cannot be controverted by the other side.

This leads to the conclusion that the Indochina experience is, at best, of limited use to the United States in building a contemporary consensus on the central issue—whether or not to intervene abroad with military force. The decision to send troops abroad is perhaps the most momentous decision a government can be called upon to make; whatever other value the Indochina experience may hold for us, it does not provide us with a point of departure for common discourse about how to face that challenge.

That robs us of something that could have been of great

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value. The Munich Pact was a disaster, but at least the Western world recognized it as such and learned that it would be a mistake to commit the same error again. The lesson of Munich can be misapplied—but the point is that it can also be *applied*. The lesson of Vietnam, if there is one, cannot be applied because we still do not agree about what happened. Far from helping to clarify policy issues in Central America or the Middle East, appeals to the lessons of Vietnam merely compound a conflict about current policy with an argument about history. Reference to Vietnam, therefore, is at this point divisive rather than unifying.

The Indochina war was surely the most tragic episode in the history of the United States in this century. If we could all look at that terrible experience through the same pair of eyes, it could teach us much. But we cannot, so it cannot. That may be the final tragedy of the Vietnam war.

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John Wheeler

COMING TO GRIPS WITH VIETNAM

The events of the Vietnam era significantly defined the generation that came of age during that period and is now emerging as a mature force in American life. How our country finally comes to grips with Vietnam will depend on how the Vietnam generation comes to grips with its own experiences. The results will determine for decades how well America faces up to questions of war and peace, and of international relief, development and cooperation.

Vietnam was both a war abroad and an interconnected series of traumatic changes at home. There was the heady idealism of civil rights "freedom rides," the Peace Corps and the Green Berets. But there were also the war, then war protest; assassinations; civil strife; ascendancy of the women's rights and the environmental movements; and the disillusion of Watergate—a debacle rooted in the attempts of White House "plumbers" to stop leaks of Vietnam-related information. These events marked the arrival at maturity of most of the "baby boomers": 60 million men and women whose parents grew up in the Depression and bore the brunt of American fighting in World War II. There is a certain tension between the two generations, in the contrast between World War II and the Vietnam War, between the two anniversaries of 1985—the fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II and the tenth anniversary of the fall of Saigon.

The turbulence of war and its domestic repercussions tend to govern the later life of the generation that comes of age during the conflict. In Europe, World War I and the caustic effects of Versailles profoundly influenced the attitudes of the generation that was young at the turn of the century and fought that war. The loss of life and bleak experiences in the trenches of Flanders and Verdun affected both the literature

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and the emerging statesmen of the generation who would become leaders in World War II. Not the least significant result was the strain of pacifism that drove Britain's appeasement of Hitler. And, on the German side, the ruthless nationalism of Hitler—a World War I veteran—and his Nazi apparatus had its roots in the perceived unfairness of the burden of reparations and the war guilt assigned at Versailles. More recently, we have seen the effect of the attitudes and policies of an aging Soviet leadership, a generation seared by the struggle on its own soil during World War II.

In our own American experience, the archetype is the Civil War, and the decades when Northern veterans dominated American politics. In fact, Americans often compare the domestic divisions and strife of the Vietnam era to those of the Civil War. During the years of construction of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., speakers on Memorial and Veterans Day referred to the Civil War and, specifically, to President Lincoln's call in his second inaugural address "to bind up the nation's wounds." That we built the new memorial with one of the v-shaped walls pointing to the Lincoln Memorial and the other to the Washington Monument is symbolic of the parallels we have drawn.

The experience of Vietnam suffuses American life. It is in the minds of our foreign policy makers as they attempt to draw up standards for engaging in combat and to gauge the public stomach for battle deaths. It is shibboleth, memory and curse. Americans have a hunger to remember and to try to understand the events of that era, and this hunger is great among my contemporaries, those who were young in the 1960s.

For old hands as well as for newcomers, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial can be a worthy place to begin their examination of how Vietnam shapes America. After the dedication in 1982, it was visited by a preponderance of veterans and their families. Since then I have noticed an increasing number of others in my age group—women, as well as men who did not wear the uniform—and other Americans and foreigners of all ages. The faces and actions of its visitors offer a glimpse of the power of the memory of Vietnam in the living American heart. It is one of the three most visited sites in the capital, often frequented by 10,000 or more people in a day. On Inauguration Day in 1985, in zero-degree weather, the flow was unabated.

Out-of-town business travelers stop by on their way to or

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from the airport. Visitors fall silent as they draw near. Names are found in the granite. Hands reach out to touch those names. Tears are shed, and small offerings of flowers lean against the black walls. The monument has become a sign of powerful psychological dynamics and personal feelings that do not ordinarily surface in public—though they are often articulated in private. Placing them in the open is a necessary step, both for public understanding and for assuring that these attitudes are seen in proper proportion, as just one aspect of the social currents that influence policymaking.

II

If the Vietnam War is taken as extending from 1959 to 1975 (the official dates of the first and last American casualties), 30 million women and 30 million men reached draft age during the war; ten million of the men wore the uniform, three million of them went to Vietnam. About 300,000 were wounded and nearly 60,000 died. The key question is how the 60 million of us matured, how we were transformed and divided by our journey to adulthood.

An awareness of these Americans as a discrete generation permeates politics and society. In the 1984 presidential campaign, pollsters and columnists found themselves discussing the 30-44 year-old bracket as a separate group—different both from their elders and from the newer voters in the 18-29 year-old bracket. The difference could be clearly seen when the leadership and support of this 30-44 year-old group boosted Gary Hart's campaign for the Democratic nomination. In the councils of both political parties, the dynamics of the Vietnam generation—their passions, their ideals and the effects of passage through the events of the 1960s—have become a focus of analysis. But this focus must also be turned on the generation's role and responsibilities in national life during the decades ahead.

In sheer numbers, as well as in their shared experiences and attitudes, the men and women of the Vietnam generation will be a major force in American life in the next three decades. Most have now reached professional maturity, and their active political life will extend into the 2020s. They will be a large and perhaps decisive segment of voters in the next ten presidential elections. Most of those presidents will probably come from their ranks, just as all of our presidents since Truman were veterans of World War II.

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Nonetheless, we have, almost all of us, been more comfortable avoiding discussion of how the events of the Vietnam era now affect us. This silence has been one of the most important and unidentified choices we have made in the last two decades—and an understandable one, given the fierce anger of the Vietnam era. It is a sign of how deep the trauma runs, and its force, especially in the 1970s, is hard to overstate. Almost as a cultural imperative of some sort, the word "Vietnam," like the word "cancer," could be uttered only with great circumspection. Just recently, a successful businessman who had been a marine officer in Vietnam wrote me that "when I came 'home' [1966] it wasn't okay to talk about your experiences, and a lot of us, myself included, just went underground."

As a soldier at Harvard with orders to Vietnam in my pocket, I found that no one discussed the war with me. After my return, I was one of two Vietnam veterans at Yale Law School; Jack Fuller, now editorial page editor of *The Chicago Tribune*, was the other. The taboo was so strong that even in that intimate school we never discovered each other and our common bond—a sharp contrast to the experience of World War II veterans on the same campus three decades earlier. We became acquainted only years later, as we each began to write about Vietnam.

This social contract of silence was not just within our generation. It extended to many of those in the World War II generation who were architects of the policies of the Vietnam era. Though some of them have discussed the war in memoirs, they have not fully grappled with the events of the period—nor have these older civilian leaders reached out to engage the youngsters and soldiers of the period in discussion of the "lessons learned." Robert Muller, founder of the Vietnam Veterans of America, says in *The Wounded Generation*: "Where are the leaders? Where are the politicians that sent us to war? . . . I can't see these jokers. They don't even want to even think about hearing about what it is I'm trying to say on behalf of Vietnam veterans. . . . The total abandonment of those people that sent us to the war is unbelievable!"

Some key Vietnam-era policymakers—including senior generals like William Westmoreland and Michael Davison, who helped in the building of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial—have occasionally met informally with veterans to counsel them, and some have been steady, quiet advisers, seeking reconcilia-

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tion on many levels. On the whole, however, the mood remains one of avoidance.

In the early 1980s we have seen some movement away from the silence, toward an assimilation, albeit delayed, of the experience of the 1960s. Starting with the writings of the veterans themselves, a body of literature on life in the war zone has been created. Political science and history courses on the events of the Vietnam War are now being taught on dozens of campuses.

To date, though, the literature and the courses continue to show an uneasiness about grappling with the deep and *present* effects of the events of the war years. They are retrospective, rather than introspective or prospective. They focus on the past, on the war zone, on the men who fought, and on Vietnam. In this focus on a time long past, on a place far away, and on others (the veterans), there is a safe remove from difficult or painful questions. The deep and permanent effects on our own country, on those who did not fight, and on America's future, go largely unexamined.

In parsing the silence, a key thread is in the great divisions within the Vietnam generation, chasms created or widened by the interconnected events of the Vietnam era. Some of these divisions have been hidden and so have not been greatly discussed.

III

The first division is among the men. Many men who were not in uniform in the 1960s feel estranged from the men who were. In *The New York Times Magazine* of January 13, 1985, psychotherapist Edward Tick writes of his discovery that "I was not the only man who had been happy to escape service in my teens only to feel angry, confused and incomplete years later." Tick had prepared to apply for conscientious objector status; he also considered going to jail or fleeing the country. A high draft lottery number saved him from those choices. He writes of talking with a patient his age who sought help in dealing with post-Vietnam stress: "Sitting across from him, I felt weak, inadequate, physically smaller, although we were the same size. I had to fight the urge to look at the floor instead of directly into the eyes that were avoiding mine." Given Tick's profession, his analysis is striking: "The warriors, honorable men like Ron who served in Vietnam, suffer, unlike veterans of other wars, because the correctness of what our nation did

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will forever be in question. Those like me, who, for one reason or another, did not serve, suffer because we chose not to perform a primary and expected rite of passage."

Talking about this division with a group of Vietnam veterans, *Atlantic* editor James Fallows said:

> I think most of my college and graduate school friends are not happy talking about these things because they're afraid they're going to be yelled at. They're afraid that all of you are going to shake them by the lapels and say, "You coward! You weren't there with us." And that is why they don't want to talk about this stuff. They would then say, "Well, you war criminal!" I think that maybe the fear is partly unrealistic, partly self-inflicted, but I think I have some experience in this vein, having written about this and having a fair collection of letters.

Fallows' Harvard College peers do not discuss the subject with him, even though they now know, through his writing, of his second thoughts about having dodged the Vietnam draft by means of a crash diet.

Service in Vietnam is, and will remain, a very touchy topic among American men of my age, since social esteem and rewards appear to be linked to it. Just as those who were never in combat fear the charge of cowardice, many men who did fight think that they are looked down on because of their service in Vietnam. But in fact, the evidence is that most Americans respect the Vietnam veteran, for example the 1980 Louis Harris survey for the Congress on attitudes toward Vietnam-era veterans.

A second division is created by a complex tension between the women and the men of the generation over the choices made during the war years. Memories of wartime choices carry much voltage, and the strongest voltage may be sexual.

On many campuses during the Vietnam era, a willingness to fight at the country's call was neither fashionable nor, apparently, attractive to women. Men started becoming "flower children," and America saw the proliferation of hippie couples where the men often had longer hair than the women. Simultaneously with the war protests, the women's movement found new energy—and made greater strides during the Vietnam era than in the preceding century.

This was not mere coincidence. In fact, it appears that the war protest both created the conditions for and fed the eruption of the women's movement, and that America became a more feminine society. Masculinity went into eclipse during

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the Vietnam era, while women's causes and femininity came into ascendancy. The price was paid by men, particularly the men who went to war; and the Vietnam veteran was banished, within his own country, for ten years. In rejecting the war we rejected the warrior.

Some Americans are having second thoughts about the results; in any event, attitudes toward the proper roles of the sexes, and toward the men who wore the uniform versus the men who did not, are in flux. America as a society is rediscovering and redefining masculinity—and the new image of the virile Vietnam veteran is a sign of this. But the interconnections between the war, the war protest, and the women's movement still make the men and women of our generation edgy. Sparks seem to fly when the issue is raised with ardent feminists. We must avoid recrimination; the point is to figure out what happened so that we can begin to understand American relationships and our capacity for unity.

One price paid by Vietnam veterans is easily seen on the professional career ladder of their generation—and on the path to leadership. The women who chose to become lawyers, investment bankers, economists or government officials zoomed on up the ladder along with the men who did not enter military service. Between these men and women there was competition, and many of the women got a boost from the pressure created by the women's movement, for example in the banking industry. But the Vietnam veterans all started with several years' handicap. At an October 22, 1981, congressional hearing on the leadership potential of Vietnam veterans, Charles O'Brien, a Philadelphia lawyer who lost a leg due to battle wounds as a platoon leader in Vietnam, testified: "These men have labored under tremendous disadvantages. They've had two to four years taken from them. Persons my age are now partners in their firms. This is a fundamental inequity and yet one that can be worked around."

There is a third great division—internal and individual. I have seen it in many men I know, as well as in myself. As a Vietnam veteran, I take pride in my service. Like most veterans, I believe that going to Vietnam was like going into hell, and that we went in the true spirit of self-sacrifice. But it took years for this self-affirmation to surface and, without it, veterans experienced an unhealthy separation of self from self. I am thankful that this sense of affirmation is spreading.

Men who did not wear the uniform also appear to be un-

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dergoing such an internal division, as they take a hard look at their actions of the past two decades and consider their roles in the present and coming decades.

IV

These divisions and fruits of the events of the Vietnam era show the outlines of four likely aspects of emerging American leadership. One is that the men who wore the uniform in the Vietnam era are being accorded a late but strong recognition of their contribution that translates into political authority. A great number of Vietnam veterans can be expected to rise to responsible policymaking positions.

Second, largely as a result of the social turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s, and of the consequent strength of the women's movement, America is becoming the first major culture in history in which women and men share policymaking power. Third, among the women and men who did not wear the uniform, there is an uneasiness and ambiguity about military matters and questions of war and peace. This could lead to deference, perhaps excessive deference, to the opinions of Vietnam veterans.

Finally, the Vietnam generation is still in a somewhat fragile state; the passions of the antiwar protest are insufficiently digested and spent. If, through bad luck or bad policy, another unpopular major war soon erupted, one or both of two things could happen: we could experience an antiwar movement of immense power that would block any successful American participation, or the Vietnam generation could undergo a drastically deeper fracturing along the hawk and dove lines of the 1960s, diminishing for good our hopes for renewed unity, idealism and policymaking creativity. In this regard, our generation is making a conscious effort to heal that rift, to recover our suppleness, and to gain a sense of unity and national stewardship consonant with its maturity and the power now in the hands of its elite. The idealism and passions of the 1960s did not disappear; they were turned inward in the face of the harsh results of the war's end and of Watergate.

This picture of prospective dynamics within the generation is a rough draft, but one that is already being confirmed by visible developments. Vietnam veterans are emerging as an important source of leadership, although the common thread of their wartime service has been little noticed. Charles Robb is governor of Virginia; Larry Pressler is senator from South

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Dakota; Bob Kerrey, who earned the Medal of Honor, is governor of Nebraska; and John Kerry was recently elected senator from Massachusetts from his post as lieutenant governor.

Conversely, during his 1984 bid for the Democratic presidential nomination, Gary Hart was hurt by the fact that he had waited until 1981 to enter military service by being commissioned in the reserves. Bruce Caputo's 1982 campaign for the Republican nomination for the U.S. Senate from New York ended when he acknowledged that his campaign literature incorrectly claimed he had served in Vietnam. The fact that the claim was made to begin with is itself instructive.

Analyzing the 1984 presidential election results, political polling consultant Samuel Popkin wrote in *The Washington Post*, on November 11, 1984, about future Democratic Party presidential nominees:

> Above all, the Democrats will have to nominate a man who, when he says "we," will be able to convince white men that he includes them too. In the context of the 1980s such a candidate might have to be a Vietnam veteran, or someone too old to have dodged the draft. Only such a candidate will appeal both to the Democratic Party's new core of blacks and working women and to white men who espouse the new patriotism and extol the competitive spirit.

There are a number of such men. Many executives in the Reagan Administration are Vietnam veterans, notably Robert McFarlane, the national security adviser. They are also emerging in the business world. For example, few people realize that the overnight delivery service, Federal Express, was organized by Vietnam veteran aviator Frederick Smith—using a hub-and-spoke system like the military airnet in Vietnam.

These men have succeeded despite the fact that America shunned the veterans of its last war. Some of the most harrowing experiences of the Vietnam veteran took place not on the battlefield, but rather after his return home. The way this rejection came about tells both about America and about the veteran leaders.

Our troops in Vietnam succeeded in eliminating the Viet Cong as a principal adversary in the battle of Tet 1968 and then in depleting the North Vietnamese regular forces to the point where the United States could obtain the cease-fire and peace of 1973. This is how the young veterans see the results of their ground battles. They know that they accomplished

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their military task. They know that the slaughter of civilians at My Lai was an exception to the general rule that American soldiers respected the most complex and restrictive rules of engagement ever placed on troops in a battle zone. Those who were staff officers know that they successfully operated the longest and most complex line of military logistics and communication in history. In the eyes of the veterans, these things are a source of pride.

Consider, in this light, America's reaction to the battle of Tet 1968, a surprise attack in which the Viet Cong were mauled. Rather than commending the military victory, Americans were instead horrified by the brutal reality of war, and Tet marked the beginning of a radically intensified antiwar protest. From the young veteran's point of view, it is as if the Battle of the Bulge or Iwo Jima had been reported, and accepted, as enemy victories because of the great resolve and strength the Germans and Japanese had shown as adversaries. Indeed, the Germans or Japanese *could* have been accorded a political and strategic victory, if that had been the reality Americans had chosen to see.

The Vietnam veterans as a group possessed a willingness to serve their country and a belief that they were in Vietnam because there had been a cry for help from a country in distress, which America had promised to help. Regardless of the geopolitical perspective in national capitals at the time, this was the reasoning of most young Americans in Vietnam for most of the war. It is literally the explanation given to his parents by a friend of mine in a letter written shortly before his death in battle.

But the war these men were fighting, so vividly displayed on television, became unpopular at home. Returning veterans were literally spat upon. Government educational benefits for Vietnam veterans never came close to matching the purchasing power of similar benefits accorded World War II veterans. Our government has been very slow even in taking a thorough look at how Agent Orange defoliant exposure may be affecting the men who fought in Vietnam.

So the emergence of the Vietnam veterans has been gradual, and in conflict with society's rejection of their role and experience. Their ultimate successes confirm one of the fundamental attributes of most cultures: that those who put themselves in harm's way for the sake of the community earn the community's respect. America's shunning of its veterans is a reflec-

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tion of how unsettling Vietnam was, but it seems to have tempered the young veteran leaders, and somehow, I believe, it has not embittered them.

V

In assessing the qualities and future impact of the veterans who are emerging as policymakers, one must take account of their idealism and relative youth. The average age of the American fighting in Vietnam was 19. His average World War II counterpart was a 26-year-old draftee (though very willing to serve). Most of the Americans in Vietnam during the war were volunteers, not draftees. Wealthy college students tended to avoid the draft, but many sons of senior American commanders served in Vietnam. It is a myth that war service was racial: deaths among blacks were in proportion to black population in the United States.

Politically, the veterans are not clones—their views vary widely, as between Republican Senator Pressler and Democratic Senator Kerry—and their experience of war bestows no more extraordinary wisdom on them than his military experience bestowed on John Kennedy, who brought us the Bay of Pigs. They are also a statistically small segment of their generation—only five percent of the 60 million women and men are Vietnam veterans—yet their expanding numbers in the policymaking elite indicate that their power will be considerable. Because of these men, in the next several decades the United States will be the only major world power whose most senior government ranks include a significant number of men who have experienced war.

The Vietnam veterans will bring to power their common sense about conventional warfare, including an intimate awareness of the importance of logistics and the difficulty of reporting and controlling battlefield events—the improbabilities and frictions that are labeled "the fog of war" in military texts. They have a personal understanding of the guerrilla fighter and they know both the power and limits of technology in confronting him. There is no trace of isolationism among the veterans; they are actively oriented toward strong American participation in world affairs.

On the other hand, they are a permanent witness to the need for sustained domestic support of the men committed to combat and for ensuring that the military objective is married to a sustainable political objective. They are powerful and numer-

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ous enough to hold the military and its generals to fine scrutiny—since the generals will be their peers, schooled by the same harsh passage through Vietnam and the return home. They can calmly and clearly assess Soviet actions in the Third World. Knowing, for instance, that our policies in Vietnam never included the deliberate maiming of children that we see in Afghanistan, they can condemn such Soviet policies with a firmness that has often been missing in our society since the Vietnam War.

Finally, Vietnam veterans show no significant sign of the bitterness that created a hunger for military display and reaffirmation of national power in post-World War I Germany. For many, and probably most of them, the combination of war service and the treatment they received at home deepened their idealism and capacity for compassion.

The soaring divorce rates, widespread draft-dodging, casual sex and civil disobedience of the Vietnam era would certainly indicate that the ideal of commitment went into eclipse. As to the question of whether anything is worth dying for, the subliminal answer of most of the generation during the 1960s was "No!" The sexual revolution, the flights to Canada and the environmental and women's movements, all emphasized living rather than giving up life. For many, the real "dirtiness" of Vietnam lay as much in the prospect of getting killed as in that of killing someone. America's rediscovery of its Vietnam veterans reflects a general recognition that there are in fact worse things than death, or bringing death.

We have passed through a disillusioning time, but idealism and commitment are still fundamental to the Vietnam generation. The new respect and emerging political voice accorded Vietnam veterans illuminate the generation as a whole. It is a confirmation of two values that are fundamental to a strong foreign policy: the principle of honoring our commitments and the belief that there are things worth dying for.

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Amine Gemayel

THE PRICE AND THE PROMISE

To many people throughout the world, the name Lebanon now suggests nothing but war and violence. Once the most peaceful of Mediterranean countries, in the last decade Lebanon has suffered more death and destruction than any of its neighbors. The bare statistics are chilling enough, but no statistics can even begin to convey the psychological and social damage which has affected the very nature of society and civilization.

The horrors of the last decade have made it difficult for foreign observers to realize what Lebanon has been, and is. Yet an explanation of the reasons for Lebanon's existence, of its cultural heritage and values, is vital to any understanding of its role and of the nature and direction of Lebanon's policies. While my course may or may not differ from those that others might have followed, I believe the Lebanese heritage would have infused the policies of others as it has certainly guided my own.

The viability—indeed the reality—of Lebanon has come into question in the West. Lebanon has no historic validity, it is said. Or, Lebanon's boundaries are artificial. Some say Lebanon is a mosaic of minorities, as if this were a blemish on the country's identity. Others claim that Lebanon is divided by hatreds and beset by perpetual conflict.

Yet Lebanon's history is longer than that of most societies. The country and its principal features and cities are referred to countless times in the Bible. As a political entity, Lebanon's history stretches back in a direct line almost five centuries, and Mount Lebanon's distinct autonomous status throughout the Ottoman era is indicative of the recognition that Lebanon could never be viewed as simply another convenient administrative unit in the empire. While it is true that the current boundaries of Lebanon date only from 1920, it is also true that the boundaries of most states in the Middle East, in the Third World and of some European countries were established after World War I.

Amine Gemayel was elected President of Lebanon in 1982.

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Because most nations are relatively recent, and because most boundaries are the result of political acts rather than of social evolution, these are perhaps not the best indicators of viability. Similarly, most countries have minorities, and few indeed are the areas where conflict is unknown. The fiction that Lebanon has suffered perpetual conflict is contradicted by reality: over the centuries Lebanon has in fact known less conflict than virtually any society in the Middle East. Violence has erupted in Lebanon before and usually, as now, as a result of foreign manipulation; the dreadful events of the last decade are an aberration in the history of Lebanon. However cataclysmic—and remember, the War Between the States remains America's bloodiest conflict—they can hardly call into question the reality of Lebanon.

And what is this reality? Briefly, Lebanon exists, and will continue to exist, because it has a way of life that is distinctly Lebanese, with values distinguishing it from the rest of the Arab world and the Middle East as a whole. Our way of life is the manifestation of Lebanon's identity. We value and appreciate the quality of that life; our first priority is to harmonize man and nature, even amid the violence that afflicts us at the present time.

We are all Lebanese: rich and poor, urban and rural, Muslim and Christian, young and old, mountain dwellers and inhabitants of the coastal plains—we have all played a part in developing the nation, and we all share the Lebanese way of life.

There is no majority in modern Lebanon: we are a country of minorities. There is neither a political majority, nor an economic majority, still less a social majority. Religious affiliation has been the primary factor of individual identity, and most Lebanese today agree that the political system we developed was too rigid, drawing confessional lines around many problems that otherwise had no sectarian significance. Despite the importance of religion in Lebanese—and Middle Eastern—society, we know, and always have known, that our identity is with Lebanon. There is no Christian Lebanon, no Muslim Lebanon; there is no Maronite, Shi'ite, Sunni or Druze Lebanon. There is but one Lebanon, which unites us all, and Lebanon is precisely the expression of our common bond.

Another aspect of Lebanon's identity, even more basic and certainly more distinctive, is the system of values that gives the highest priority to human dignity. Because we believe man is unique, and that men are born equal, we also believe that

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organized human society must recognize basic human rights as inalienable. Lebanon's diversity has led us to place great emphasis on the importance of according these rights not only to groups, but also to the individual. The people of Lebanon have always been leaders in the global struggle for human rights. Even if we have fallen short of our goals—and who has not, in this never-ending quest?—we shall never weaken in our resolve.

The Lebanese belief in the dignity and equality of man in the context of our diversity has led us easily and directly to our primary political values—liberty, pluralism and democracy. In a country composed of so many discrete traditions, any attempt to translate human rights into a political system that provides for freedom for the individual must necessarily accept the concept of pluralism and the principle of unity in diversity. Our own system of government, while quite distinct from the systems of Europe or the United States, was an attempt to provide the maximum degree of latitude for each community to pursue its own unique course while preserving the unity we all sought, and still seek, in one Lebanon.

To those, then, who aver that the Lebanese have no identity, I would reply that our values and our way of life in this Middle Eastern context are both distinctively Lebanese. The marriage of East and West that characterizes Lebanon has benefited all Lebanese. The proof is that, despite all that has befallen us, no individual or community has called for secession, or for partition, or for the cession of any part of our territory to another state.

II

Lebanon's role in the Middle East and beyond derives directly from our identity and our values. From independence in 1943 to the present day, Lebanon has proudly taken an active role in promoting cooperation rather than conflict. Lebanese intellectuals like to attribute this role to our philosophical attachment to human rights; the true reason may be less noble, but more understandable—greater cooperation directly benefits the Lebanese, who are active in business throughout the Middle East and have served as entrepreneurs to facilitate Western business activities in the region. Lebanon has played a key role in promoting human interaction based on common

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needs, common interests and common aspirations. Little wonder, then, our attachment to U.S. objectives in the Middle East—peace, security and stability.

The Lebanese government has had a record of support for human rights unique among new states, and especially noteworthy in the Middle East. Our support for these rights has not been limited to rhetoric or the way we vote at the United Nations. For example, we celebrated this year the 50th anniversary of female suffrage in our country, the first in the Middle East to grant women the right to vote. True, we were 15 years behind the United States, but we were ahead of several European countries. While we do not presume to tell other peoples how to govern themselves, all Lebanese take just pride in our traditional support for democracy, our philosophical revulsion with totalitarianism, and our rejection of the imposition of state objectives upon human objectives.

When the Lebanese system developed, each major community felt its security lay in preventing the other major communities from dominating it. This attitude may be compared with the fear of the smaller American states toward their larger counterparts when the U.S. Constitution was being debated. Too late have we come to realize the costs of the weak government we valued so much; for, shackled by the need for consensus, the government was unable to take initiatives in development or modernization, unable to ensure national defense as effectively as it should have, and unable to identify and address itself to societal problems.

So great has been our antipathy to "big government," in fact, that many, including Lebanese citizens, have criticized the Lebanese government for its irrelevance to people's needs. In other countries of the Middle East, and elsewhere, government has dominated society and the economy as well as politics, invading the lives of individuals and groups. Yet in Lebanon it is the private sector that thrived. In our country, politics was just another profession, and not a particularly desirable one. The central government was weak—too weak in fact to perform some of the social and economic functions modern society demands, such as ensuring greater equity in the distribution of incomes, for example, or channeling development resources to guarantee equal opportunities, or at least equal treatment, to all citizens.

With the private sector predominant, is it any wonder that Lebanon pursued the path of peace? We saw that our economic,

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political and social interests all depended on the maintenance of peace. Although the Lebanese were unanimous in their outrage at the injustice to the Palestinian people, we have never supported violence as the means of settling disputes. Consequently, Lebanon was the only major Middle Eastern state never willingly involved in a regional war. To the Lebanese, peace not only symbolizes our way of life, but also protects it. We are a small, weak state. To the extent violence is the language of conflict resolution, we pay a high price. Violence can only harm us. Our livelihood—trade—is ill served by war, which is a grave threat to our heterogeneous society. It is no secret that nationals from every regional state and from larger powers outside the region frequented Lebanon, conducted business in Lebanon, listened to the pulse of the Arab world through Lebanon . . . and enjoyed the unique and harmonious Lebanese way of life. For its part, the Lebanese government exerted a real and significant effort to avoid any threat to the security of either of Lebanon's larger neighbors.

However, one of the false assumptions we made was that "Lebanon's weakness is its strength." The Lebanese believed the creation of a strong army would be seen as a threat by others. The absence of such an army would be an earnest of our dedication to peace, it was believed, guaranteeing that we would remain outside regional hostilities. This philosophy left us unprepared, unequipped and unable to deal with the anomic forces that exploded in Lebanon in the early 1970s, with the Palestine Liberation Organization playing the role of catalyst.

In many ways, then, it was precisely the uniquely peaceful approach of Lebanon to its foreign relations that led to the recent period of violence. As long as Lebanon avoided the vortex of conflict in the region, the Lebanese could live their own lives in their own way and make great progress toward development and modernization. Tragically, however, Israel, the PLO and the Arab states, each for different reasons, set out to modify Lebanon's position. In the process, the delicate balance that preserved both Lebanon's political system and its orientation in the turbulent Middle East was destroyed. The result has been a decade of unimaginable horror.

We have paid a heavy price for Lebanese pluralism. Had we been a unitary state, had the national government been more powerful, or had the Lebanese enjoyed less freedom, it would have been more difficult, perhaps even impossible, for external forces to destabilize our society. For, despite the disparate

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points of view that characterize any free society, violence is largely a foreign import. As in the 1860s, so again a century later, the intervention of external elements, more than any other single factor, is responsible for the upsurge of violence.

In a sense, both Lebanon and the United States have faced the same problem: the attractiveness of liberty to those deprived of it. Both countries have been seen as a threat by governments that cannot tolerate freedom; both have attracted large numbers of citizens from other countries, particularly refugees fleeing authoritarian regimes or religious and ideological persecution; both have granted them the rights to which all men are entitled. Neither country has yet learned how best to reconcile the unselfish offer of rights we believe in and take for granted with the need to ensure that such rights can be safeguarded. Non-citizens frequently are incapable of accepting the responsibilities involved.

At the same time, it is logically fatuous, morally wrong, and analytically unsound to point the finger of blame at others. We Lebanese must learn to assume responsibility for what has taken place in our own country. It is we who refused to strengthen our armed forces, thereby permitting the PLO to become a state within a state on our land, and allowing external forces to intervene in our affairs virtually at will. It is we who were too complacent about the way events would develop, so that, as some had predicted, we found ourselves unable to control our own destiny. It is we who, through mistaken principles, allowed ourselves to work with external forces against Lebanese interests. It is we who, in promoting or protecting specific interests, have sacrificed our own homeland. For too long have we failed to recognize the need to strike a balance between individual and community interests, on the one hand, and the common national interests, on the other. So accustomed were we to exploiting our freedoms that we neglected to protect the sources from which they originated. What a price we have paid for our errors! And none can say when the bill will be paid in full. It would be incorrect to suggest that the non-Lebanese played no role in the events leading to the destruction of Lebanon, but, after all, Lebanon is and was ours, not theirs, and it was our responsibility to defend our rights, our interests and our homeland. This we failed to do.

III

By 1982, government authority over Lebanese territory had dwindled to a few square kilometers around the Ba'abda pres-

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idential palace. Syria maintained a presence in the northern and eastern parts of the country. Over one-third of Lebanon (the southern region) was under Israeli occupation. The PLO, ousted from the south and from Beirut by the Israeli invasion of June 1982, exercised influence in the region of Tripoli and in some parts of the east. A U.N. Interim Force had exercised control over a small enclave south of the Litani River since 1978. East Beirut, north almost to Batrun, was under the control of the Lebanese Forces militia. Yet other parcels of land were controlled or dominated by militias such as the Marada around Zgharta, Amal in the Shi'ite areas, and the Progressive Socialist Party in the Shouf.

Although varying degrees of government presence were allowed in these areas, whether occupied by external forces or dominated by Lebanese militias, the government was unable to exercise valid authority over the Lebanese people by representing their interests, ensuring effectual social services, or exploiting and organizing the natural resources for the common good. If the state of Lebanon were as "precarious" as its critics suggest, if it were a mere fiction, as some insist, there might be no Lebanese government today. Yet, despite government weakness, despite social divisions, despite the manifest inability of the government to meet people's needs, the trend after 1980 was increasingly to request the return of the government, especially the Lebanese army. This phenomenon was no more Christian than Muslim—it was Lebanese.

When I assumed the presidency in September 1982, I had four primary goals: withdrawal of the Israeli army, reconstruction of the Lebanese army, political reconciliation and reform, and socioeconomic development. Incidentally, the evidence is conclusive that this was not only a reflection of the objectives of the Lebanese people as a whole, but also of their priorities. Virtually all Lebanese accepted the need to achieve *each* goal, and recognized too that securing the withdrawal of Israeli forces *had* to be the first step.

Lebanon's position that all non-Lebanese forces should leave Lebanon remains unchanged. In the frequent discussions I have had with President Hafez al-Assad it was agreed that Syrian forces will withdraw upon the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanon. At the same time, Lebanon needs direct Syrian support to consolidate its internal front, to cultivate the new coalition represented in the government of national unity, and to contain the many militias that emerged in the ten-year war. While Lebanon and Syria are independent and sovereign

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countries, and while their social, economic and political systems differ, they nevertheless share a long historical experience and wide-ranging interests that necessitate close cooperation and coordination.

Now that Lebanon must concentrate on the liberation of its territory, it must work closely with Syria to overcome the many security hurdles that lie in the way. Syria is supporting Lebanon in its policy of building a Lebanese army that would fill the void left by the withdrawal of external forces and by the dissolution of the local militias. Building such an army is the next step. Without liberation it was clear that external views, not Lebanese interests, would determine the nature of political reforms. The only way of allowing the *Lebanese* to express their desires is to liberate them from external domination.

From the summer of 1982 until the spring of 1984 the United States was deeply involved in Lebanon. There is a long history of close, warm and broad-based cooperation between our two countries; the unusually close ties between our two peoples are indicative of the many values we share. Though only a small number of U.S. marines were actually deployed to Lebanon, the American commitment and investment were politically and psychologically invaluable. The United States assumed a major role in all aspects of Lebanon's attempts at recovery and paid a heavy and tragic price. Washington strongly supported Lebanon's national strategy, and played a vital and active part in negotiations with Israel to bring the latter's occupation to an end.

From the outset these negotiations were understood to require the preservation of the Lebanese consensus so recently produced by the events of violence and occupation. And, in fact, the consensus endured throughout negotiations, to the point where the resulting accord of May 17, 1983, received almost unanimous support in the Chamber of Deputies.

A combination of factors—international, regional and local—worked against the agreement virtually from the very day it was signed by the heads of the three delegations. In the subsequent weeks and months Israel acted in a manner inconsistent with the letter and the spirit of the agreement, thus contributing to bloody strife in the Shouf region, and raising doubts about Israeli intentions. The preconditions that Israel set for implementing the agreement—namely the prior withdrawal of Syria, the return of prisoners held by Syria and the PLO, as well as the return of the remains of Israeli soldiers

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supposedly buried in Syria—were virtually unimplementable. These conditions were summarily rejected by Syria. It soon became clear that U.S. hopes to convince Syria to accept the agreement were not likely to be realized, and we began to look for a new course. On June 6, 1983, I wrote a letter to President Reagan expressing prevailing doubts about the agreement.

The moderate Arab states that found the agreement reasonable in April and May began to entertain second thoughts in June, July and August, and one after the other began to retreat from previously declared positions. These developments exerted an adverse effect on the internal consensus, and soon the politico-psychological environment under which the agreement was signed began to crumble. It became obvious that the agreement was dead.

The questions that occupied us for many months dealt with the timing of the cancellation and with the arrangements that we felt were essential for the national interest. After the Geneva conference on national dialogue among Lebanese leaders, and after extensive consultations at the national, regional and international levels, I called the Council of Ministers on March 5, 1984, for the purpose of canceling the agreement. The council did so. But as a country deeply interested in peace, for itself and for the region, our statement canceling the agreement included a firm commitment to implement our own security arrangements in the south in a manner that would ensure peace and stability in that region, restore Lebanon's sovereignty over it, and prevent infiltration across the frontiers. We communicated this decision to the United Nations and the United States.

In an effort to break the ensuing deadlock, the U.N. secretary general called on Lebanon and Israel to participate in talks at Naqurah, under U.N. auspices, to discuss Israeli withdrawal and security arrangements in south Lebanon. As Lebanon was anxious to liberate its territory and to enhance peace, it joined the Naqurah discussions with high expectations. Lebanon submitted a plan defining in detail the deployment of its troops in all the area occupied by Israel. Israel continued to raise doubts about the Lebanese army, and to propose solutions that, in our opinion, would compromise our sovereignty. In a speech dated January 6, 1985, before the ambassadors accredited to Lebanon, I reaffirmed the role of U.N. forces in speeding the withdrawal process; I refused to have U.N. forces used to separate one Lebanese region from another; I called again on

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Israel to submit a comprehensive withdrawal plan for all Lebanese territory; and I expressed Lebanon's sovereign right to ask for U.N. help after the submission by Israel of a comprehensive plan for its withdrawal from Lebanon. Israel refused to submit such a plan. Instead it decided to withdraw in three stages, each of which is dependent on a cabinet decision. The last phase supposedly will take place in September 1985. We do not know if this withdrawal will in fact be completed, or if surrogate forces are to be left behind as in 1978.

Failure to reach understanding on Israeli withdrawal has intensified passions and conflicts in occupied south Lebanon and has strengthened the local resistance movement. The movement has attracted young men and women from the entire fabric of the population. Most of the population in the occupied area is Shi'ite. As the Shi'ites are now undergoing a powerful religious revival, and as martyrdom is a revered ideal of this community, it is likely that the Shi'ite dimension of the resistance will continue to gain attention. Nevertheless, it would be a serious mistake to see the Shi'ites as standing alone. All Lebanese seek national liberation.

If Israel does not withdraw fully and soon, the Lebanese resistance movement could develop from a movement to free Lebanon from Israeli occupation to a movement that threatens the Israeli state per se. Passions that are unleashed now could evolve into a massive and unpredictable movement with long-range consequences for the prospects of peace in the Middle East.

Our southern population is largely farmers—orange and tobacco growers. They live off the land and are deeply attached to it. They fear being forced to experience the fate of the Palestinians and live abroad as refugees, hence their struggle must be seen as an affirmation of their legitimate right to live freely on their own land. Our people have learned from the lessons of others, and are determined to remain on their national territory.

Insofar as the resistance in the south is Lebanese, it is expected to last as long as occupation of Lebanese territory lasts. It is therefore different from the Palestinian resistance, which seeks its objectives in Palestine proper. The weakening of the PLO in Lebanon at the hands of Israel, and as a result of internal conflicts within the movement itself, has greatly diminished its role in southern Lebanon. In contrast to past PLO activities directed against Israel from the south, the Lebanese

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resistance is based upon individual valor and local spontaneous acts of resistance with some guidance from an organized party or from some distinguished community leaders. The people of south Lebanon are, however, basically peace-loving people, and they yearn for the restoration of their dignity as citizens of Lebanon under the authority of the Lebanese government. We should help them regain their normal way of life.

The crisis resulting from the May 17 agreement also interrupted progress in the reconstruction of the Lebanese army. Our army has long been the symbol of Lebanon's independence; and while it has received much criticism in the Western press, most professional military observers, including American observers, have been very favorably impressed with the quality, motivation and potential of army personnel. Although the size of the armed forces remains at an all-time high of almost 40,000, only about half of these forces are fully available to the government at this time. Geographic or mission constraints are imposed upon the rest, in large part as a result of the presence of foreign forces.

The tragic events of 1983 and 1984 dramatically altered national priorities. The divisions that reappeared in 1984 made it clear that national reconciliation and political reforms could no longer await Israeli withdrawal. This reversal in priorities was demonstrated in the two National Dialogue and Reconciliation Conferences in Geneva (1983) and Lausanne (1984), in which all major political factions participated. These two conferences led to follow-up meetings, and if both demonstrated some divergence in political views, they showed much more clearly the common ground we share: the desire to ensure Lebanon's survival as a free, united, democratic and pluralistic country; the resistance to partition by whatever name; and the vehement rejection of annexation of any part of our national territory.

A number of reforms have already been agreed upon among the leaders who participated in the talks, and more will follow. These reforms are now being discussed by broader sections of the population. The adoption of the reforms program as a matter of highest priority had another benefit—it facilitated the creation of a government of national unity, something I personally had sought for many months and had called for publicly on numerous occasions.

We must not delude ourselves into assuming that there will suddenly be complete agreement among all Lebanese. The

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Lebanese have been out of touch with each others' communities—their interests, perceptions and expectations—for almost a decade. More than just a concerted effort will be needed to restore these links; time, patience and understanding—commodities in short supply after the trauma of the last ten years—will be required in abundance.

IV

What lessons can we learn from the aftermath of the 1982 war? They are several, and their relevance extends well beyond Lebanon.

Perhaps the most evident lesson of the Lebanese drama over the past two years relates to the role of small states in large conflicts. The natural tendency to place Lebanon in the forefront of moves to resolve or transform the Arab-Israeli crisis is understandable, in view of the moderate position adopted by small states. However, experience elsewhere suggests that militarily weak states are not best suited to break an impasse unless the superpowers behind them are willing to give unqualified support; for it is ultimately the superpowers who must bear, and alone can overcome, the inevitable pressure that will follow.

A second and related lesson, this one of specific relevance to the immediate Arab-Israeli theater, is that no Arab government except Egypt will, or can, pursue any extended negotiation with Israel without strong and clearly manifested support in the Arab world. This lesson, in turn, is linked with a third.

Contemporary constraints on the use of power (political, economic and military) by forces outside the region reduce the value of great-power support. The impact of modern communications on operational choice and flexibility, and on political action, is more far-reaching than any but experts in the field of communications have realized. Communications have dramatically increased the cost of any decision or action to parties external to a conflict, especially in democracies. It is virtually impossible to explain to one's compatriots why they should incur high costs in support of some distant country whose importance is difficult to define. Polls in most Western democracies seem to suggest that even the defense of regions clearly and demonstrably vital to national interests is unpopular. Consequently, the high domestic political costs involved in overseas support reduces the likelihood of timely, effective and consistent behavior, particularly when the conflict is protracted.

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Mass communications, in highlighting differences and problems, also tend to be a major divisive influence both in the conflict core area (in this case, Lebanon) and within and among external supporting countries.

Developing and small countries continue to underestimate the importance of a full understanding of the processes of policymaking and the strength of public opinion in the democratic great powers. Given our own democratic tradition, we Lebanese should never overlook these considerations, but at times of political pressure even we tend to think of the governments of the United States, France and Great Britain, for example, as unitary actors.

Recent experience also shows that local and external governments must learn to realize that different degrees of interest are to be expected from neighboring states than from distant powers. Lebanon is more visibly and immediately important to its neighbors than to a country like the United States, in spite of the broad array of American interests in the Middle East. Conflicts in the Middle East often develop from local issues affecting the very existence of those involved. But this sense of involvement, of urgency, is not necessarily shared by external governments: for them the stakes may be too high.

Another lesson of the Lebanese experience is the importance of avoiding layering. Simple, or one-dimensional, problems are not only more amenable to analysis and planning, they are also more comprehensible to external powers and therefore more likely to attract foreign support. Once a conflict becomes multidimensional, or layered, it becomes more difficult for distant countries to understand. The linkage of the Lebanese crisis to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the autumn of 1982 proved catastrophic to conflict resolution in Lebanon. Ironically, partly because of the effects of communications, diplomatic speed has become more, not less, elusive. Secrecy is much more difficult to maintain. Moreover, the mobilization of large elements of policy bureaucracies made possible by modern communications enables more individuals, offices and interests to complicate, slow or even block decision. Similarly, rapid decision is antithetical to the involvement of more than two parties, since each country has a multiplicity of these potential blocking elements. In the course of time, circumstances change, and the environment can often be modified much more quickly than the policy processes can respond. We were too late to appreciate the critical importance of speed in resolving the Lebanese problem

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in 1982. The violence erupting since 1982 is largely a reflection of regional conflict rather than of internal disagreement; it escalates and abates in response to the needs and interests of external powers.

V

Lebanon has survived and will continue to exist, not only for the sake of the Lebanese but because the Middle East, too, needs Lebanon. But this faith is intangible, and we must develop strategies and policies that translate the intangibles into a free, reunified and rejuvenated Lebanon. The last two years have demonstrated clearly that Lebanon can be held only by force. History proves that a divided Lebanon is a dangerous Lebanon, inherently unstable (because the Lebanese, despite their differences, yearn to reunite their land) and therefore inherently explosive. The proximity of Israeli and Syrian forces in Lebanon is much like smoking near the proverbial powder-keg; even the smallest cinder may detonate it. Already countless sparks have been produced by the friction of this juxtaposition, two of these sparks (the 1981 "missile crisis" and the 1982 war) having created major international crises.

Lebanon is an Arab state. It lives in and depends upon the Arab world. Yet there are persuasive indications that the Arab world and Israel alike are prepared to accept Lebanon's disengagement from the regional conflict, so long as it is genuine, and not merely camouflage for a separate peace with Israel, on the one hand, or for an assumption of a more overtly hostile posture toward Israel, on the other. Equally important, Lebanon must be seen as a roadblock, rather than a road, between Israel and Syria. These two countries are determined to prevent political or security threats from arising in Lebanon. A strong, independent Lebanon is the best insurance that neither of Lebanon's neighbors will use Lebanon against the other.

A truly independent Lebanon will benefit the region. The recurrent crises in Lebanon have absorbed too many diplomatic resources; they have crippled Lebanon's role as an entrepôt, with dire economic effects; they have diverted resources needed for reconstruction; and the problems arising from negotiations have often bedeviled inter-Arab relations. The victimization of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians, the role of the Palestinian fighters (with whom many people in the Gulf identify), Arab and Israeli adventurism, and the involvement of the major Western countries, especially the United States—

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all these factors have produced sporadic but intense fears and tensions in the Gulf states; these, as a consequence, have been expected to influence or appease other Arab states, responsibilities that are often costly in financial as well as psychological terms.

The interdependencies of the internal and external factors in any Lebanese crisis cannot be overlooked either. An independent Lebanon will decrease the incentive for external actors to buy Lebanese support, and will obviate our need to secure outside assistance. That there are differences among the Lebanese is incontestable, but these are problems eminently open to negotiation and resolution, because we need each other, we know each other, and we know we need Lebanon.

No one is well served by the ripping asunder of Lebanon's social fabric, or by the consequent rending of the body politic. Disengaging Lebanon from the clutches of regional conflict will allow us to continue the process of political reform in its proper context—a context of modernization and political development. This is hardly an incendiary suggestion: there is not a single faction in Lebanon unaware of the need for reform of the political system. This process is now under way, but it is a process that would be much more reassuring if the give and take of debate were not accompanied by the give and take of violence. Yet it is well known to all Lebanese that the current violence, while it is taking place within the country, is essentially a product of the interplay of foreign forces, sometimes applying pressure on Lebanon, more frequently on each other. This is the reason I believe we must take active steps to secure the withdrawal of foreign forces at the earliest possible date.

Disengagement, as we have called it, should not be confused with passivity. Although we have enormous tasks of reconstruction ahead of us, Lebanon must not turn inward, and indeed the Lebanese character would not permit us to do so. Lebanon remains, and has remained throughout the years of violence, a commercial and banking center. Lebanon has a role to play in the Arab world; and we are traditionally the bridge between the Arab world and the outside world. Since 1975, however, Lebanon's infrastructure necessary to support this role has deteriorated in some respects and become obsolete in others. We must make an early and strenuous effort to restore and modernize this infrastructure.

Lebanon also has its vocation as an interpreter. With one foot in the developing world, and the other in the developed,

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Lebanon has not only been a means of communication but has assisted the two worlds to understand each other better. Lebanon is an Arab state, but its sustenance is no less Western. In earlier days, happier days, better days, Americans, French, British and others came to our small country to learn Arabic, to learn about the Arab world, and to immerse themselves in Orientalia. No people takes greater pride in its traditional culture, or has studied it more deeply, or is more able to share it on a broad cultural front than the Lebanese. Where else can the West learn to understand the political, economic and social currents of the Middle East, and especially of the Arab world? There is still no home more open to guests or a people more eager to serve as facilitators than ours.

The West has pursued its economic interests in the region, especially in the Gulf. Certainly, the face of the Middle East is vastly different from what it was just a decade ago. But modernization entails psychological and social change, too, and the Lebanese may be better prepared to assist those changes, since we are an integral part of the Arab world and we understand the roots of Arab values, consciousness and culture. Lebanon will continue to recognize its Arab character, and will continue to emphasize its close relations with the rest of the Arab world. It cannot be otherwise, for our economic well-being is no less Arab than our roots. Our values are distinct, our identity is distinct, but we remain an Arab state. The marriage that is Lebanon, so Western in many ways, yet always aware of its Arab background, has long assured it a special place in the region and in the world.

Others in Europe and in the Middle East have tried to become the new Lebanon, the new entrepôt, the new crossroads. They have had a decade, but they have not succeeded in usurping our place. Why? Because this role depends first and foremost on people, not on dollars or equipment or location. Lebanon is irreplaceable because the Lebanese and their unique cosmopolitan attitudes are irreplaceable.

But Lebanon should not pretend that the recent past did not happen. We cannot overlook the cost of neglecting our political role. A reformed and strengthened Lebanon should play a leading conciliatory role in the Arab world and between the Arab world and the West. The Lebanese, who have seen how adversely regional conflict can affect them, should only become much more active in regional diplomacy and conflict resolution. If only the tiniest part of our negotiating effort and the

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resources we devote to business could be devoted to the diplomatic sector, Lebanon could achieve wonders for itself and for the world.

The bond between the United States and Lebanon remains a special one. When the American marines, who were deployed in Lebanon to help us, were attacked in a terrorist act, we Lebanese mourned the dead and wounded as our own, for in many respects that is precisely what they were. The American sacrifices in Lebanon will never be forgotten. The United States has other priorities than Lebanon now, priorities beyond the Middle East, but as a superpower the United States will remain involved in regional diplomacy. It is clear that the American people and their government remain aware that they can ill afford to turn their backs on the Middle East. The oil that even now is required for the economic, military and, therefore, political and social security of the West may be less immediately threatened today than it once was, but a total interruption of oil from the Gulf—and I am not suggesting a cut-off due to the Gulf's own action—would still be catastrophic. A confrontation between the United States and the U.S.S.R., like those we have already seen several times in the Middle East, would be even more disastrous. In view of these concerns, and in view of America's long history of political, economic and cultural interaction with the area, in both the private and public sectors, we certainly expect the United States to remain involved.

There is another factor, as well, and it is pointed out all too infrequently: despite disagreements over policy issues, there is not a government in the Middle East—certainly not in the Arab world—that does not want and expect the United States to play a role in the region. The orchestration of that role—the determination of the appropriate timing, the nature and the amount of political, economic, social and other resources—must be American, and can reasonably be expected to shift with changing circumstances; but of the need for the United States to assume some role, and its desirability, there can be no doubt.

The United States is aware of our needs and can certainly help. We need continuing U.S. support to ensure an orderly Israeli withdrawal from our land. We need vigorous U.S. support for our efforts to secure credit from friendly nations and from international agencies that will help us overcome the raging economic crisis. As a beleaguered democracy, we de-

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serve concerted attention on the part of the great democracies, and yet at times we feel deserted precisely because we have difficulties.

U.S. interest in the Middle East peace process, though not directly related to the Lebanese crisis, will help. Such interest should benefit from the experiences of the past few years. In the context of the Middle East problem it does not help to concentrate on one aspect in isolation from the others, even though spectacular results may loom, albeit briefly, on the horizon. Syria cannot be excluded if a settlement in the region is to be seriously considered. The PLO, with all its diverse membership, is involved in the Middle East problem; so are Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt, as countries bordering on Israel and, in the case of the first three, as hosts of large numbers of Palestinians. The fate of Palestinians in these countries is of great importance to their decision-makers. In the case of Lebanon, the Camp David accords had a negative, if not devastating, effect, radicalizing the large, despairing Palestinian population in the country. A pact limited to governments without a broad popular base cannot succeed. Truly, the problem is great—but it is not insurmountable.

After Lebanon, the United States is likely to reassess its policy in the Middle East. We can only hope that it will decide to take new initiatives, that those initiatives will be based on consultation with all the parties, and that on this basis the United States will advance the kind of creative recommendations and exert the kind of active moral suasion of which we know this great country is capable. Certainly, this is the role and spirit best attuned to the objective realities and to America's substantial long-range interests in this part of the world.

A stable Lebanon can and should look forward to the opportunity to assist the United States and other outside powers in their efforts to play a role, even if it is a supportive rather than a leadership role, in the move toward peace.

VI

Anyone who considers the record of conflict in Lebanon over the last decade must marvel at the way Lebanon and its people have survived. It is no less than a miracle that a country of only some three million inhabitants could sustain such a toll. With a population of less than two percent of that of the United States, we have lost half as many dead as the Americans did in World War II. Our economic losses are such that they are

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threatening the very foundation of our free economic system. Still, it is true that by far the greatest damage is psychological. We need time to reconstruct our economy and redefine policy, but above all we need time to restore the nation and allow society to regain its health.

Survival is not enough; it is not enough for the people of Lebanon or any other people. Lebanon has a mission, a mission we understand better today than ever before. It is we who must help the region achieve peace; for we know the meaning of war, and we have felt, and know we shall continue to feel, its consequences. Today, the Lebanese are subject to the divisive influences of foreign forces much more powerful than we are, but these influences have only reinforced our awareness of the need for national unity. The united Lebanon that will re-emerge has learned painful but important lessons from its tragic experience. Above all, we in Lebanon have learned two things: that we must recognize and cherish our Lebanese identity above all others, and that we must never fail to assume our proper role—sometimes of leadership, sometimes of support, but always of realism, peace and cooperation—in the Middle East.

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Fouad Ajami

LEBANON AND ITS INHERITORS

In the Shia vision of history, born of centuries of oppression and marginality, a time comes when the mighty are humbled; the lowly who kept the faith rise up and inherit the earth free from oppressors. From this vision has come consolation. It sustained an embattled minority faith through the eras of worldly and political dispossession.

Something of this vision has come to pass in our time in Lebanon. The country has turned into a slaughter ground, but an inheritance as well. Passion, demography and chance have raised a once-marginal community above the insularity and fears of the past.

In the south of Lebanon, two and a half years of Israeli occupation have given the Shia a new and sustaining myth of resistance. In Beirut, Shi'ite squatters and urban newcomers have crossed once-forbidden lines. The western half of the city, traditionally home of the more privileged Sunni Muslim community, has all but fallen to the downtrodden Shia. In the Bekaa Valley, under the shadow of Syria, extremist elements in the loosely joined Party of God, known as Hizbollah, proclaim their intention to "cleanse the country" and to transform this fractured polity into an Islamic republic: a seeming parody of the realm established in Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran.

The Shia phenomenon arises from the accumulated resentments—and achievements—of a quarter-century. But the midwife of the current resurgence was none other than Israel, which came into Lebanon in June of 1982 both to destroy a Palestinian dominion in West Beirut and the south, and also to restore Christian Maronite hegemony over the country. The first mission was relatively easy to achieve. Over the course of a decade the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon had been emptied of its exalted claims and had turned into an affair of caprice and showmanship.

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Israel's second mission was not to be fulfilled. The time of the Maronite ascendancy had passed. Demographic realities had caught up with the Maronites; no amount of Israeli or American support could sustain their bid for hegemony over an unwieldy country. In retrospect, the Israeli invasion and its aftermath only served to highlight the Maronite weakness.

The beneficiaries of Israel's war and the subsequent occupation of south Lebanon turned out, thus, to be the long-suppressed Shi'ites. Israel shattered the Palestinian dominion; it did for the Shia what they had not been able to do for themselves. Then Israel's occupation of the Shi'ite ancestral land in the south closed the circle: it gave a people awakening to their own power the material out of which militant myths are made.

The Israeli withdrawal has begun and must eventually take Israel back to the international border, or something very close to it. If the withdrawal were to be confined to the first two phases—from Sidon and its surroundings in the first phase, from the eastern sector overlooking Syrian positions in the second phase—Israel would still be in occupation of the Shia heartland. There would still be nearly 400,000 Lebanese under Israeli occupation, and 80 percent of those would be Shi'ite. Resistance to Israel would take on an added measure of despair and determination. All this was known to the Israeli decision-makers when they announced in mid-January 1985 that they were on their way out of Lebanon.

Israel's withdrawal will leave Lebanon a virtual Syrian protectorate—a dubious prize for any patron. It also prepares the Shia, more radicalized than ever before and representing some 40 percent of the country's population, to come of age as claimants to power.

II

They were an unlikely people for a history of rebellion and exaltation; historically, the Shia of Lebanon were the bearers of a tradition of lament and submission.

The Shia world in *Jabal Amil* (the mountain of Amil, a largely barren piece of land north of Galilee, today's South Lebanon) was, until its inclusion in Greater Lebanon in 1920, an impoverished and marginal corner of the larger entity of Syria. Remote Shia villages and towns fell under Ottoman control, along with the rest of Syria, when the Ottomans spread across

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Islam in the sixteenth century.[1] The Shia geographic isolation was parallel to their religious and cultural isolation. Though subjects of a (Sunni) Ottoman state governed in various eras from Damascus, Sidon and Acre, the Shia were cut off from the power and symbols of the empire and the culture of its great cities.

To make matters worse, early in the sixteenth century the Safavid dynasty in Iran imposed Shi'ism as a state religion and entered into a protracted war with the Ottoman empire. Shi'ism may have rescued the Safavid empire, marked it off from the expanding Ottoman state, but men caught on the wrong side of the divide—Shia in Ottoman realms, Sunnis in the Safavid world—were destined to suffer.

Plunder and cruelty intruded upon this Shia domain, and power was always exercised by men beyond the Shia faith. Folklore related the cruelty of Ottoman officialdom; it taught the futility of political action. More objective histories did not differ much from the folklore. C.F. Volney, French author of one of the great eighteenth-century travel books about Syria and Egypt, passed through the Shia lands after one of the ruinous Ottoman military campaigns; he recorded the existence of a "small nation," a "distinct society." "Since the year 1777," he wrote, "Djezzar, master of Acre and Saide [Sidon] has incessantly laboured to destroy them . . . it is probable they will be totally annihilated, and even their very name become extinct."[2]

David Urquhart, another eighteenth-century British traveller and pamphleteer, called the Shia "unclassible men." "In religion, they are Shi'ites, in race Arabs. . . . They have been prevented by their religious schism from being included in the administrative order of the empire."[3] Urquhart wrote of the "mystery" of the Shi'ite appearance in Lebanon: "Whence it came, how it came, what its race, what its character . . . have been matters of much doubt and mystery. . . . To all inquiries respecting them, even on their immediate borders, the only answers to be obtained were fables revealing utter ignorance mixed with fear and hatred."[4]

[1] Muhsin al Amin, *Khitat Jabal Amil*, Beirut: Matba'at al Insaf, 1961, and Muhammad Jabir, *Tarikh Jabal Amil*, Beirut: Dar al Nahar, 1981.

[2] C. F. Volney, *Travels Through Egypt and Syria*, Vol. II, New York: John Tiebout, 1798, p. 56.

[3] David Urquhart, *The Lebanon (Mount Souria): A History and a Diary*, London: Thomas Cautley Newby, 1860, p. 95.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 94–95.

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Shia history remained raw and limited. This was a people who neither waged, nor faked, a great anticolonial struggle. No major causes of nineteenth-century nationalism touched their lives or transformed their heritage.

At the end of World War I the Ottoman empire collapsed, and no Shia grieved for it. Ottoman dominion was replaced by the mandatory rule of France, which in 1920 appended the Shi'ite territories to Greater Lebanon, with its heartland in the Mount Lebanon area, overlooking the city of Beirut, with the Maronites in its northern part and the Druze in the south.

Two dominant ideas were brought together in the Lebanese polity that the French fashioned and whose independence they granted in 1943: a Maronite concept that stressed Lebanon's Christian identity, and a Sunni Arab conviction, upheld by the merchants of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon, that the country was a piece of a larger Arab world. The impoverished and quiescent Shia fit into neither concept. They were Lebanon's "hewers of wood and drawers of water." On the eve of independence, Lebanese statistics (for whatever they are worth) put the Shi'ite population at some 200,000 inhabitants. Numerically, they were behind the Maronites and the Sunnis. Politically, they lagged behind the smaller but more assertive Druze. The Shia carried into the new Lebanese republic age-old attitudes of aversion to the world of politics.

Quintessential outsiders, some Shia youth were drawn to fringe political movements in the 1950s, the Baath, the communists, or the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party. More dominant remained the handful of semi-feudal Shia families, the rule of the "big men." The Lebanese state had its ways of dealing with both: the big men, the *beys,* could be ignored or bought off with small concessions; the parties of the left labored in a country of sects and clans that could not comfortably assimilate borrowed ideologies. Conflicts of class and economic grievances were turned into sectarian feuds. The marginal parties were shut out of the politics and the division of spoils.

So it all was seen through Lebanon's first two decades of independence. But within the closed Shia community, things were changing. There was a demographic explosion, a migration to the city, improved schooling made possible by remittances from those of the faith who made their way to West Africa to work as hawkers, small traders and diamond smugglers. Such changes remained largely undetected by the world outside as the 1950s drew to a close.

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III

The Shia had always maintained cultural and religious traffic between the hinterland of Shia Lebanon and Persia. Normally, the direction of the traffic took ambitious Shi'ite divines, mullahs, from the impoverished world of Jabal Amil to the large realm of Iran, where clerics were needed to spread the Shia faith. A latecomer to Shi'ism, Iran had become one of the two great centers of the Shia world (Iraq being the other). Ambitious and restless clerics from a small impoverished community were drawn to the patronage and resources of a large state. Shia Lebanon remained a backwater.

In 1959, one Sayyid Musa al Sadr, a tall, handsome cleric, 31 years of age, made a reverse journey. To retrace his path is to embody the transformation of the Shia.

Born in Qom, Sayyid Musa came to the Lebanese coastal town of Tyre as its *mufti*, or religious judge. He was heir to a distinguished lineage; his was one of the most celebrated clerical and scholarly families in the Shia world. Their roots were in Iraq and Iran. Sayyid Musa's cousin and brother-in-law, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al Sadr, was a brilliant scholar executed by the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein in 1980. Sayyid Musa's father, Ayatollah Sadr al din al Sadr, had crossed the border from Iraq to Iran in the mid-1920s after a Shia-led revolt was broken by the British. In Qom, Ayatollah Sadr al din al Sadr, until his death in 1953, played a leading role in the revival of the religious *madrasas*, the seminaries. On his maternal side, Sayyid Musa was the grandson of Ayatollah Hussein Qummi, a cleric in the forefront of the opposition to Reza Shah's effort to centralize the Iranian state and undermine the role of the clergy.

Sayyid Musa al Sadr brought with him a daring and self-confidence alien to the world of Shia Lebanon. In the land of his birth, ayatollahs and great ulama had supported and opposed kings, paid for private armies, administered large welfare networks, led merchants and urban mobs to resist the encroachment of Western monopolies and concessions. Sayyid Musa al Sadr was to do some of the same in Lebanon over the next two decades.

More still, Musa al Sadr was to leave the Shia of Lebanon with a vibrant myth. In the summer of 1978, he disappeared while on a visit to Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi, a fitting end

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to a leader of the faith.[5] In the Shia myth, the Twelfth Imam—religious and political successor to the Prophet—vanished to the eyes of ordinary men in 873–74, to return at the "end of time" and fill the earth with justice. This is the doctrine of the *Ghaiba*, the absence, the occultation, of the Hidden Imam. Musa al Sadr embodied the myth in modern times. He left inheritors and followers sitting under his posters, repeating his words, awaiting his "return." Musa al Sadr was the medium for some of the profound changes in the Shia community.

Sayyid Musa arrived as the Shia were breaking out of their rural insularity and making their way into Beirut, its southern suburbs and its northeastern shantytowns. In 1960, the per capita income in Beirut was five times larger than in the south. The city was a magnet; the lure of the land was being eroded.

In his first decade in Lebanon, Sayyid Musa put together a coalition of educated Shia civil servants, professionals and men with new money. He sought, as he put it, to change the "psychological outlook" of the Shia community; he provided an alternative to the parties of the left and the rule of the feudal families. His first institutional creation was the Higher Shia Council to represent the corporate demands of the Shi'ites before the state. This was a break with the Sunni establishment, and a search for an independent Shia path. It was an effort blessed and aided by the Maronite elites.

A decade after he had arrived in Lebanon, Sayyid Musa al Sadr became known as "Imam" Musa al Sadr, a title loaded with messianic expectations. Here, on a small scale, was the tale to unfold in Iran a decade later with the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini. In both cases, a cleric was set apart from other clerics, was accorded the title of imam and given political authority and obedience.

The symbols of Shi'ism were turned into political weapons, as would happen later in Khomeini's Iran. The tales of martyrdom and persecution that had provided the material for Shia

[5] What is known of the tale is what follows: Musa al Sadr went to Libya with two of his companions—a cleric and a journalist—on August 25, 1978. He was last seen in a Tripoli hotel on August 31; he said to a group of Lebanese that he was on his way to a meeting with Qaddafi. After this the matter becomes controversial. The diplomatic cables suggest that he and his companions were murdered on that day. Libyan exiles who defected to Amman—the king of Jordan was a friend and admirer of Musa al Sadr—confirm the story of foul play. But the Libyans offered a story of their own, and a clumsy coverup job: Musa al Sadr, they claim, left for Italy on an Alitalia flight. What arrived in Italy was Musa al Sadr's baggage, brought there by Libyan agents posing as Musa al Sadr and his companions. The ambiguity of the entire tale has been the source of its power.

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laments became, in Musa al Sadr's reconstruction of them, episodes of political choice and courage. Annually, the Shia mourned the death of Imam Hussein, the Prophet's grandson, who fell in the seventh-century battle of Kerbala, which pitted him and a small band of zealots against the armies of the caliph in Damascus. Musa al Sadr read modern needs into Imam Hussein's death; Hussein was turned into a "revolutionary," a man who made a clear political choice against the rule of an oppressive state. The bearers of Hussein's legacy, he exhorted, owed it to the memory of Hussein to go beyond tears and lamentations.

Musa al Sadr's first followers had come from among the Shi'ite patricians. His second decade was one of populist politics. He was, as he said of himself, a man who grew up in Iran without hearing the sound of a bullet. Yet by the mid-1970s, he established and financed a Shia militia, Amal; "Arms were the adornment of men," he declared to his followers. Shi'ism, the religion of lament, was undergoing transformation into a faith of activism.

IV

Musa al Sadr's populist themes were elaborated against mounting disorder in Lebanon. The Palestinians, banished from Jordan in 1970–71, had created a mini-republic of their own in Lebanon. The Lebanese state to which the cleric had been appealing turned out to be—his description—a scarecrow. The Maronite custodians were in no mood to discuss issues of political reform. They brooded over the country's future and its purity. Panic was driving the Maronites behind their own lines. By the mid-1970s the country was claimed by two armed camps—the Palestinians and their Muslim Lebanese allies on the one hand, the Maronites on the other.

Musa al Sadr straddled the fence. There was no easy choice for him, or for his community. The program of the Maronites was too brittle for him to embrace; that of the Palestinians too reckless. The Palestinian dominion was, for the most part, in Shia land. The Palestine Liberation Organization staked a claim to the south of Lebanon that made the claims of its own inhabitants look petty and irrelevant. The south was turned into a "bridge" for the "re-conquest of Arab Palestine." The Palestinians spoke the language of national liberation and revolution. Their mistakes could be smothered by appeals to a larger cause. No apology had to be made for the massive Israeli

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reprisals that Palestinian operations brought in their train. A grandiose "Arab Cause" was pressed from remote places where the inhabitants had no voice of their own.

The Shia were not articulate and organized as were the Palestinians. The latter belonged to the mainstream of Arab political life. The Palestinians represented an urban Sunni culture imposed upon a rural Shi'ite population. Dispossessed in 1948, the Palestinians had found their way into Arab courts and nationalist movements alike. Unable to "liberate" Palestine or retrieve what had been lost in 1948, the Arab states did the next best thing: they gave the Palestinians yarn and invited them into the Arab councils of power. Funds were available to maintain a Palestinian movement of considerable wealth, to arm and equip a relatively formidable Palestinian presence in Lebanon. The other Arab states bought peace for themselves by indulging turmoil in Lebanon. Steadily, the Palestinian sanctuary in the land north of Israel was evolving into a substitute homeland, and the resident Shia had trouble finding the means and self-confidence to cope with their new Arab occupiers.

Musa al Sadr himself was particularly ill-equipped to confront the Palestinians. His Iranian birth trailed him like a dark shadow, and he was ever anxious, at times excessively so, to assert his Arab credentials. Like the community he led, he desperately wanted acceptance by the larger Arab world. In the early 1970s, he had made the standard statements of fidelity to the Palestinian cause. But years of disorder in the south of Lebanon brought the breaking point between the Shia and the Palestinians. A remarkable memoir by a Lebanese politician, Karim Pakradouni, renders Musa al Sadr's judgment of the Palestinian occupation:

> Shortly before Musa al Sadr's disappearance, he said to me: "The Palestinian resistance is not a revolution; it does not seek martyrdom. It is a military machine that terrorizes the Arab world. With weapons Arafat gets money; with money he can feed the press; and thanks to the press he can get a hearing before world public opinion. . . . The Shia have finally gotten over their inferiority complex vis-à-vis the Palestinian organizations."[6]

The Shia journey out of self-contempt and political quies-

[6] Karim Pakradouni, *Al Salam al Mafqud* (The Missing Peace), Beirut: Ibr al Sharq, 1984, p. 118.

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cence had been led by the charismatic mullah as far as one man could take it. Musa al Sadr walked between rain drops. He had given political activism the sanction of religious symbols; he linked to the larger Shia world lonely people who had felt isolated and cast adrift. It fell to his inheritors to build up his mystique, to exploit the power and symbolism of his birth in Qom and his mysterious disappearance.

Like a chameleon, he was different things to different people. The patricians among his followers saw him as a man of moderate politics, a reformer. For others, Musa al Sadr was to become a great avenger, his tale and memory a warrant for daring deeds and unbending politics. Some saw him as a man who sought the integration of the Shi'ites into the Lebanese political order. Others depicted him as a Pan-Islamic figure who had his gaze fixed on Iran, who spent the last two years of his activity consumed with the struggle between the Shah and the Iranian opposition.

The times played into the legacy and enhanced it: Iran's revolution erupted shortly after Musa al Sadr's disappearance. An "armed imam" brought down the monarchy; the humble folk of Shia Lebanon became part of a large upheaval. The Iranian revolution exalted the once-timid and embarrassing symbols of Shia Islam. Leading figures in post-revolutionary Iran had been sheltered and helped by Musa al Sadr and had drawn on the funds and the hospitality of the Shia of Lebanon—men like Musa al Sadr's nephew, one-time Deputy Prime Minister Sadeq Tabatabai, or Mustapha Chamran, who was defense minister until his death on the Iraqi front in 1981. Musa al Sadr himself was a man of double identity claimed by the Iranians and by the Shia in Lebanon; he embodied the bonds—both real and imagined—between the Shia of Lebanon and of Iran.

Khomeini's revolution brought a change in the relation of the Shia to the larger Arab world and its symbols. In times past, when Pan-Arabism was the strident faith of large Arab cities, the "Persian connection" of the Shia of Lebanon and other Arab realms was carried like some embarrassing and insinuating baggage.[7] Now the Iranian revolution stood history on its head. A major revolt succeeded in the name of Islam and cultural authenticity. The material for messianic politics

[7] See Abbas Kelidar, "The Shi'i Imami Community and Politics in the Arab East," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 19, January 1983.

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and radicalism was there—all the more so as the Iranian revolution devoured its liberal wing and set out to create a "reign of virtue," and to export its ways.

V

The Shia of Lebanon sat out the war of 1982, it was not their war. Initially, they gave Israel's campaign their silent approval. No tears were shed for the Palestinians, whose presence was a dominion of strangers that showed every sign of digging in for a long stay, turning into something permanent, impossible to dismantle.

But the Shia—unlike the Lebanese Christians—could not openly embrace Israel. They were not that kind of people; traffic with men beyond the faith was not part of their history. For centuries, the Maronites had played the game of inviting strangers and drawing on their resources. The Shia, on the other hand, brought with them a nervousness about encountering strangers, a fear of defilement. The peculiar Shia relationship to the larger Arab world—they were of it, but not fully—rendered them unable to come to terms with Zionism. Like Caesar's wife, they had to be above suspicion. They were sure that they would not be forgiven a close association with Israel.

Israel's long-range designs in Lebanon were yet another problem for the Shia. Israel had come in as a savior, but saviors could betray. There had always existed in Lebanon a suspicion that Israel coveted the lands of the south and the waters of the Litani River. A body of political literature had popularized that theme. There was enough Zionist scripture around, and enough Palestinian reiterations of it, to make men wonder and worry. Israel could never provide sufficient assurance that its presence would be temporary. And the longer Israeli troops stayed, the more credible the suspicions became.

The grace period extended to Israel lasted little more than a year. Israel had come to Lebanon with a flawed understanding of the country; Israeli decision-makers knew next to nothing about the Shi'ites. Israel was, in effect, trying to impose Christian hegemony in a part of Lebanon which had very few Christians. On Israel's coattails rode the brigands of Israel's crony, Major Saad Haddad, who moved all the way from their strip on Israel's border up to the Awali River. Then came the zealous units of the Maronite "Lebanese Forces." A Palestinian

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dominion in the south was replaced by a Christian regime of harassment and extortions.

Trouble was waiting to happen. And trouble came on a particularly symbolic day: October 16, 1983, the day of *Ashura*, the tenth of the Muslim month of Muharram, commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussein at Kerbala. An armed Israeli convoy coincidentally turned up in the Shia town of Nabatiye on that day, and tried to make its way through the procession of mourners and flagellants. Two people were killed, several wounded.

The die was cast in the south. The next day Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams El Din, the leading cleric in the Shia community, vice-chairman of the Higher Shia Council (the chairmanship is retained by the missing Imam Musa al Sadr), issued a *fatwa*, a binding religious opinion, calling for "civil disobedience" and "resistance to occupation in the South." Dealing with Israel, he said, was "absolutely impermissible." Of his "brothers and sons in the South," the cleric asked fidelity to the land, that they defend and hold it at any price. Every generation, the cleric said, has its own Kerbala· man makes his own choice; he can "soar and sacrifice" or he can "submit and betray."[8]

The seventh-century tale of Kerbala became a modern weapon. The cleric who issued this fatwa was a conservative man who played the conventional game of Lebanese politics. But other clerics and true believers believed in an entirely different kind of politics. And Syria, entrenched in the Bekaa Valley, was ready to harness the wrath and the passion of extremists for its own purposes. Suicide drivers and "martyrs" were not far behind. On November 4, a suicide driver struck the Israeli headquarters in Tyre. Israel responded by closing the crossing on the Awali River which connected the south to Beirut. Clinton Bailey, an Israeli academic who served as a liaison officer in south Lebanon, summed up the impact: "The basis of the southern economy collapsed. It was this event that finally smashed the last friendly sentiments toward Israel."[9]

VI

The fight in the south was one Shia concern. Another Shia fight was waged in Greater Beirut over the city itself, and over

[8] See the text in *An Nahar*, October 18, 1983.

[9] Clinton Bailey, "Lebanon's Shi'ites After the 1982 War," Tel Aviv University, December 1984, p. 18.

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the nature of the Lebanese regime to emerge after the war. This was a fight that pitted the Shi'ites and their Druze allies in the nearby Shouf Mountains (and their Syrian backers) against the Phalange-based regime of President Amin Gemayel and, by extension, his American backers.

Guilt for the summer of 1982 and for the Sabra and Shatila massacres of that autumn had taken the U.S. marines to Lebanon on an undefined mission in a setting that Washington did not fully understand. Once on the ground, the distant superpower became a party to the sectarian feud. Behind the shield and prestige of a great power, the Phalange-based regime set out to subdue an unwieldy country. In times past, when France was a power to be reckoned with, the Maronites made themselves part of France's mission in the Levant. And for a brief moment (from the fall of 1982 until the winter of 1984) history seemed to repeat itself for the Maronites. The United States was to do for them—so they hoped—what France once did. It was a time of great Maronite delusions. The Shi'ite "squatters" in the southern suburbs were to be cleared out; the Druze of the Shouf Mountains were to be defeated.

A fantasy from the past continued to see the Shia of Greater Beirut as intruders on the city, peasants who could be sent packing to their two ancestral homelands in the south and the Bekaa Valley. It was in this vein that one Pierre Yazbeck, the representative of the Lebanese Forces in Israel, told a visiting American journalist: "The Shia in Beirut are an unnatural concentration. They are refugees from the south and should return."[10] Boulos Namaan, the influential head of the Maronite Order of Monks, put forth a similar view to a young Shi'ite journalist. In the vision of this militant priest, the urban Shia—some 700,000 inhabitants, perhaps more—would be sent back to the land. A large Shia population had grown in the city, and much of the real estate in Greater Beirut belonged to them. Yet their right to a place in the city was not yet recognized.

The Shia had been through this before. Early in the civil war, they had lost one of their major city footholds, an Armenian-Shia settlement northeast of Beirut. They were expelled in 1976 when that suburb fell behind Maronite lines. It took no great imagination to see the new scheme: East Beirut would remain Christian; West Beirut, the traditional haven of the

[10] Craig S. Karpel, "Onward Christian Diplomats," *The New Republic*, September 3, 1984, p. 23.

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Sunni community, would have to come to terms with the Phalange for it lacked the armed manpower to defend itself. There was no room left for the Shia.

The Gemayel regime found a Sunni figleaf in the person of a minor Beirut politician, Shafiq al Wazzan, who was appointed prime minister. Then it pushed on two fronts—against the Druze in the Shouf and the Shia in Greater Beirut. It shut out of its deliberations Nabih Berri, the leader of Shia Amal, and the Druze chieftain Walid Jumblatt. It then signed the American-sponsored accord of May 17, 1983, with Israel. The Gemayel regime sought the support of a foreign power to substitute for a social contract at home. By mid-summer 1983, the Gemayel regime's strategy had forged in opposition a novel alliance between the Druze and the Shia.

The Maronite bid for hegemony could not be sustained against the Druze and the Shia together, and the ruthless determination of Syria to hold sway in Lebanon. The Phalange were convinced of America's commitment to them, but soon the distant superpower was on its way out of Lebanon. Suicide drivers struck the American and the French barracks on October 23, 1983. The United States could not annul geography for the Maronites, or push Syria out of the country, or make the Druze and the Shia accept Phalange hegemony. Eight days after the attack on the marines, Syria convened a conference of Lebanon's warlords in Geneva. Nabih Berri, a man of modest background, joined the traditional notables in the councils of power.

But the fight in Beirut would not be settled for another three months. In early February, the Shia and the Druze swept into West Beirut, and Berri called on the army to desert the regime. All along, the army had a rank-and-file Shi'ite majority and, predictably, it split along sectarian lines and collapsed. The leader of Amal had acted in the nick of time, for the battle in the south against Israel was being fought by militant clerics, and the extremists in the Bekaa Valley were gaining power. The middle-ground held by Amal was caving under.[11] In Clinton Bailey's words, Berri had to act "to check a growing tidal wave of support for the fanatics."[12]

[11] See chapter by Augustus Richard Norton in Juan Cole and Nikki Keddie, eds., *Shi'ism and Social Protest*, New Haven: Yale University Press, forthcoming in 1985. Portions of this chapter were presented in a Council on Foreign Relations study group, January 29, 1985.

[12] Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

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The challenge of the Druze was an old communal threat. Constituting only some six percent of the country's population, the Druze sought only to be left alone in their own part of the country. The Druze centrality of command subordinated the men of the religious institution to the authority of the chieftain.

The Shia were a wholly different problem. Their numbers were much larger. Their long memories of persecution were suddenly awakening to a sense of power. They spoke with a multitude of voices: clerics battled secular leaders for ascendancy. Only Musa al Sadr himself, "the Imam," had laid claim to combined political and religious leadership. In his absence there were competing inheritors: the clerics insisted on the primacy of their role; the laymen who willingly followed Musa al Sadr now wanted the clerics to return to the traditional functions of the men of religion. A patrician from the Bekaa Valley, Hussein al Husseini, now speaker of parliament, continued to play by the old rules of the Lebanese system. His rival, Nabih Berri, now a member of the coalition cabinet, brought to his own quest the energy of an ambitious outsider—the drive of a new Shia middle class grasping for its own place.

And there was the chaos in the country bringing forth new men who found in the anarchy an outlet and a vehicle for their own ambitions.

VII

The most profound truth of Lebanon is as old as the land: the primacy of the religious sect and the clan, and the will of the "big man" leading a particular sect. Men may have moved beyond their sects during periods of self-confidence, but they retreated behind communal lines during times of upheaval. The leading sect thrived when it had something to offer the country beyond sheer dominion. Liberals had long tried to make of Lebanon a sophisticated republic by the Mediterranean. But that was a pretense, and we have seen its terrible harvest. Marxists brought to Lebanon the categories of class and the conflicts of class. But the country outwitted and eluded them as well. Today Shia clerics, Maronite monks and Sunni emirs (princes) of Islamic associations lead the people of Lebanon and tap their deepest phobias and aspirations.

The Druze, a formidable sect of warriors, once governed the heartland of Lebanon as feudal rulers and warlords. Then, in the mid-nineteenth century, the Maronites overtook them, found their way to the city of Beirut when it was becoming a

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thriving trade center, developed links to Europe through a vibrant silk industry, and learned the ways of the modern world. The Druze were too brittle to change. The Maronites had something more substantial and viable to offer Lebanon—and even the Arab world beyond. It was on that reserve that the Maronites drew for a little more than a century.

History has again turned in Lebanon. It is the Shia who have emerged as the country's principal sect. The skills and the habits of authority, and the self-confidence that come with power and a settled existence, are not yet theirs. But a profound change in their fortunes has taken place. For the moderate Shia mainstream, this was a chance for the country's largest group to lay claim to its legitimate share of power. For more marginal and intemperate men, there was something to the recent events resembling a millennial fulfillment. The great drama that came to pass in Iran, *Wilayat al Faqih*, the rule of the jurist, found those who would want to emulate it in Lebanon. In the words of a young cleric from the Party of God (Hizbollah), Sayyid Ibrahim al Amin: "the realm of the *faqih*, the jurist, is not a specific geographical realm; it covers the entire world of Islam."[13] In this one true believer's vision, the special situation of Lebanon is not particularly important; Lebanon is an "impure realm" that has to be cleansed and the Shia state that found its fulfillment in Iran should be duplicated in Lebanon.

But the specter of a Shia state is a Shia delusion; it is also a demon that others in Lebanon—Sunnis, Maronites—summon up to deny the legitimate claims of the country's largest group. The fight in Lebanon now is not about the establishment of a state of the zealous; it is about the apportioning of power among the country's principal sects. Some Shi'ites, to be sure, borrow the example of Iran. But the overwhelming majority of the Shia recognize the limits of the country. Even Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, Shia Beirut's most compelling preacher, dismisses the idea of an "Islamic state" in Lebanon. The "objective conditions," he says, are not there for "Islam to rule Lebanon"; such ideas, he says, are "leaps into the void"; one has to consider "the larger balance of forces."[14]

Men in Lebanon sharing Iran's Shi'ite faith live in a world and a state of their own. Carried across frontiers—particularly

[13] Anon., *Al Harakat al Islamiyya fi Lubnan*, Beirut: Al Shira', 1984, p. 148.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 259–265.

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across a tough, unsentimental state like Syria—the Shia truth of Iran runs into concrete social realities that are different from the old country. Beirut is a tough and cynical city now hardened by war and ruin. There, men and women see a scoundrel behind every mask. This is not exactly the ideal site for great movements of redemption.

The true believers in Hizbollah in the southern slums of Beirut and a splinter movement of fanatics in the Bekaa—Islamic Amal headed by Hussein Muswai, a former government schoolteacher now doing Iran's bidding in Lebanon—are sure to give their militant vision a try. They have going for them the sense that history is on their side, that moderation everywhere in the region has been discredited, that the time is right to settle old historic accounts, that great odds could be overcome by faith and terror. Hizbollah and Islamic Amal will fight for their place and their vision of the country. As in other similar situations, the true believers will bring to their quest the grievances of ambitious men, the legitimacy of time-honored symbols, and will try to make up in passion and frenzy what they lack in numbers. But if the offer made by Hizbollah for the Christians of Lebanon to convert to Islam is a true indication of the extremists' mood, theirs is a state approaching delirium.

So far the men in Hizbollah have coexisted, uneasily, with the Shia mainstream movement, Amal. The former are made of sterner stuff, but they know that they are in the minority. Only a fool would say for sure whether the Shia center will hold: the odds are in its favor, and the Shia mainstream is not without some credits of its own. It fought a successful battle for Beirut in February of 1984; it threw its weight into the battle in the south against Israel as a way of preempting the appeal and the claim of the extremists. The Shia mainstream is a legitimate piece of Lebanon—with all the appertaining strengths and weaknesses.

A Shia bid for power that tries to outrun the sectarian compact can succeed no better than the Maronite dream of a state cut off from its Arab environment. The harsh economic limits of Lebanon will always push that country in the direction of the Arab world as a petitioner for funds and help. And the custodians of Arab wealth in the Gulf states will try their best to calm the tempest in Lebanon, or to quarantine Lebanon's troubles. A radical Shi'ite enterprise in Lebanon will end in isolation and frenzy. There is no viable agricultural hinterland

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in Lebanon to sustain a zealous state of the faithful. Unlike Iran, there is no oil wealth that would accrue to those who conquer political power. The space and resources for a utopia of any kind do not exist in Lebanon. A radical Shia political enterprise would be starved by the Arab world. Utopias do not thrive in small economies of trade and services.

VIII

More concrete and less grandiose Shia causes will figure in the phase ahead. Above all, there is the issue of reclaiming the land. The south of Lebanon will be up for grabs in the aftermath of Israel's withdrawal. That is as sure as anything in Lebanon; the weakness of the Lebanese government will preclude a happier outcome. There will be, as well, a settlement of petty accounts with the collaborators and "enforcers" of the occupation regime. But beyond the small accounts, there is the larger imperative of controlling the territory itself.

Israel's preferred solution is the control of the south by its new client, General Antoine Lahd, and his South Lebanon Army; its nightmare is the return of its old nemesis, the PLO. It should be patently obvious that the South Lebanon Army—a group of mercenaries—will be unable to inherit Israel's position or to pacify the south. What power has been exercised by that army has been derived from Israel's own presence. And that power has in the main consisted of acts of harassment and violence. As a force of Christians in a predominantly Shi'ite part of the country, the South Lebanon Army will, in time, be overwhelmed.

The question of the return of the Palestinians to the south of Lebanon is more tangled. One does not have to range very far to divine the reasons why Yasir Arafat might try a comeback to the south of Lebanon. In the latter part of 1983, Arafat returned from his Tunisian exile and made a stand in the refugee camps of Tripoli; he vowed to "fight to the end," and was forced out by Syria and its own Palestinian clients. As the dream of Palestinian nationalism faces the combined power of Israel and Syria, Arafat's search for some geographic base of his own is a fight to keep his own claim alive.

The large Palestinian refugee camps in the Sidon area could tempt Arafat. This would be in keeping with his own style: the avoidance of hard choices, his inability to disavow the slogans of the past—i.e., the "armed struggle"—or to pursue, through Jordan, whatever diplomatic options are available on that front,

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and to carry with him his principal lieutenants in a sharp break with a legacy of Palestinian negations.[15]

The PLO would bring to Lebanon money and weapons and more of the delusions that the West Bank could be rescued, and Israel could be defeated, from Lebanon. Young Palestinian boys without a future would be given guns and the illusion of a political undertaking. The Sunnis of West Beirut and Sidon, worried about Shia numbers and Shia militancy, could offer support to Arafat's PLO. The Palestinians would be brought back—indeed this has begun—to West Beirut as a praetorian guard for a threatened Sunni community witnessing the passing of its own ascendancy.

In the final analysis, though, Arafat and his organization would bring to the refugee camps in the south the same hell that trailed them to Tripoli in 1983. Arafat would have to fight Syria's breakaway Palestinian factions, as he did in Tripoli. And this time his forces would be face to face with an armed Shia population. It will be impossible for the Palestinians to brandish in the face of the Shia the cause of an armed struggle against Israel. Plainly, the Shia proved to be more formidable enemies of Israel than did the PLO. The awe with which Arafat and his cause were once held is a thing of the past.

Israel, then, is left with having to trust today's enemy—the Shia—to keep the Palestinians out of the south. Until the Lebanese state goes beyond the factionalism of the warlords—not a likely prospect in the near future, if ever—it is only the Shia mainstream, and its armed movement, Amal, that could secure the south. They would do it for their own reasons; armed Palestinian activity would be checked to keep intact the Shia world in southern Lebanon.

No assurances should be sought by Israel from the Shia. For, if the past is any guide, none will be offered. The control of the land would have to be left to its own people. The fragile institutions of the Lebanese state—a cabinet in which the

[15] A full and unequivocal PLO proxy for Jordan that would suffice to tempt King Hussein and interest Israel and America would be tantamount to the admission of a generation of Palestinian leaders that their own vocation and their own quest has reached a blind alley. And this is something that political men who have known no other vocation must, for obvious reasons, be reluctant to undertake. In effect, the PLO is being asked to choose between its own unity and "organizational imperatives" on the one hand and "saving the land" on the West Bank on the other. The paralysis is easy to understand. One must therefore remain skeptical about the outcome of the PLO-Jordanian negotiations launched in February 1985. A similar effort broke down in April 1983. An inevitable discord is built into the peculiar Jordanian-Palestinian relationship. This has been elaborated by Aaron David Miller, *The PLO and the Politics of Survival*, New York: Praeger, 1983.

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leader of Amal has a portfolio for the affairs of the south, an army in which whole brigades and units are manned and led by Shia, a Shia defense minister—could provide the cover and the legitimacy of the state for the Shia endeavor in the south. None of this will bring order to Lebanon, or change the country's ways, or enable the place to look beyond its feuds and phobias. It only means that a foreign power that crossed an international border has retreated, leaving the place to find its own balance of forces.

There is no likelihood of a tranquil Israeli-Lebanese border, no guarantee that Katyusha rockets will not again be fired into Galilee after Israel's withdrawal. No government in Israel should have to make that kind of promise; only the men who waged the war of 1982 entertained such grandiose expectations.

The case for the Israeli withdrawal is a more cautious one, based on a hard reading of the outcome of Israel's invasion of Lebanon. The war ended in a major setback for the nation that waged it, and in great ruin for the people at the receiving end of that invasion. A war billed as a war against terrorism and radicalism culminated in deeper levels of rage and terror. The retreat to the international border would be a liquidation of that war and a return to the status quo ante. From the border, Israel would have the means to defend itself and the right to reprisals that stay within the rough rules of proportionality. The reign of informers and of Israel's Shin Beth security force, which made life a nightmare for occupier and occupied alike, would be replaced by a return to more conventional means of security.

The fight between the Shia and Israel is more "normal" than that between Israel and the Palestinians. The current struggle in the south of Lebanon is the classic one between a native population and a foreign occupier. There are no Shia territorial claims against Israel. The argument that Israel has ended up with the enmity of hundreds of thousands of Shi'ites, as opposed to that of several thousand Palestinian guerrillas, is misplaced. It is not across the border to the south that the Shia look. Their cause is in the south of Lebanon itself and in Greater Beirut. For the true believers among them, there is a cause to their east—the battle between the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and its Shia challengers. Iraq has the holy cities of Shia Islam—Najaf and Kerbala—and the gripping historical memories of an embattled faith. It was in Iraq's

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shrines and religious seminaries that the Shia clerics of Lebanon studied.

IX

Closer to home, there is the power of Syria to be confronted by Lebanese Shia and non-Shia alike. So far Syria has pursued a two-tier Shia policy—unleashing the Shi'ites against the Americans and the Israelis and the Gemayel regime, and then reining them in when it saw fit to do so. From its position in the Bekaa, Syria manipulated the Shia rage and the passions for its own *raison d'état*; it has played off rival Shia factions and contenders for power against one another.[16] As the new guarantor of the Lebanese political order, Syria can be expected to do what it can against a major Shi'ite bid for power. This would be in keeping with Syria's past behavior in Lebanon. A decade ago, Syria dashed the hopes of those on the Lebanese left and among the Palestinians and the Druze who sought to overwhelm the Maronites and turn Lebanon into a radical republic of their own. Then it aborted the Maronite drive for hegemony. Is one to doubt whether Syria would have the will to thwart a radical Shia undertaking that goes beyond the limits of Syria's tolerance?

Syria has no great schemes for Lebanon; it is free of the sort of illusions that Israel and America had about the country. The Syrian leaders know the Lebanese cast of characters. They have been dealing with Lebanon's warlords for more than a decade; they know the factionalism of the place and the hopeless ways of Lebanon's tribes. The custodians of the Syrian state have asserted, and successfully so, their right to intervene in Lebanon, and have defended that prerogative against the Palestinians and their Lebanese allies in 1976, and against the Maronites and Israel and America in 1978–84. Syria has paid homage to the shell of Lebanese sovereignty when it saw fit to do so, and violated it during that brief interlude in 1982–84 when the Phalange-based regime groped for an Israeli, then for an American, prop in order to push Syria out of the country.

Syria will continue to work within and through the shell of Lebanese sovereignty. The Syrians will not push their luck in Lebanon. The facade of Syrian power—imposing when the Syrians are engaged in mischief against the Israelis and the

[16] See Patrick Seale, *The Observer* (London), September 23, 1984.

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Americans, and against other Arabs—hides all sorts of Syrian weaknesses and troubles, troubles that would come to the surface if the Syrians set out to subdue Lebanon or if the dream of Greater Syria becomes more heady and reckless. The Syrian regime remains a minority-based regime ruling a sullen and resentful country. A presence in Lebanon that turns unduly grim and costly is not something that the custodians of the Syrian state are interested in.

Syria has in place the kind of Lebanese regime it wants: a regime with clipped wings and with no other foreign option, a regime in which all the competing warlords—Shi'ite, Sunni, Maronite and Druze—journey to Damascus to check the schemes of their rivals, to obtain what insurance policies the custodians of the Syrian state are willing to underwrite. Syria will let the "natural" workings of power run their course. Damascus is sure that its pull and weight will bring whole parts of Lebanon under its sway, places like the Bekaa Valley (Shia) in eastern Lebanon and Tripoli (Sunni) in the north were historically parts of Greater Syria. It was a foreign decision—that of the French in 1920—to assign these portions to the Lebanese state. As the Western world, France, then the United States, retreats from Lebanon, an old historical pattern will reassert itself. Damascus, a city of the interior, will have its way against Beirut, a city on the Mediterranean hitherto sustained by Western power and pretensions.

Syria will not allow Lebanon to be used by others against it. Damascus denied the land to the Palestinians, then to the Israelis and the Americans. Shrewd players, the Syrians knew—and repeatedly told the Lebanese—that the Americans did not have the stomach, or the stakes, for a fight over Lebanon. The Syrians escalated the stakes and waited for America to pack up and leave. Roughly the same strategy was applied against Israel. Israel was far too vulnerable to withstand a campaign of attrition. It was the "balance of interest" that operated to Syria's advantage against the Americans and the Israelis in Lebanon and that will continue to do so in the years ahead. Syria was willing and able to out-wait both the Americans and the Israelis in Lebanon and to sustain greater losses there.

As for Syria's duel with the Palestinians in Lebanon, that was never such a difficult undertaking and will be far easier in the phase ahead. An armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon is an alien structure. For now the three preeminent groups in Lebanon's politics—the Druze, the Shia, and the Maronites—are

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all agreed that there can be no independent Palestinian role in Lebanon. And it is a view shared by the custodians of the Syrian state who have long believed in their own prerogatives as the "principal Arab state" in the Fertile Crescent, and as the most legitimate and interested party to the question of Palestine.

If and when the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon is completed, those in Lebanon trying to shape the future will confront the will of Syria and the harsh economic and sectarian limits of their country. Some power has come to the Shia, to be sure. The Shia leaders recall a time not so long ago when Beirut was an alien place, a land of Sunni Muslims and Christians, and when the dead in the Shia community had to be taken back to their ancestral villages for burial because there was no Shia cemetery in the city. Now some of the great fortunes in the city are Shia fortunes; the Shia are present in force. But power has come to the Shia during a time of ruin. All in Lebanon battle one another, a vicious circle of helplessness. In a world of states, the lives of men and sects without states of their own are chronicles of futility.

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William G. Hyland

THE GORBACHEV SUCCESSION

Two trendlines suddenly intersected in March 1985. The arms control negotiations between the two superpowers resumed, after a long break that had threatened to become a permanent breakdown. As the delegations were arriving in Geneva, Konstantin Chernenko died in Moscow, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev was quickly named the new general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The succession to Leonid Brezhnev had at last been completed.

The new talks in Geneva are indeed new: they begin against the backdrop of a threat of a revolutionary upheaval in the superpowers' strategic competition. For the first time in the nuclear age, the possibility of strategic defense is being taken seriously: at issue is whether this prospect will prove to be the cause of a truly dangerous confrontation between Moscow and Washington, or the source of new common ground and even a political breakthrough.

In Moscow, for the first time, the leadership of the Soviet party has passed to a man born after the Bolshevik revolution. Change is in the air. A new generation is taking power. In his initial public remarks, however, the new general secretary elaborated on old and familiar themes: prosperity and reform at home, and peace and security abroad. He promised both, of course. But it was not a bad platform.

It is fashionable in the West to dismiss, with some contempt, the idea of any major changes in Soviet foreign policy simply because of new personalities. Nevertheless, the reelected President of the United States finally had a partner to deal with; a man who could easily survive well beyond the end of President Reagan's second term. So the President extended an invitation for an early summit meeting. And the atmosphere of Soviet-American relations began to clear.

Much will depend on Geneva, and whether an acceptable resolution can be found to what looked like an immediate stalemate over American plans to proceed with a Star Wars defense and Soviet determination to block it. The resolution

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of this confrontation, in turn, will depend in some measure on whether Mikhail Gorbachev is a man who would be willing and able to challenge the Soviet system and change it.

II

The Soviet state and party form a massive bulwark against change. It is largely the same system as that created by Josef Stalin, though without his personal insanities. It is a heavy bureaucracy, bound by a stultifying ideology and administered by careerists, whose vested interests are in maintaining the status quo, perhaps occasionally permitting just enough change to mollify the forces of discontent. Only strong leaders have affected this mass inertia: Stalin by terror, Khrushchev by surprise attack. Stalin, of course, succeeded all too well; Nikita Khrushchev eventually faltered and suffered the fate of innovators—in October 1964 he was the victim of a coup staged by his loyal lieutenants, Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin and Mikhail Suslov. (Mikhail Gorbachev at the time was a minor functionary in the town of Stavropol in the Caucasus.)

There were flickers of change in the wake of the anti-Khrushchev coup. A reform program was sponsored by Kosygin in 1965. But the Brezhnev era was not to be a time of change. Rather, it was a time for the system to settle down after the tumult of Khrushchev. For a decade the Soviet leadership was virtually unchanged. Reform was quietly dropped, as was de-Stalinization. Party morale was repaired, the split with China became definitive, and Russia massively rearmed.

Leonid Brezhnev made the Soviet Union a true superpower. But there was a price. Stability became stagnation: the economy ran down; the leadership began to atrophy. And superpower status, once earned, could not be maintained without aggressive foreign and defense policies that eventually clashed with the main line of Brezhnev's détente policies. By the early 1980s, the necessary flexibility and dexterity required to deal with growing problems abroad were beyond the capacity of the ailing and aging Brezhnev. It seemed to outsiders that it was time for a change.

But Soviet politics does not change much. There are rules of engagement. One of them is that seniority counts; that was Brezhnev's contribution. Thus the succession progressed first to the reliable Yuri Andropov and then to the tried and true Konstantin Chernenko. It remains one of the Kremlin's many

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mysteries why Chernenko, whom Brezhnev had anointed as the crown prince, was denied the succession in the first round after Brezhnev died in November 1982. It is also something of a mystery why, given his health, he was granted a second chance when Andropov died in February 1984.

In any case, Andropov proved to be something of a surprise. Thought to be the representative of the old orthodoxy by virtue of his service in the dreaded KGB, he loomed as a potentially disruptive force—but as a reformer. His campaign against corruption seemed to herald more sweeping changes, perhaps even a shift to the liberal economic reforms of Hungary, where Andropov had served in the 1950s. It was against this background that Mikhail Gorbachev emerged as the nominal second in command and a potential successor; thus, Gorbachev came to be closely identified with the reform faction.

To be designated as the successor is a dubious and dangerous honor. The position has been occupied by many Soviet leaders who then passed into oblivion (Kirichenko, Kozlov, Kirilenko). Gorbachev's success in surviving the change from Andropov to Chernenko, and then assuming power so smoothly, suggests he has formidable political skills, a conclusion that seems borne out by the firsthand testimony of his British interlocutors during his visit to London last December.

Yet the transfer of power from Chernenko to Gorbachev was the tip of the iceberg. Below the waterline, Soviet politics was marked by the clash between the forces of continuity and the imperative of change. The tendencies toward reform that began under Andropov (presumably supported by Gorbachev) were stifled under Chernenko's brief reign. Indeed, some advocates of economic reform were officially chastised in one of those Aesopian pronouncements that signal major controversy in Soviet politics. The magazine that had sponsored some suggestions of change was forced to apologize for its errors.[1]

The strength of the old guard was also dramatically demonstrated in September 1984, when the chief of the general staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, was summarily dismissed, and sent to the military equivalent of Siberia. His ostensible error was that he complained too publicly about the economic inefficiencies that were blocking the kind of military progress necessary if the Soviet Union was to adjust to an era of nuclear stalemate.

[1]"Stern Rebuke for Advocate of Economic Reform," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, No. RL 476/84, December 19, 1984.

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One suspects that he was removed less for his heretical views than for his boldness in challenging the aging political coalition in the Politburo. It is intriguing to speculate about the military's position in politics, now that Chernenko has departed. Could there be a comeback for professional officers such as Ogarkov? One thinks of Marshal Zhukov's career. It was this general atmosphere of reaction under Chernenko that led to speculation that the new successor would not be Gorbachev, but the more conservative Grigory Romanov. One can wonder whether this would have been the outcome had Chernenko lingered on.

III

Now the Gorbachev era begins. The conventional wisdom in the West is that we should not expect much change until Gorbachev has consolidated his position. It took Khrushchev a full three years to defeat his rivals for Stalin's mantle. It took Brezhnev about four to five years to emerge from the group that overthrew Khrushchev. One would expect a younger, less experienced leader to take even longer. Moreover, Soviet history suggests that succession struggles lead to strange turns in policy. Stalin vilified Trotsky, drove him out of the Soviet Union in 1929, but then adopted his economic program. Khrushchev attacked Malenkov for his heretical departures from Stalinism, then used de-Stalinization to drive out Molotov. In the Khrushchev era it was Frol Kozlov, the potential successor, who was portrayed as the Stalinist (in a famous poem by Yevtushenko), but it was Kozlov's rival, Brezhnev, who prevailed and then halted the attacks on the memory of the dead dictator in the name of restoring stability.

Thus it is conceivable—indeed consistent with Soviet history—that Gorbachev too will be forced to carry out the careful maneuvers, strike the political bargains, and engage in the shifts of policy that the system requires if he is to hold on to power in the Kremlin. But there is also reason to believe that this will not prove to be the case this time. Gorbachev's position as second in command was only mildly challenged when Chernenko was in office in the summer and fall of last year (1984). He has been presiding over the Politburo for some time, and the circumstances of his accession to Chernenko's position suggest a prior decision, one dating back perhaps several months. And most important, he does not assume power as

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only the first among equals, as was the case with Andropov and Chernenko.

The Gorbachev Politburo, which shrank to only ten members when Chernenko died, is not a collection of powerful contenders, as was the case when Stalin died or when Khrushchev was overthrown. The Gorbachev Politburo has two tiers: the remainder of the old guard (Andrei Gromyko, Nikolai Tikhonov, Viktor Grishin, Mikhail Solomentsev and Vladimir Shcherbitsky) and several younger members. His rivals are not particularly impressive. It is difficult to put Grishin, the longtime leader of the party bureau in Moscow, in the same category as Molotov in 1953 or Kosygin in 1964. This does not mean that Gorbachev's power approaches that of Brezhnev in his prime. The old guard, especially the durable Prime Minister Tikhonov and the redoubtable foreign minister, Gromyko, clearly will influence politics and policy. Moreover, Grigory Romanov, who might have succeeded Chernenko, remains a potential rival for Gorbachev.

Politics in the Kremlin does not stop simply because of a change in generations. Nevertheless, the position of general secretary carries with it enormous power and wide prerogatives. And there is ample room on the Politburo for Gorbachev to build up his own base of power. He acts like a man in charge, and there may be good reason for his self-confidence. We may well be spared the dreary process of Kremlin infighting.

Gorbachev's emergence as a reformer seems now to be taken for granted—at least in the West. "Impatient Seeker of Economic Change," ran one headline in an American newspaper. His most frequently quoted statement has been: "We will have to carry out profound transformations in the economy and in the entire system of social relations." Yet the Soviet Union is not China, where a nearly magical transformation could take hold because Mao's system had made only a scratch on an ancient society.

This is not true of the Soviet Union. The Stalinist system has been maturing for decades. It cannot be easily reshaped. Soviet officials, with some indignation, insist that the U.S.S.R. is not Hungary, that reforms that are possible in a small economy are not applicable to the vast machinery of the Soviet Union. And, even if Gorbachev is determined to make significant changes, what would be their essence? Will a tired party apparatus be able to institute a dynamic economic reform program that would threaten that party's very legitimacy? Or will the party

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have to be shaken and reformed as well? But this was Khrushchev's downfall—an example Gorbachev surely must remember.

Nonetheless, we must be prepared for a period in which the Soviet Union does attempt to throw off some of the dead weight of the past. Gorbachev seems likely to be a vigorous leader, forceful and dynamic. Is this in the Western interest?

IV

Strange as it may seem, a healthy, self-confident Soviet Union may now be more in the Western interest than an adversary that is brooding and snarling to cover its fears and weaknesses. Some observers believe that only when the domestic crisis deepens will we witness any genuine reforms or shifts in Soviet foreign policy. But one aspect of that crisis may now be over, with the change in leadership. At this stage in the nuclear era, the President of the United States needs a reliable counterpart in the Kremlin who can commit the U.S.S.R. beyond the next change in the old guard. The United States needs to negotiate with a leadership that is not cowed by the fear of compromise. And the United States should want a leadership that will recognize that the Soviet Union needs to put its own house in order instead of taking refuge in a bombastic and dangerous foreign policy.

This does not mean that the Gorbachev succession is all to the good. He is an untested and, to a large extent, unknown quantity. He could even prove a short-term leader. His road to power has been almost effortless—and, to a degree, fortuitous. It remains to be seen whether he has the ruthlessness that is a prerequisite for ruling in the Kremlin.

It would also be rash to conclude that activism means genuine reform. A shrewd Soviet leader can operate for a long time by treating the symptoms of the U.S.S.R.'s problems rather than attacking the structural base. Nor can we assume that liberal economic reforms mean conciliatory foreign policies. It is much too early to diagram a Soviet game plan. But we have to take careful note of certain objective factors that operate on Soviet foreign policy.

Gorbachev inherits a foreign policy that recently suffered a major failure, which has been only partially repaired. During the interregnum since Brezhnev, the U.S.S.R. met with one of its worst and most significant defeats: failing utterly to prevent the U.S. deployment of missiles in Western Europe. This failure

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may have been partly because, as the confrontation over the missiles unfolded, Brezhnev was no longer up to the challenge. As usual, the Soviets relied too heavily on the "peace forces" in Europe and on German politics to head off the U.S. deployments. Moreover, while Brezhnev was ailing, major diplomatic openings were missed. Andropov ran to catch up, turning out proposals almost every month; but he fell seriously ill, and a possible slight turn in tactics was snuffed out by the Korean airline disaster in September 1983, which coincided with the beginning of his final illness. It is still fascinating to speculate about who made the ghastly decisions during this crisis. What was Gorbachev's role? He was, after all, thought to be Andropov's second in command at that time. If so, he did not suffer from the crisis, whereas the chief Soviet public spokesman, Marshal Ogarkov, was removed from office a year later.

It was left to Konstantin Chernenko to salvage what he could. A Brezhnev protégé who had advanced in the years of détente, Chernenko apparently fell back on that experience—creating an opening to the Americans. His initial instinct was to shift away from the harshness of superpower relations. His first major speech on March 2, 1984, seemed to move in this direction. He laid out several measures that could be taken to rebuild confidence. It seemed like the beginning of a new dialogue.[2] But something or someone interfered (perhaps the old guard could not agree). Relations worsened when the Soviet Union pulled out of the Los Angeles Olympics. But a sudden turnaround began shortly thereafter, when on June 29, 1984, the Chernenko administration invited the United States to new arms control talks, thus refuting the conventional wisdom that the Soviets would not do business with Ronald Reagan. Despite the failure of that particular exchange, by the early fall Gromyko was in Washington chatting with the very man who had written off the Soviet Union as an "evil empire."

The new line was shored up in innumerable statements and interviews attributed to Chernenko, thus suggesting that he had played an important role in initiating the turn toward the United States. Even when he was taken ill, the new line was not abandoned, suggesting collective support of the Politburo. By then, however, the Soviet leadership was under the nominal control of Gorbachev, who for his part took a rather concilia-

[2]Arnold Horelick, "The Return of Arms Control," *Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1984*, pp. 511–537.

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tory position during his visit to the United Kingdom. And the Soviets nailed down the opening of new arms control talks. In his initial address to the Central Committee after taking power, Gorbachev confirmed that there was indeed a new line, when he fondly recalled the détente of the 1970s in terms reminiscent of Brezhnev. And the Soviet delegation in Geneva ostentatiously revealed that Gorbachev had presided over the Politburo meeting of March 7 that authorized their negotiating instructions.

It is easy to dismiss Gorbachev's early statements as campaign rhetoric. After all, one would not expect the new general secretary to start his career by frightening his audiences with threats of war. Yet it was only a year ago that the Soviet Union was warning of the danger of a new war. The late minister of defense, Marshal Dmitri Ustinov, was one of the most strident voices; Gromyko, with some reluctance, seemed to fall into line. Romanov lacerated the United States: "The American reactionaries are ready to commit any crime, even the vilest one, to incite tensions." And Gorbachev echoed some of the same language in December 1983:

> Not we but capitalism has to maneuver, camouflage its actions and resort to wars, terror, falsification and subversion in an effort to hold back the inexorable advance of time. . . . In terms of its intensity, content and methods, the 'psychological warfare' that imperialism is currently waging constitutes a special variety of aggression that flouts that sovereignty of countries.

Within a year, by the time of his visit to the United Kingdom, he was taking a more conciliatory line, thus supporting Chernenko—to the point that Prime Minister Thatcher said that he was a man she could do business with.

V

If the West can do business with Gorbachev, it will have to be on new terms worked out by both sides. If Gorbachev intends to consolidate the current turn in Soviet-American relations, the focal point has to be the arms negotiations in Geneva. He will have to address the issues without too much delay, and, in particular, decide how to cope with the famous Star Wars defense. The United States is not likely to yield to the blandishments and threats of the Soviet negotiators. Good atmospherics, an affable manner and clever tactics will not

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charm the United States under Ronald Reagan—though in the age of television and instant global communications Gorbachev may be a formidable public rival. The new Soviet leader will be challenged at some point to offer a realistic basis for compromise.

If and when such a Soviet offer is made, the United States will then be challenged to find a response, rather than rigidly insisting on its own proposals. A failure in Geneva this time could have vastly more serious consequences than the last breakdown, when the Soviets walked out in December 1983. This time we cannot simply wait for another turn in the Soviet leadership. The structure of the superpower relationship could collapse. This is a heavy burden on both leaders.

The shifts in superpower relations cannot be attributed only to the changes from Brezhnev to Andropov to Chernenko. The clash between the United States and the Soviet Union has deep roots in the conflicting national interests of each side—from Afghanistan to Poland to Nicaragua—to say nothing of the fierce strategic competition and the failures in arms control. In this broad sense, personalities are not overly important.

But it would be foolish to take a pseudo-Marxist view and dismiss the human factor altogether. Stalin made a difference. So did Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Now Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev takes their place. He is reported to be highly intelligent, quite capable, and bristling with energy. If so, then he should understand that at some point he will have to grapple with strategic realities. One of those realities is that the Soviet Union finds itself beset with problems: a potential explosion in its decaying East European empire; an endless war in Afghanistan; infectious religious fanaticism along its southern borders; vibrant adversaries in China and Japan. Above all, its main enemy (to borrow a phrase from Mao)—the United States—has proven its amazing resilience, ten years after the debacles of Vietnam and Watergate.

It may not be that the Soviet Union is headed for a historical decline, as some Americans have been too eager to predict. For Moscow still has opportunities for strategic gains in Europe, perhaps in China, and even in Central America. But the new leaders in Moscow should also recognize that the "correlation of forces" that they so carefully assess is no longer favorable to the Soviet Union. Thus, it may be an opportune moment for a new leader to establish an equilibrium with the United States. It would not be a bad policy for Gorbachev to consider as he

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prepares for the next Party Congress, which should be held late this year. The new Five Year Plan should be adopted at that time, and Gorbachev will have an opportunity to shore up his political leadership.

Perhaps the most that can be said at this very early point is that vitality seems to be the watchword of the Gorbachev succession. There are certainly dangers in a Soviet Union that is pressing outward, under new and more dynamic leadership. (A "Soviet Kennedy" has been a recurring Western nightmare.) But belligerence is not Gorbachev's only option; he may choose to tend to the malaise in Soviet society. His first pronouncements point in that direction.

The United States, in the Bush mission to Chernenko's funeral and the Reagan invitation to Gorbachev, seems to be extending its hand. A summit meeting seems likely. There is always the risk of another "peace offensive" designed to buy time for a new Soviet leadership, as was the case of the Geneva Summit of 1955. Nevertheless, there are some grounds for optimism at this critical juncture in the relations between the two superpowers.

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Fred Charles Iklé

NUCLEAR STRATEGY: CAN THERE BE A HAPPY ENDING?

Our policies for preventing nuclear war, mercifully, have never been tested to the point of failure. This cannot be said of our policies that have sought to reverse, or at least to halt, the expansion of nuclear arsenals threatening our annihilation. For more than two decades now, the United States, using both diplomacy and self-restraint, has tried—and failed—to halt the nuclear arms competition with the Soviet Union.

The most important reason for seeking to manage and control the nuclear arms competition is to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The U.S. pursuit of these linked objectives, however, has been under the spell of a particular theory from the mid-1960s until recently. This theory holds that "the two sides" can limit or reduce their nuclear weaponry if, and only if, they both consent to leave their territory totally vulnerable to each other's nuclear attack. Such consensual vulnerability constitutes "strategic stability," according to the theory, and is the best, if not the only, way to prevent nuclear war for the indefinite future.

In the real world, nuclear forces are built and managed not by two indistinguishable "sides," but by very distinct governments and military organizations. These, in turn, are run by people, people who are ignorant of many facts, people who can be gripped by anger or fear, people who make mistakes—sometimes dreadful mistakes.

The intellectual poverty of the consensual vulnerability theory accounts for much of the current opposition to strategic defense. Of course, like most theories that gain throngs of adherents, this theory contains a kernel of truth. Up to a point, the nuclear age has led to "two sides" mutually vulnerable to each other's retaliation. So any military expert may say some valid things about mutual nuclear vulnerability without consid-

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ering how governments really function, or how people think and act. So too, any surveyor can measure a plot of land without considering the shape of the earth. But we cannot navigate to a distant haven if we assume the earth is flat.

II

Even the purely technical dimension of the nuclear age is often oversimplified, as if to fit a flat-earth theory. Today's opponents of strategic defense argue that their concept—"two sides" agreeing to a stable relationship of consensual vulnerability—reflects not a choice of doctrine but an inescapable technological fact. The mutual threat of assured destruction as the guarantor of peace, they say, is unchangeable because nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented.

Although nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented, other things are being invented. To say that the immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes the nuclear era unique is but a partial truth. As we look back in human history, to be sure, nuclear arms represent a unique change in the meaning of war and peace. For the future, however, we must expect other changes of perhaps comparable scope and consequence. Technology does not stand still, nor stay put in a few countries. And no heavenly law operates in this world to constrict the results of technological advances to "two sides."

It is important, therefore, to separate technological facts from doctrinal fictions. It is a fact that modern technology provides means that could be used to destroy people, wealth and even parts of nature with a totally unprecedented speed, intensity and magnitude. It is fiction, however, that the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers are the only such means we need to be concerned about. It is a fact that other devices for mass destruction, existing or yet to be invented, could be delivered to an intended target in ways that are difficult, or perhaps too costly, to prevent. To conclude, however, that the only practical way to protect against destruction is to threaten retaliation in kind reflects not a permanent fact of technology but a choice of doctrine.

The sequence in which science presents governments with possibilities for new devices of destruction or new means to counter them is a vagary of history. Imagine that early in this century the development of science had taken a different turn. Biology and genetic engineering might have made dramatic advances, instead of the great progress in physics that then

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occurred. As a result, a different "Manhattan Project" in World War II could have produced a radically new biological weapon, exploiting the destructive potential of genetic engineering that people have begun to worry about today. Such a weapon could be far more efficient for causing mass destruction than the biological agents that the United States eliminated in the early 1970s, in compliance with the biological weapons treaty. That treaty, we recall, permits defensive measures but prohibits testing and stockpiling of offensive biological weapons—the reverse logic of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

Today's opponents of ballistic missile defenses often argue that such defenses are useless, since the "other side" could always smuggle nuclear bombs into our cities—the suitcase bomb. Hence, they conclude, we must rely exclusively on our ability to retaliate. None of these opponents of defense, surely, would choose to ban defenses and rely only on retaliation in kind if the "other side" developed powerful new biological weapons—whether or not these could be delivered in suitcases.

Yes, ballistic missile defenses could be circumvented. There are many ways to sneak a nuclear explosive into a city. Some day such an act might be attempted by a terrorist organization, or by a nuclear power that pursues irrational terrorist ends. A U.S.-Soviet relationship of consensual vulnerability would afford absolutely no protection against such a disaster. On the contrary, it might make it more likely or even aggravate its consequences.

Thus, it is not the destructiveness of a particular technology, but vagaries of both technological development and of American strategic thought, that have led to the excessive emphasis on retaliation and to the neglect of defenses in the current strategic posture of the United States. The notion of a stable strategic relationship based on the acceptance of mutual vulnerability reflects not a state of nature but a state of mind.

III

Whenever the proponents of a theory resist new facts while attacking all alternative explanations as heresies, that theory turns into dogma. At that point, the proponents often try to buttress their case by distorting history. Critics of President Reagan's initiative on strategic defense have charged that his proposed defenses would upset a stable relationship of mutual deterrence that has obtained throughout the nuclear era.

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But this stable equilibrium of "two sides" defenselessly poised for mutual assured destruction has never existed.

For the first five years of the nuclear era, there was no stable balance of nuclear forces at all—the United States had a monopoly. For the next 15 years, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union eschewed defenses against nuclear attack in pursuit of a mutual vulnerability theory. In the 1950s, the United States spent about two-thirds as much on air defenses as on nuclear offensive forces, some $200 billion in ten years (in today's dollars). In 1960, the United States actually allocated more to its defenses against Soviet nuclear attack than to its nuclear offensive forces.

Only in the 1960s did the theorized "stable" balance of consensual vulnerability become a partial reality, in the very limited sense of shaping U.S. force planning and U.S. arms control policy. Beholden to the "flat earth" theory, we saw to it that we would be proven right in our own garden. For two decades we shrank our budget for nuclear offensive forces nearly every year. We reduced expenditures on our defenses against nuclear attack drastically, and after 1970, we cut them practically to zero. And, most dangerous of all, we permitted our intelligence projections for Soviet forces to become warped by our own dogma. In particular, from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, we misled ourselves by the mistaken forecast that the Soviet Union, in light of our self-restraint, would not want to overtake us in nuclear offensive forces, much less seek a capability for destroying most of our deterrent strength.

The 1972 treaty curbing ballistic missile defense became the apotheosis of this belief. In the American view, it was meant to seal a Faustian bargain with the devil of nuclear destructiveness. By the terms of this bargain, both sides had to guarantee their own devastation on a possible Judgment Day, when one side, having been attacked by the other, would want to avenge this attack. Thus, Judgment Day would never dawn. In American eyes, the implied bargain consisted of two parts: both sides would abstain from defenses that could destroy the opponent's revenge forces *after* they are launched; and both sides would abstain from the kind of offensive capabilities that could destroy the opponent's revenge forces *before* they are launched. In the jargon, the former are called "active defenses," the latter, "counterforce" capabilities.

Only the United States kept one part of this two-part bargain. Only the United States gave up on active defenses, against

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aircraft as well as against ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union, by contrast, has spent slightly more on active defenses since the signing of the ABM Treaty than on its nuclear offensive forces. Some of this effort went into a vigorous program for ballistic missile defense (both deployment of the treaty-permitted Moscow system, and the development of future systems); the bulk of it went into air defense.

The United States initially intended to keep the counterforce part of the bargain. From 1970 to 1972, the U.S. Congress voted against improving the accuracy of our missiles in order to deny ourselves the ability to destroy Soviet missiles in their silos. But the Soviet Union continued its expensive buildup of nuclear forces, including enhanced versions of the SS-18 and SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles, contrary to a policy of eschewing counterforce. So, by the end of the last decade, as the Soviet buildup in counterforce capability continued unabated, we felt compelled to respond in kind. As the President's Commission on Strategic Forces (the Scowcroft commission) put it in 1983: ". . . we cannot safely permit a situation to continue wherein the Soviets have the capability promptly to destroy a range of hardened military targets and we do not." Clearly, our arms control efforts had failed to halt competition in counterforce capabilities.

Thus came to naught the leading concept for strategic arms control that reigned in the United States from the mid-1960s until recently. By now, this story has often been told. Yet many Americans and Europeans still pine for the Faustian bargain that they believe the ABM Treaty had sealed. In a triumph of hope over experience, they want to try again.

IV

It is important to understand the essence of these painful lessons. The strategic world does not consist of "two sides," each willing to be locked into a symmetry of utter vulnerability. Even though we tried to conform to this dogma, the "other side," that is to say the real Soviet leaders and their real military advisers, did not. These men made every effort to reduce the vulnerability of their country—and especially of themselves. They ordered the construction of a great many hardened command posts, located well away from cities, for military commanders and officials at all levels of the government and Communist Party. They maintained a vigorous effort to improve their air defenses and develop missile defenses. And,

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above all, they deployed missiles increasingly capable of destroying our nuclear forces, thus equipping themselves to eliminate the cause, the very source, of their own vulnerability.

Why didn't the Soviet leaders act in accordance with our theory? Perhaps they did not want to entrust forever the future of Soviet communism and the Soviet empire to the rationality of American leadership. Perhaps they did not want to rely on the discipline and technology of the American military forever to prevent a cataclysmic accident. Perhaps, in their eyes, American policy seemed incoherent—and, hence, made them skeptical of our intent—since it combined the American doctrine of "stable" mutual vulnerability with the NATO deterrence policy that includes the threat of using nuclear weapons first in response to a massive conventional attack. But it is also possible that they saw in the absence of U.S. ballistic missile defense an invitation to acquire the missilery capable of destroying the U.S land-based deterrent.

Those who remain opposed to strategic defense argue that missile defenses would merely stimulate the "action-reaction cycle of the arms race." The Soviet leaders, they maintain, would feel compelled to thwart our active defenses. Up to a point, to be sure, this may be a valid prediction. For a short stretch of our voyage, it is safe to assume the earth is flat. For a while, yes, the Soviet leaders undoubtedly would try to thwart our active defenses, much as they are trying to thwart passive defenses such as hardening and mobility that protect our deterrent today. By increasing the numbers, accuracy and destructive power of their missile warheads, they aim to overwhelm our hardened missile silos; by expanding their air defenses, they try to counter the survivability of our bombers; by stepping up their anti-submarine program, they try to negate the protective mobility and quietness of our nuclear missile submarines.

Here is a classic action-reaction cycle in armaments. Ought the United States to desist from improving these protective measures for its deterrent forces? Would anyone advocate such U.S. self-restraint—say, a halt in the hardening of our missile silos or in maintaining the protective elusiveness of our submarines—"to slow down the arms race"? In this country, most opponents of strategic defenses would not endorse such an idea. On the contrary, they postulate a stubborn determination on each side to protect its retaliatory forces. Yet their dogma

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excludes the possibility that one side might have, as well, a stubborn determination to protect its homeland.

Would the Soviet leaders, in fact, augment their offensive missile capabilities in order to thwart our defenses? This will depend on the ability of our defensive systems to impose costs and difficulties sufficient to dissuade them from doing so. Also, very importantly, it will depend on our presenting to the Soviet leaders alternatives for their nuclear policy that they can find acceptable. President Reagan's initiative seeks to meet both these conditions. It offers the Soviet leaders a new strategic relationship with the United States that will better meet their fundamental security requirements. And it ushers in new technologies for defense that hold the promise of making countermeasures unattractively costly.

A case in point here may be the history of the Soviet bomber program. When we invested heavily in air defenses in the late 1950s, the Soviet Union ceased building new bombers and instead shifted to ballistic missiles. But, when it became clear that we had given up on air defenses, the Soviets again invested in the development and then the production of a new strategic bomber. They decided to build new vehicles to take advantage of the freeway we opened for their bombers.

By analogy, if we began to close the freeway in space that we have preserved for ballistic missiles, the Soviet military might stop investing in new ballistic missiles and instead rely on new bombers and cruise missiles. That in itself would be a great gain. Bombers and cruise missiles, compared with ballistic missiles, are less suited for surprise attack because of their longer time of travel. And bombers are safer as deterrent forces since, by taking to the air, they can be made nearly invulnerable in an alert, yet could safely return to their bases should the warning be false. Also, using in part the same technologies and systems, air defenses could later complement our ballistic missile defenses.

In sum, throughout the nuclear era, all the evidence shows that the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship never conformed to the theory of stable consensual vulnerability—either before or since the ABM Treaty. Furthermore, contrary to that theory, the Soviet government has not designed and financed its vast nuclear buildup just to maintain forces for destroying American society. Instead, by acquiring active defenses and counterforce capabilities, it has shown its determination to reduce

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Soviet vulnerability rather than depend exclusively on such a threat of revenge.

V

Unable to achieve a stable equilibrium of vulnerability between us and the Soviet Union in the past, are we likely to achieve such a strategic order in the future? Compelling reasons make this a most improbable outcome.

If we put the flesh and bones of real governments on the abstraction of "two sides," and if we recognize that these governments must function in the real world of many powers—of allies, of captive nations, of friends and foes—then we can readily see why such a two-sided equilibrium of mutual vulnerability is a relationship that cannot remain stable.

To begin with, the makers of Soviet foreign policy take a long-term view. Even if they were prepared to trust the U.S. government always to play the role of the reliable partner in such an equilibrium, they would feel it essential to take account of other nuclear powers, present or future. The planners in Moscow surely recognize that, despite the astonishingly successful American-Soviet cooperation in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, the capacity to manufacture nuclear explosives will continue to spread to additional countries. They must be aware, for example, that they once helped China to acquire a nuclear capability and are now facing a slowly expanding strategic nuclear force across the world's longest border.

But, quite apart from the fact that the arena of nuclear powers does not consist of only two sides, there is a more fundamental reason why we should not expect the Soviet leadership to settle for the strategic order of consensual vulnerability. Like oil and water, the two ingredients in this order will always separate: the accord on a stable equilibrium of mutual restraint is psychologically incompatible with the constant threat of reciprocal annihilation. The first ingredient of this mixture represents the best in international relations: a continued willingness to cooperate in restraining one's own military power, coupled with a serene reliance on the opponent's prudence and his common sense. The second ingredient of the mixture represents the worst in international relations: an endless effort to maintain forces that are constantly ready to annihilate the opponent, coupled with an unremitting determination to deny him escape from this grip of terror.

The believers in the dogma of a stable, mutually agreed

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vulnerability fail to appreciate the dynamic of this incompatibility. Their vaunted strategic order is unstable at its very core. We cannot keep the balance of mutual threats of mass destruction from ceaselessly tilting. Yes, we can try to adjust this quivering balance, year after year, augmenting our offensive nuclear forces, substituting more effective or more survivable nuclear arms for older ones, in order to defeat the inevitable Soviet attempts to reduce the magnitude of the American nuclear threat to themselves. This has been our policy in past decades.

Today's critics of strategic defense argue that the Soviet rulers would never accept a strategic order in which the United States and its allies were no longer vulnerable to nuclear mass destruction, even if these rulers could acquire a similarly effective defense of their own homeland. Yet the critics firmly believe that these same Soviet rulers, whom they view as hell-bent on maintaining their threat of our destruction, will forever nestle down with us in an equilibrium of mutual vulnerability. By accepting such an equilibrium, the Soviet rulers would have to accept indefinitely a future where any American president, or (in their eyes) perhaps even "some American general," could unleash the engines that would destroy the Soviet Union. To the men in the Kremlin, such a world cannot look like a place of stability. It cannot be the chosen destination of Soviet policy. As Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko put it in 1962: ". . . to base the policy of states on a feeling of universal fear would be tantamount to keeping the world in a permanent state of feverish tension and a hysteria anticipating war. In such an atmosphere, each state would fear that the other side would lose its nerve and fire the first shot." Contrary to Gromyko's protestations today, the 1972 ABM Treaty did not convert the Soviet government to a strategic order of consensual vulnerability; Soviet investments in offensive and defensive systems speak louder than current denials.

VI

One cannot address the future of our nuclear strategy without considering the role of American nuclear weapons in NATO's defense policy. Ever since the Yalta agreement 40 years ago, a major objective of the United States has been to prevent Soviet domination of Western Europe. This imperative has confronted a stubborn problem: for an attack on Western Europe, the Red Army could amass manpower and firepower

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that always seemed superior to the forces the West European nations could muster. The creation of the Atlantic alliance provided but a partial solution. Even the combined forces of the alliance, the allied governments have held, could not be kept at a strength sufficient to defeat a massive and sustained Soviet attack in a conventional war.

Hence it has always been agreed within the alliance that nuclear weapons must play an essential role, whether in deterring conventional attack, or in coping with such an attack should deterrence fail. This role, in turn, has exerted a pervasive effect on the development of our nuclear forces, strategy and arms control policy—an effect far greater than is often realized. Deterring or responding to a conventional invasion of Western Europe was the primary mission of the U.S. Strategic Air Command well into the 1950s, and throughout the 1950s the United States opposed negotiating limits on its nuclear forces without a reduction in the conventional threat to Europe. It has proven difficult, however, to agree on a single, coherent concept for this role of nuclear arms in protecting allies. The political leaders, defense officials and military staffs of the Atlantic alliance have shaped and reshaped, time after time, several strategic concepts.

The initial concept exploited the American advantage in nuclear weapons. During the short-lived American monopoly, the application of this concept, in theory, seemed simple. In the event the Red Army invaded Western Europe, the U.S. Air Force would drop atomic bombs on targets in the Soviet Union. Actually, as seen from Washington at that time, it was far from certain whether U.S. nuclear forces would have been powerful enough to inflict a decisive military defeat on the Soviet Union. And later, when the United States had acquired a nuclear arsenal and delivery systems able to destroy the Soviet Union as a military power, it could not be certain of escaping grievous damage at home from Soviet retaliation. The Eisenhower Administration agonized long and hard over this dangerous dilemma.

So a second concept was born, which envisioned using nuclear weapons on the battlefield, not to retaliate, but to repel the invading divisions. This concept held to a more traditional, a more "conventional," application of military power. As Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson put it in 1957, "The smaller atomic weapons, the tactical weapons, in a sense have now become conventional weapons. . . ." As long as the United

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States enjoyed an effective advantage in nuclear forces, these two concepts could lend coherence to the overall strategy. In the jargon of the nuclear theorists, we enjoyed "escalation dominance": we thought we had more, or more effective, tactical nuclear weapons, so we could expect to deter, or if necessary defeat, a Soviet invasion by using tactical nuclear weapons; and we had superior global nuclear forces, so we could expect to deter the Soviet Union from using its intercontinental nuclear forces against us.

Today, this "escalation dominance" has been overtaken by the massive changes in nuclear arsenals. Indeed, on both sides of the Atlantic, it is no longer judged to be a solution. The United States patently has no plans to regain its former advantage in global nuclear arms, or to restore the West's superiority in tactical nuclear arms. A few years ago, in fact, political opinion in Europe opposed even the deployment of the so-called "neutron bomb," a weapon capable of killing enemy soldiers in their tanks without destroying the nearby towns. Yet, the more these tactical nuclear weapons can destroy the intended military target without destroying what they would seek to defend, the greater would seem their credibility as a deterrent.

Despite the massive changes since the end of World War II, there is wide agreement on both sides of the Atlantic that nuclear weapons continue to contribute to the deterrence of a conventional invasion of Western Europe. This consensus comes easy. However, the concepts guiding the use of nuclear weapons should such deterrence fail are more painful to spell out. Some of Europe's political leaders and elected representatives understandably prefer to avoid the issue. Some assert that NATO's nuclear weapons must never be used to defeat invading Soviet divisions, but only to preclude armed aggression by threatening massive nuclear revenge. Here we meet the old problem bedeviling the theory of deterrence: the credibility of threatening an irrational act. If a conventional war ever broke out and the invading divisions pressed forward, could the *act* of nuclear revenge serve the national interest of any member of the alliance? If not, will the *threat* be credible in time of crisis?

Folly likes company. Many of those who would constrict NATO's nuclear policy to such a threat of revenge also oppose missile defenses, clinging to the dogma of consensual vulnerability. And, to boot, they often fail to support increased con-

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ventional strength, thus leaning even more heavily on their dubious nuclear threat. By rejecting missile defenses for Europe, they would leave many critical elements of NATO's conventional and nuclear forces vulnerable to shorter-range Soviet missiles, which—even if conventionally armed—could be accurate enough a decade hence to destroy some of NATO's key facilities. In essence, they would rely almost exclusively on the global nuclear forces of the United States to provide the comprehensive guarantee that protects Europe.

In the long run, the force of this guarantee depends on its support by the American people. Some European opponents of missile defenses for the United States appear to believe that to assure the vulnerability of the United States somehow preserves this guarantee. This logic makes no sense. It implies that the larger the number of Americans who would be killed in a nuclear war, the more credible a decision by the U.S. president to respond to a conventional invasion of Europe by initiating nuclear war.

Now, it must be said that a free alliance of democratic nations is a very ecumenical association. Many contradictory beliefs can coexist—provided the alliance is at peace. It is in time of war, or even during a major crisis, that the coherence of the allied strategy would be put to the final test.

VII

Our democracies will have to defend themselves for the foreseeable future against the military might and political ambitions of the Soviet ruling class, still dominated by men imbued with Lenin's totalitarian philosophy. And who can foretell whether other totalitarian powers might not emerge as major military threats to Western democracy? Against such opponents, democratic governments cannot keep up the necessary strength, decade after decade, without the continuing support of their people.

But the men and women who work and vote in our democracies have never been tested against the searing edge of nuclear war, nor have the politicians, soldiers and scientists who must dedicate themselves to sustain our military strength. Only the effects of low-yield nuclear weapons on isolated military targets can be predicted with some confidence, having been tested realistically. Much remains unknown. Sometimes a particular horror is overlooked, sometimes it is exaggerated.

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Possibly critical effects that might result from large-scale nuclear attacks have been discovered only by accident.

For example, in 1954, one of our thermonuclear tests in the Pacific accidentally disclosed the potential extent of radioactive fallout; the medical histories of the injured people subsequently disclosed the human consequences of fallout; a high altitude test in 1958 led to the accidental discovery of electromagnetic blackout; in the early 1970s, totally unrelated studies revealed how high-yield nuclear explosions might damage the ozone layer; and in the early 1980s, new studies opened the possibility of "nuclear winter."

Naturally, such revelations awaken those deep anxieties about nuclear war that slumber in our minds. For many people they strengthen the belief that nuclear war would mean "the end"—not just of their own lives and those of their families, but of their country and all they cherish. In various ways, therefore, the people in democracies express a strong belief that nuclear weapons cannot be used as instruments of national policy, except somehow to preclude "the end." Recent opinion polls show that close to 80 percent of respondents both in Western Europe and in the United States oppose the use of nuclear weapons if a conventional invasion of our European allies could not be repelled by non-nuclear means. A surprising number of people have lately been saying they would even oppose using nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet first use; they thus betray perhaps a touch of confusion about the intended working of deterrence.

Within Western alliances, citizens who so strongly reject almost any military use of nuclear arms can readily organize themselves to promote policies that would reduce—in their eyes—the risks of nuclear war. This is as it should be in free democracies. It is also not unexpected that the Soviet government tries to reinforce, and perhaps redirect toward its own goals, these political stirrings in the West.

What the Soviet government has recently done on this score is trifling, however, compared with what in a major crisis a Leninist or Stalinist might choose to do. Someone in control of Soviet military power and schooled in the uses of terror for political ends could lay iron hands on the deepest emotions and fears of a great many people in the West. He could make them believe that the horrors of nuclear destruction were about to become real—unless they prevailed on their leaders to make major concessions.

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Even the current deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe came close to being prevented by the combined pressures of Soviet manipulation and political opinion in the West. Had one of the West European elections turned out differently, the Soviet government would have succeeded in depriving the alliance of one of the supports it sought for deterrence. Mark that this was in peacetime, when nuclear destruction seems a remote abstraction. Mark also that the pressures employed by the Soviet government were mild—merely diplomatic admonitions and some furtive propaganda operations in the West. Can we count on future Soviet leaders being so "cautious" that they would not use the hammer and anvil of nuclear terror, even in a crisis?

In the future, Stalin's heirs, recalling the effectiveness of mass terror in the pursuit of power, may discover new ways to turn the threat of nuclear destruction into the ideal instrument for totalitarian expansion. It would serve no useful purpose here to speculate on how they might go about this. One is reminded, though, of an idea that surfaced many years ago: detonating a large nuclear weapon more or less harmlessly in the sky as a "demonstration" of one's seriousness. (Of course, at that time the shoe was on the other foot; the idea was that the Western democracies would frighten the heirs of Stalin.) For the future, the "balance of terror" cannot favor the defense of a democratic alliance. Sooner or later, it will favor those most at ease with, those most experienced in, the systematic use of terror.

The West has long relied heavily on the creativity and inventiveness of its scientists and engineers to compensate for the Soviet advantages in territory and mobilizable manpower. But our scientists and engineers, like any professional men and women, require moral satisfaction to work creatively. It can become a demoralizing task to invent and perfect, year after year, better means for inflicting nuclear destruction—not to defend one's country, but to revenge its destruction. The prospect of achieving strategic defense provides a new, positive motivation for our scientists and engineers who work on national security.

The danger of demoralization by relying on a strategic order of consensual vulnerability goes further and deeper. Upon an alliance of democracies, such a policy imposes a passive, almost cynical, resignation toward the possibility of an atrocity unsurpassed in human history. It offers a prospect of anxiety without

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relief, an intellectual legacy crippling the outlook of each new generation, a theme of desolate sadness. As Kenneth Clark observed, civilizations require confidence, "confidence in the society in which one lives, belief in its philosophy. . . ." To insist that only a rigorously preserved vulnerability will preserve us from annihilation is a credo that must corrode the confidence upon which civilizations are built.

VIII

The conclusions fall into place. We need to accomplish a long-term transformation of our nuclear strategy, the armaments serving it, and our arms control policy. To begin with, we must disenthrall ourselves of the dogma of consensual, mutual vulnerability—the notion that unrelieved vulnerability of the United States and the Soviet Union to each other's nuclear forces is essential for halting the competition in offensive arms, and is the best guarantee against the outbreak of nuclear war.

Such a relationship never obtained in the past and it is most unlikely to come into existence in the future. Moreover, an agreed balance of mutual vulnerability would be repugnant on moral grounds. And it could in no way reduce the consequences of an accidental nuclear attack.[1] In the long run, reliance on a balance of mutual vulnerability would favor totalitarian regimes, with a demoralizing effect on democracies.

The key now for the needed transformation is technological development to make effective defensive systems possible for the United States and our allies. The priority requirement is non-nuclear missile defenses capable of negating the military utility of a Soviet missile attack and of diminishing its destructiveness. Depending on progress in arms reductions, the missile defenses might later be complemented with air defenses. As strategic defenses make it increasingly unlikely that Soviet offensive forces can accomplish their mission, the incentive for new Soviet investment in them is reduced. We thus enhance Soviet willingness to join us in deep reductions of offensive forces.

To this end, we ought to take two complementary approaches. We should energetically seek Soviet cooperation, since it would greatly ease and speed the transformation. But

[1] These points have been elaborated by this author in "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?" *Foreign Affairs*, January 1973, pp. 267–285.

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we must also be prepared to persist on the harder road, where the Soviet Union would try as long as possible to overcome our defenses, and would resist meaningful reductions in offensive forces. The better prepared we are and the more capable of prevailing on the hard road, the more likely it is that the Soviet Union will join us on the easy road.

Critics of missile defenses fear that defenses could not be made leak-proof against a massive attack, that a fraction of the missiles might penetrate, causing dreadful destruction, with whole cities lost. Usually this fear assumes that the Soviet leaders would expend the bulk of their missile force to destroy our cities. Yet if only a fraction of the attacking force were to reach some unpredictable targets, while missing most of the militarily important targets, to launch such an attack would accomplish no rational purpose. It would serve no strategic objective, and would be akin to a wanton terrorist act. It is precisely against such irrational acts that an exclusive reliance on deterrence would offer no protection at all.

We cannot know at this time whether the Soviet Union will join us and agree on major reductions in offensive nuclear arms, and whether it would abide by them. As one tries to promote arms control, Soviet failure to comply with past agreements is a bone in one's throat. But if the Soviet leaders are willing to cooperate on a purpose both East and West can share, that purpose surely cannot be the perpetual hostility that is inherent in unopposed forces constantly poised for mass destruction. It can however be a strategic order that will eventually eliminate Soviet vulnerability to massive nuclear destruction, even if this means in turn surrendering their capability to inflict mass destruction on Western Europe and the United States. Conversely, should the Soviet leaders choose to preserve their doomsday capability at any price, the prospects for arms control would be bleak indeed.

The more the offensive armaments can be reduced by agreement, the easier and cheaper the job of providing effective defenses. Yet, to be realistic about Soviet motivations, we must seek to develop and deploy systems that can provide effective defenses even without such reductions. The United States is now pursuing new technologies that hold promise for success on the "hard road" as well. Thus, we make it all the more probable that the Soviet leaders will join us some day on the easy road of cooperation.

Our thinking on nuclear strategy must reach far into the

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future. It is not enough that our strategy serve to prevent nuclear attack in this decade or the next. Nuclear armaments and defensive systems take ten years or more to design, develop and build; and once deployed they will last for a quarter-century or more. We are today constrained in the choices for our nuclear policy by strategic theories that 30 years ago began to influence the development of our present weapons systems. The time to start designing a safer nuclear strategy for the twenty-first century is now.

For a few more years, to be sure, many arms control experts, military technicians and bureaucrats in our alliance will cling to the dogma of the allegedly stable consensual vulnerability. They will marshal all sorts of evidence to prove, as an "iron law," that the means for nuclear attack will always outpace the means for defense, keeping mass destruction an inescapable threat for all nations.

One is reminded of another theory that was influential at the beginning of the last century: Thomas Robert Malthus marshaled a huge body of evidence to prove that the growth of population will always outpace the means of subsistence, keeping mass poverty an inescapable condition of mankind. Malthus' theory became so influential because it combined a seductive simplicity and rigor with an important kernel of truth (a truth to be seen this day in many impoverished regions of the world).

The Malthusian theory turned economics, as Thomas Carlyle put it, into "the dismal science." Yet today all economists, regardless of differing views on population policy, agree that new factors have negated Malthus' iron law. The nineteenth-century marriage of capitalism and modern science brought forth such an immense creation of wealth—enhanced by the social and cultural benefits of modern democracy—that economics ceased to be a dismal science.

Nuclear strategy, too, will cease to impose its dismal prospect on the future, if we now apply our creativity in science, technology and statesmanship to build a new order for preventing nuclear war.

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Leon Wieseltier

WHEN DETERRENCE FAILS

It is a delicate matter to defend deterrence, the doctrine that it is the very lethality of nuclear weapons that lessens the likelihood of their use sufficiently to make us safe. That the consciousness of that lethality in the corridors of power in Washington and Moscow has played an important role in the keeping of the peace since the advent of the nuclear age is beyond doubting, as is the unwisdom of tampering with that consciousness, of accepting theories or technologies that will diminish the terror with which the prospect of nuclear war has been traditionally regarded and make nuclear weapons in any way less inhibiting to use. Still, if it is possible to underestimate the contribution that nuclear weapons make to the prevention of nuclear war, it is possible to overestimate it, too.

The essential fragility of deterrence must never be forgotten. Its central irony, that what may destroy us may be relied upon to deliver us, really is intolerable. That is the basis in reality for the criticism of deterrence from both the right and the left, for Ronald Reagan's dream of ballistic missile defenses and for the peace movement's dream of nuclear disarmament. Many of their arguments, to be sure, originate in moral, ideological and strategic assumptions that may be refuted. Against a great many alternatives, deterrence may be defended without apology. But there is at least one criticism of deterrence that may not be refuted: it may fail.

II

The failure of deterrence is a plain possibility. It does not require any form of scientific or strategic expertise to see it. Deterrence is a wager upon a broad variety of technological, military, political and diplomatic arrangements, any of which may collapse in a crisis; but at bottom it is a wager upon the human heart. Who would dare make do with such a wager? History gives no grounds for such a quantity of trust. Just a

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reading of Thucydides should suffice to rattle the most devout defender of deterrence. There is evil in man, and folly. There has never been a weapon that was never used; and many more weapons were used unjustly than justly. The tragic dimensions of human experience, then, must haunt the nuclear debate.

The idealists of the nuclear debate who plead for the abolition of nuclear weapons, or the abolition of war, or the abolition of power politics, or the abolition of the system of sovereign states, certainly appreciate the magnitude of the nuclear danger; but they do not correctly represent either human history or human nature with their perfectibilian proposals. Their idealism is the same as a counsel of despair. The magnitude of the nuclear danger means, rather, that realism—which is to say, deterrence—is the better way. A time in which there are 50,000 nuclear weapons in the arsenals of two great powers caught in political and philosophical competition is not a time to reform man. It is a time to manage him; that is, to deter him.

Yet deterrence may be complacently or uncomplacently constructed. Too many of its defenders construct it complacently. They avert their gaze from its flawed human origins, from the extent to which it is itself an expression for a state of emergency, from the luckless chance that it may fail. Consider some of the most influential American deterrers. Robert McNamara, for example, has stated categorically "that nuclear weapons serve no military purpose whatsoever. They are totally useless—except only to deter one's opponent from using them."[1] Mr. McNamara is correct, of course, that there is no meaningful military mission that can be accomplished by weapons of mass destruction, that the military means will always exceed the political ends. Perhaps there are no circumstances of any sort in which the use of nuclear weapons will be justified, though the revolution that such a belief wreaks with Western strategy should be appreciated.

What if the Russians, however, use them? Of what use will the truth about the military inutility of nuclear weapons be to the president who will be faced with the responsibility of nuclear retaliation? Presumably Mr. McNamara is not suggesting that the president not act at all. But he has not provided the president with any guidance about the courses of action

[1] Robert McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1983, p. 79.

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that may be allowed after the deterrent use of nuclear weapons has disappointed.

Consider also a school of liberal strategists whose enthusiasm for deterrence has resulted in an enthusiasm for nuclear weapons. The most sophisticated member of this school, and an important influence upon the academic study of deterrence theory, is Kenneth Waltz. Mr. Waltz has written a close analysis of the many rewards of nuclear deterrence that concludes in a plea for nuclear proliferation:

> The world has enjoyed more years of peace since 1945 than had been known in this century. . . . Nuclear weapons do not make nuclear war a likely prospect, as history has shown. . . . Much of the writing about the spread of nuclear weapons has this unusual trait: It tells us that what did not happen in the past is likely to happen in the future. . . . A happy nuclear past leads many to expect an unhappy nuclear future. . . . With more nuclear states the world will have a promising future. . . . Nuclear weapons make it possible to approach the deterrent ideal.[2]

This is a little backward. Nuclear weapons are not there to create deterrence. Deterrence is there to cope with nuclear weapons. And the nuclear past has been peaceful, but it has not been exactly happy.

More examples could be cited of such complacency. There is a touch of liberal meliorism here, of liberalism's familiar disinclination to think the darker thoughts about man. There is also a hidden apocalyptic premise. The rejection of the idea of operational thinking about nuclear weapons implies that the end of deterrence will be the same as the end of history. More specifically, it implies that once any nuclear weapons are used, all nuclear weapons will be used. The possibility that the arsenals may not be emptied, that a nuclear exchange may consist of an infernally small number rather than an infernally large number of launchings, is not considered. It implies, too, that immediately after deterrence fails, from the moment that a nuclear weapon is fired, there will be nothing left to save.

To be sure, the remorseless advance to annihilation that is euphemistically known as "escalation" is a very plausible way to consider the progress of a nuclear war; and much of the operational thinking about nuclear weapons is flawed precisely by an egregious refusal to entertain the possibility of escalation

[2] Kenneth Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better*, Adelphi Papers, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981, pp. 1, 33, 3, 30.

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with sufficient seriousness. It makes sense to plan for the worst case. But it does not make sense to plan only for the worst case. In their planning for the post-deterrence predicament of the United States, many defenders of deterrence, well, they do not plan at all. Instead, as the British philosopher W.B. Gallie has remarked in a brilliant discussion of the apocalyptic approach toward nuclear weapons, "all less bad cases—all possibilities of forestalling or moderating the danger before it reaches its climax—are dismissed as delusive, as if on the principle that only the worst is bad enough for us!"[3]

Thinking about the use of nuclear weapons, runs the distinguished liberal argument, makes the use of nuclear weapons more thinkable. You cannot consider the possibility that deterrence may fail without contributing to the likelihood of its failure. The argument is valid, as will be seen, against a good deal of official and unofficial wisdom about nuclear use. Still, the liberal evasiveness must end. Defenders of deterrence must have an answer to this most difficult question of all, for three reasons.

First, the absence of an answer weakens the argument for deterrence itself. As is well known, the argument has been challenged on the grounds of "credibility"; that is, it has been said that for the threat of retaliation to remain plausible, weapons systems must be developed and deployed that can make less destructive strikes against more discrete targets. It is not uncontrolled nuclear violence but controlled nuclear violence that the Soviet Union will really fear; a suicide threat, which is an integral part of the doctrine known as mutual assured destruction, will not be taken seriously. Thus the "flexible response" of the McNamara strategy, which culminated in the "limited nuclear options" of the Schlesinger strategy. To this rather exceptionable argument, however, the defenders of deterrence have replied robustly that if deterrence is "working," it is not because of "options," but because of the open-endedness of "options"; not because either the United States or the Soviet Union is persuaded that it can control the level of nuclear violence, but because neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is persuaded that anybody can control the level of nuclear violence. The point is not that escalation is

[3] W.B. Gallie, "Three Main Fallacies in Discussion of Nuclear Weapons," in *Dangers of Deterrence, Philosophers on Nuclear Strategy*, eds. Nigel Blake and Kay Pole, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983, p. 164.

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always automatic, but that escalation is always possible; and until somebody proves that it is impossible, neither side will have a rational reason to start a war.

Still, the argument against deterrence is not thereby exhausted. The deterrer's work is never done. There is another ground on which deterrence has been challenged, to wit, that it may fail, and that it is therefore morally, strategically and intellectually irresponsible not to foresee its failure. So it is. It is also a disservice to the theory of deterrence, and to the millions of people whom that theory is supposed to free from anxiety.

Second, the refusal to think beyond the success of deterrence makes such thinking of no consequence for policy. The position of the president is not like the position of the political scientist or the pundit. The president needs more than an analysis; he needs a policy. But too much of the theory of deterrence is conceived at a level of conceptual complexity that makes it utterly useless for the purposes of policy. It will not help to present the president, in the middle of a crisis, with game theory, or with murmurings about "mirrorings."

Third, it is essential that those who fully appreciate the enormity of nuclear war do not surrender the subject of nuclear use to those who do not fully appreciate it. While the failure of deterrence will certainly constitute the greatest mistake in human history, it may not constitute the last mistake. There are more wrong and less wrong, more catastrophic and less catastrophic things that can be done with nuclear weapons. It happens, in part due to the indifference of liberal strategists to the dirty details of nuclear strategy, that most of the operational thinking about the post-deterrence period has been of the more wrong and more catastrophic kind.

The insistence that nuclear weapons must never be used is of no help in a debate about the proper course of action once they have been used. An idea about the period of war cannot be refuted by an idea about the period of peace. Once the United States has suffered a nuclear strike, the president will have to make many decisions that will be not only about the automaticity of retaliation, about which the theory of deterrence teaches, but about the structure of retaliation, about which the theory of deterrence teaches not at all. What remains of nature and of culture after a war between the superpowers will depend upon the intelligence of these decisions.

The next stage in liberal thinking about nuclear weapons,

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then, must be the confrontation with the meaning of the fragility of deterrence—with its military meaning, and not merely its moral meaning. Is there a way to think about the failure of deterrence that cannot be accused of contributing to the failure of deterrence? That is the question that its defenders must try to answer. Obviously nuclear disarmament is an answer; deterrers, too, dream of disarmament. But until nuclear disarmament is achieved, in the interim that feels like an infinity, the question remains. As long as the power to destroy the world rests in the imperfect and infirm hands of men, provision must be made. And not just any provision; and probably not the provision that has already been made.

III

The need for policy has usually been interpreted as a need for strategy. Mutual assured destruction, it is argued, is not a strategy; for strategy, it is argued, means the purposeful application of military means to political ends. Of MAD this is certainly true. Indeed, MAD is nothing other than the negation of strategy, insofar as it denies that these military means can have a purposeful application to any political ends. The doctrine of mutual assured destruction, according to which nuclear use is essentially indiscriminate, can furnish no instruction to the military planner, whose job is precisely to discriminate. The planner must make choices about targets and weapons, and the order in which the latter will be dispatched against the former. He requires criteria for these choices. MAD obviously cannot furnish such criteria, since it considers all the choices to come to the same thing, which is the extermination of societies. Moreover, to the extent to which there is a prescription for policy made by MAD, it is to make the worst strike first, to begin a nuclear war with an attack on cities. This makes the situation of the planner morally intolerable, in addition to militarily intolerable; it puts the planner in the business of the slaughter of innocents.

The moral objection to MAD has been accompanied throughout by a military objection. Indeed, the United States has probably never had a pure version of MAD as an actual plan. Recent studies of American targeting policy deduce from the declassified documentation that, with the exception of a short-lived and bureaucratically inspired adoption of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction by the McNamara Pentagon, it has never been the American intention to strike first against cities.

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During the period that bombers were the means of nuclear delivery, the lessons of the Strategic Bombing Survey were not lost upon nuclear planners; and the notions of "flexible response" and "nuclear options" made their appearance shortly after missiles became the means. Thus there is no point in clinging to MAD as a strategy, because it never was one.

The planner, then, has a need for strategy. The failure of MAD to satisfy the need seems to signify a failure of the destructive difference of nuclear weapons to provide a different mode of military thought and military action. There is a new weapon, but there is not a new strategic idea. There is, however, an old strategic idea. That is, there is the tradition of classical strategy, to which the planner promptly repaired. Again, the poor planner's predicament is not hard to understand.

He is frequently told that he must honor the difference between conventional weapons and nuclear weapons, but he is not told how. He is frequently told that nuclear weapons must never be used, but he is the man who must plan for the possibility of their use. And so nuclear strategy has developed under the sign of conventional strategy, and committed, from its beginnings, what Hans Morgenthau called "the conventional fallacy."[4] From General Curtis LeMay's comment that a nuclear bomb is just another bomb[5] to the recent comment of one strategist that the targeting of control, command and communication centers by small intercontinental ballistic missiles would constitute "a form of maneuver warfare,"[6] there runs through the operational thinking about nuclear weapons a fateful consistency between the categories of conventional warfare and the categories of nuclear warfare. (The consistency is more pronounced, and less accompanied by ambivalence and argument to the contrary, in the Soviet strategic literature.) The most famous official formulation of "the conventional fallacy" was certainly Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's

[4] Hans Morgenthau, "The Fallacy of Thinking Conventionally about Nuclear Weapons," in *Arms Control and Technological Innovation*, eds. David Carlton and Carlo Schaer, New York: Wiley Publishers, 1976.

[5] Cited in Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 257. Henry Rowen has observed that in the early years of the nuclear era "the nuclear planning task was seen as an extension of strategic bombing in World War II." Henry Rowen, "The Evolution of Strategic Nuclear Doctrine," in *Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age*, ed. Laurence Martin, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1979, p. 137.

[6] James T. Westwood, "Future Intercontinental and Theater Nuclear Systems," *Naval War College War Review*, January-February 1984, p. 85.

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speech at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor in June 1962:

> The United States has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. . . . That is to say, our principal military objective in the event of nuclear war . . . should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces. . . . Specifically, our studies indicate that a strategy which targets nuclear forces only against cities or a mixture of civil and military targets has serious limitations for the purpose of deterrence and for the conduct of general nuclear war.[7]

This is the strategic doctrine that came to be called counterforce; and it is in the name of counterforce that the distinction between conventional weaponry and nuclear weaponry has been blurred more or less constantly from the Kennedy Administration through the Reagan Administration. The doctrine of counterforce targeting received its most rigorous treatment, and was adopted most unapologetically, in the "limited nuclear options" of the Schlesinger Pentagon. It persists in the "countervailing strategy" of Harold Brown and the "prevailing strategy" of Caspar Weinberger, which are the logical consequences of the reliance of nuclear strategy upon conventional notions by default, of the idea that the need for strategy may be met by strategy as it has been classically conceived. Both represent what Colin Gray tellingly calls a "*war-fighting, or classical strategy*, approach to nuclear deterrence [italics added]."[8]

The "countervailing strategy" consisted, briefly, in the plan to make deterrence more "credible" by designing American nuclear forces of sufficient flexibility that they would successfully "put at risk" targets of critical significance for the Soviet Union, most notably their military forces and their structure of command, control and communication, and thereby successfully "deny" the Soviets any prospect of meaningful military success. Not the possibility of American victory, but the impossibility of Soviet victory, was the official rationale for the strategy.

The intellectual pathos of the doctrine is profound. It is a kind of halfway house between mutual assured destruction and

[7] Quoted in William Kauffman, *The McNamara Strategy*, New York: Harper & Row, 1964, p. 116.

[8] Colin Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and Strategic Planning*, Philadelphia: Philadelphia Policy Papers, 1984, p. 5. This monograph is of immense analytic value, despite its conclusions.

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the complete conventionalization of nuclear war. This accounts for its many confusions. Thus one official of the Brown years wrote in the same breath that the "countervailing" strategy "does not assume that a nuclear war is likely to be protracted" and that "the United States must act to improve its ability to conduct a sustained exchange."[9] No such pathos may be discovered, however, in the "prevailing strategy" of Caspar Weinberger. It is less troubled than its predecessor by the problem of conventionalization, and speaks candidly about "prevailing" (in another formulation, of "prevailing with pride") in a nuclear war that would be fought "over a protracted period," with a distinct emphasis upon "decapitation," or the destruction of the Soviet military and political authority.[10]

Both "countervailing" and "prevailing" have been sternly criticized. These strategies are indeed caught in many of the contradictions observed by their critics. There is the problem of escalation, of Clausewitz's familiar "friction." The certainty that a nuclear war can be controlled is no greater than the certainty that a conventional war can be controlled, which was never very great; indeed, in the case of nuclear war there can be no certainty at all. And there is the problem of co-location. Too many of the enemy's "counterforce" targets are too close to too many of the enemy's "countervalue" targets; there is no way to destroy the Soviet military and its centers of command without destroying Soviet cities as well, which means that the Soviet Union will have little reason to interpret our "limited" strikes as a sign of restraint.[11]

But there is a larger historical irony about the evolution of nuclear strategy that has rarely been remarked, and that accounts in large measure for its present problem. It is that the theory of counterforce preceded the technology of counterforce. The moral and military flaws in the destruction of cities were discovered many years before the weapons were discovered that could destroy anything less. Recent improvements in

[9] Walter Slocombe, "The Countervailing Strategy," *International Security*, Spring 1981, pp. 23–24.

[10] Richard Halloran, "Pentagon Draws Up First Strategy for Fighting a Long Nuclear War," *The New York Times*, May 30, 1982.

[11] Desmond Ball, "U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would They Be Used?" *International Security*, Winter 1982/83, pp. 31–60. Colin Gray has a point, in his way, when he writes that "to prevail in stressful circumstances the United States must be able to defend itself against nuclear attack. . . . It would be imprudent to begin a small nuclear war unless one had on hand a capability for waging, surviving, and recovering from a large nuclear war." Gray, *op. cit.*, pp. 2, 70.

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the technology of terminal guidance appear to have made the instruments of a limited nuclear strike finally imaginable.[12] But a limited nuclear strike, not a limited nuclear war. The development and deployment of nuclear warheads of higher accuracy and lower yield will not put an end to the peril of escalation. Only the dismantling of the warheads of lower accuracy and higher yield will accomplish that; and it is a distant dream. To be sure, when the "ladder of escalation" concludes in the possibility of holocaust, it is not a small thing to add some more rungs to the ladder. But it is important to recognize, too, that the fundamental facts of nuclear life have not been altered.

So it is that we have arrived at the present moment in nuclear planning. Deterrence may fail. Therefore, nuclear policy. Therefore, nuclear strategy. Therefore, conventional strategy. Therefore, the fighting of a nuclear war.

But a nuclear war must never be fought, as Ronald Reagan likes to say. Is there a way, then, to break this melismatic movement from the fragility of deterrence to the fatality of a nuclear war? Is there a form of operational thinking about nuclear weapons that honors the difference between conventional weapons and nuclear weapons? Is there a strategy for the use of nuclear weapons in the aftermath of deterrence that seeks neither to "countervail" nor to "prevail"? Is there, for the planner and the policymaker, a lesser evil?

Perhaps there is.

IV

There is one thing that would constitute a moral and rational course of action in a nuclear war. That is, to end it. The objective of nuclear strategy should be what strategists refer to as "war termination." Bernard Brodie made the point succinctly not long before his death: "The main war goal upon the beginning of a strategic nuclear exchange should surely be to terminate it as quickly as possible and with the least amount of damage possible on both sides."[13]

Brodie's proposal for the objective of operational thinking about nuclear weapons would seem to be utterly banal. Who

[12] The recent writings of Albert Wohlstetter are briefs on behalf of such a development, though he would make the point more polemically and argue that mutual assured destruction has hobbled nuclear strategy with a prejudice against precision.

[13] Bernard Brodie, "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," *International Security*, Spring 1978, p. 79.

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could be opposed to the ending of a nuclear war? Yet a close examination of the pronouncements of the secretaries of defense of the past decade reveals some rather critical complications. James Schlesinger, be it said at once, seems to have been the policymaker most alive to the question of war termination. Indeed, the "limited nuclear options" that he forthrightly installed at the center of American nuclear strategy appear to have been designed partly for the purpose of allowing for some kind of armistice. In his annual report for 1975, which introduced the new construction of "flexibility," Schlesinger observed that: "What we need is a series of measured responses to aggression which bear some relation to the provocation, have prospects of terminating hostilities before general nuclear war breaks out, and leave some possibility of restoring deterrence. . . ." A year later, he stated with good sense: "Surely if there is only a small probability that limited response options would deter an attack or bring a nuclear war to a rapid conclusion, without large-scale damage to cities, it is a probability which . . . we should not foreclose."[14]

And yet Schlesinger proceeded to vitiate substantially his stated objective for strategy. In his important briefings to the House Foreign Relations Committee in 1974, he uttered the words that have come to haunt the official position on war termination. The aim of American "flexibility," he said, was to stop the war "at the lowest possible level consistent with U.S. objectives." Those are not many words, but they take a lot back. This locution, which may be found in the official and unofficial statements of Schlesinger's successors, is not as platitudinous as it may seem; indeed, as will become clear, it achieves nothing less than a restoration of the conventional fallacy to nuclear strategy.

Donald Rumsfeld presided over such a restoration rather unabashedly. He called for "a system of multiple . . . capabilities combined with a survivable control, command and communications network to permit the president to direct the strategic nuclear forces in a deliberate and controlled pursuit of national objectives." These objectives he defined grandiosely as the capacity "to retard significantly the ability of the U.S.S.R. to recover from a nuclear exchange and regain the stature of a

[14] U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger*, Washington: G.P.O., 1975, p. 38; U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger*, Washington: G.P.O., 1976, II, pp. 6–7.

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twentieth-century military and industrial power more rapidly than the United States."[15] "More rapidly" means, presumably, that the arms race will be succeeded by a recovery race.

Harold Brown had a less ambitious agenda for American strategic forces after the collapse of deterrence. While he confessed candidly, in his annual report for 1979, that "we cannot afford to make a complete distinction between deterrent forces and what are so awkwardly called war-fighting forces," he added that the objective of the latter would be "to ensure that no adversary would see himself better off after a limited nuclear exchange than before it. We cannot permit an enemy to believe that he could create any kind of military or psychological asymmetry that he could then exploit to his advantage."[16] There is no consideration here of American advantage as an aim for operational thinking about nuclear weapons; only of an absence of Soviet advantage. The line is fine.

It is not fine at all in the post-deterrence plans of Caspar Weinberger, where the restoration of the conventional fallacy is pretty well perfected. In his annual report for 1984, for example, he numbers among the objectives of our nuclear forces "in the event of an attack, to deny the enemy his objectives and bring a rapid end to the conflict on terms favorable to our interests; and to maintain the political and territorial integrity of the United States and its allies." Later in the text he remarks that "should deterrence fail, our strategy is to restore peace on favorable terms."[17] In his report for 1985, he is more ringing about the conditions he sets for nuclear war termination. "We must plan for flexibility in our forces and in our options for response, so that we might terminate the conflict on terms favorable to the forces of freedom, and reestablish deterrence at the lowest possible level of violence, thus avoiding further destruction."[18]

These subclauses about "favorable terms," about advantage and disadvantage, smuggle into American plans for nuclear use in general, and into American plans for nuclear war termina-

[15] U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld*, Washington: G.P.O., 1978, pp. 78, 68.

[16] U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown*, Washington: G.P.O., 1979, p.56.

[17] U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger*, Washington: G.P.O., 1984, pp. 16, 32.

[18] U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger*, Washington: G.P.O., 1985, p. 24.

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tion in particular, the most characteristic principle of conventional thinking about war, which is the distinction between victory and defeat. I say smuggle, because no American administration has so far adopted a doctrine of victory in nuclear war. While the notion of victory has been renounced, however, the rhetoric of conquest has been retained. This has the consequence of diluting considerably the priority of war termination after the failure of deterrence.

War termination is an objective of American nuclear strategy only when it is the immediate objective of American nuclear strategy. No military or political goal of any kind may be allowed to obstruct the effort to end a nuclear exchange. When the annihilation of American society and Soviet society may have already begun, the capture of West Germany by the East or of East Germany by the West should be of little consequence. Nuclear weapons are supremely unsuited to the recapture of territory, which they can merely destroy. More important, the notion that the termination of a nuclear war should await the analysis of the results on the battlefield, that its timing should be determined by the prospects for the recovery of a military or political position, or more generally for a return to the *status quo ante bellum*, is a pretext for the fighting of a nuclear war, and nothing else.

The immediacy of the imperative to stop a nuclear war, the absolute nature of the notion of nuclear war termination, has been bitterly criticized: "the best prospect of all for minimizing (prompt) damage lies in surrendering preemptively."[19] This is not merely demagoguery; it is also a dismal collapse into conventional categories of strategic thinking. True, the sort of war termination offer that must be made in a nuclear war may be seen as surrender in a conventional war. Still, there is a critical difference. In a conventional war there are winners and losers. A war termination offer made by a loser to a winner can be called surrender. In a nuclear war there are only losers. A war termination offer made by a loser to a loser cannot be called surrender. It can be called rational. Dispensing with another round of fighting is all that should be desired after deterrence fails.[20]

The notion of war termination usefully sharpens, then, the distinction between conventional warfare and nuclear warfare.

[19] Colin Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: A Case for A Theory of Victory," *International Security*, Summer 1979, p. 75.

[20] See Paul Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958.

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The distinction, indeed, may be defined by it. We may say that in a nuclear war *war termination is a strategic objective*. Of course this defies the Clausewitzian canons, according to which war termination is the result of calculations of profit and loss. If deterrence disappears, however, such canons and such calculations must disappear with it.

V

It is not enough to want to end a nuclear war. You must be able to. War termination must not only be posited; it must be planned. The mighty military, strategic and technological tendencies of America's nuclear arsenal cannot be reversed or redirected in a time of crisis or a time of war. By then it will be too late. Thomas Schelling, one of the lonely few who have worked on the problem of nuclear war termination, has called it "the crucial challenge" and observed that "in earlier times, one could plan the opening moves of war in detail and hope to improvise plans for its closure; for thermonuclear war, any preparations for closure would have to be made before the war starts."[21] There is no evidence, however, that the Pentagon, even during the tenure of officials who understood the immense importance of nuclear war termination, has developed plans to end the war with anything like the devotion that it has developed plans to fight the war. Moreover, the university, which frequently is the government's quarry for precepts of policy, has likewise allowed the study of war termination to languish. The literature is scant; it is almost entirely about the termination of conventional warfare; and it is owed in large part to the difficult duration of the Vietnam War, which inspired a bout of serious academic interest in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the methods of ending a war. The state of the subject, then, inside and outside government, is something of a scandal.

It is not a subject to which this writer can contribute. The theory and practice of war termination must be worked out by those who have the scientific and strategic training. Still, I wish to propose that it be placed on their agenda, and that it be given a pride of place. And I will make bold to list a number of conditions for the swift and successful termination of a nuclear war that rather obviously suggest themselves:

[21] Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, p. 205.

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The Principles of Strategy. A nuclear war will be terminated by those who have been schooled in the idea and the instrumentalities of war termination.

This factor—the mentality of the officials on whose watch deterrence fails—should not be overlooked. When deterrence fails, it will almost certainly fail with a limited nuclear strike. But a limited nuclear strike can mean many things. The technology of countervailing, prevailing and terminating is the same. What will matter, therefore, is what the employers of the technology think that they are doing with it. The history of warfare shows again and again the extraordinary influence of intellectual and physical drill upon military behavior. If the planners (and the politicians) with the authority to use nuclear weapons come into a crisis with the conviction that they can use them to countervail, to prevail, or to win, the conviction will carry the day. There will be no time for a discussion of the first principles of the nuclear world, not in a crisis, and certainly not in a war. But there is time now.

Targeting policy. The termination of a war will not be negotiated by a party that believes it has nothing to lose. A strike against cities, or more generally against a population, will almost certainly preclude the possibility of preventing any further strikes.

This is the good news, and all the good news, about counterforce. The theory of war termination suggests something important about (*horibile dictu*) the character of a first strike, which is that it must be seriously limited. A massive first strike will make war termination impossible (not to speak of all the other things it will make impossible). But in the initial stage of a nuclear war, at least, counterforce is not yet war-fighting. In fact, as Kenneth Waltz has correctly observed, it is perfectly compatible with what he calls, oxymoronically but on the mark, "a deterrent strategy," a strategy for nuclear use that commences with "a few judiciously delivered warheads" that hold in reserve the threat of the society's final destruction and "are likely to induce sobriety in the leaders of all the countries involved and thus bring rapid de-escalation."[22] (To this extent, moreover, a "countervailing strategy" may be tolerated; that

[22] Waltz, *op. cit.*, p.24. See also the testimony of McGeorge Bundy to the Ad Hoc Hearing on Nuclear Danger, House of Representatives, November 22, 1983, pp. 11–14, unpublished. This was an interesting step away from the liberal indifference to the problem of the failure of deterrence. I thank Mr. Bundy for making the text available to me.

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is, to the extent to which the negotiation of an end to the war will require that the Soviets, too, perceive no meaningful "advantage" from nuclear use; but that is all the confidence in countervailing that seems justified.)

Nor will the termination of a war be negotiated by a party that believes it has no bargaining power. A strike against strategic forces, the "first strike" that has featured prominently and passionately in the recent debates about the "window of vulnerability" and the MX, will certainly not completely succeed, if only because the accuracy of an ICBM should not be confused with the reliability of an ICBM; but even a partial success could leave the other side with the feeling that it has been robbed of the strength it would need to negotiate a halt and not a surrender. The scale of a counterforce attack, then, will make a difference, too. A very large counterforce strike would probably induce a feeling of despair that would tempt the merely human command of the side that was struck into an orgy of retaliation. It is unused weapons, and not destroyed weapons, that will provide the assurance necessary for the conclusion of an armistice.

Force Design. The scale of the counterforce attacks that may be made must not be prejudiced by the design of our weapons.

The fewer warheads on a missile, the better. The arming of missiles with multiple warheads (MIRVs) made them more attractive targets. The development of ICBMs in the direction of ten warheads to a missile (and more, according to some excessively excited planners) makes large counterforce attacks more attractive, and thus more likely.

Similarly, the higher the accuracy and the lower the yield of strategic warheads, the better. Not for the purpose of making deterrence more "credible," and not for the purpose of making a nuclear war "winnable," but for the purpose of keeping the apocalypse at bay for as long as possible. To be sure, the "low" yield that is sometimes spoken of by strategists is not quite low enough to nullify our nightmares. Different types of nuclear weapons mean different types of horrors and nothing else. Still, the chances of concluding the war go up as the dimensions of the catastrophe with which it began go down.

More important than not deploying a first-strike weapon is not deploying a first-strike force. Such a force would furnish the technological foundation for the misguided notions that the nuclear forces of the other side can be completely removed, and that they can be removed without murdering the number

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of innocent people that would transform a counterforce motive into countervalue action. A first-strike force, a force of vulnerable land-based MIRVed missiles, like the MX, deployed beyond a certain number, would tempt the Soviet Union (and the United States, since the Soviet ICBM force is equally vulnerable and more than equally deadly) into the kind of attack that will invite, no, implore, escalation.

Control and Command. The termination of a war can be negotiated only with those who have the authority to negotiate it.

For the purpose of preventing escalation and putting an end to hostilities, nothing could be more stupid than the destruction of the political and military authority of the enemy. In 1945 the United States chose to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and not Tokyo. But the destruction of such Soviet authority has been American policy for years. Despite Harold Brown's thoughtful observation, in his annual report for 1982, that "we recognize the role that a surviving supreme command could and would play into the termination of hostilities and can envisage many scenarios in which the destruction of them would be inadvisable and contrary to our best interests," the Carter Administration finally adopted Presidential Directive 59, which placed a high priority on the targeting of the Soviet leadership. Top priority accorded to the destruction of Soviet command and control was codified by the Reagan Administration, where it is called "decapitation."

The initial stage of a nuclear negotiation will be tacit; it will consist in the correct identification of a counterforce attack, of the restraint that it implies. The attack itself will be a message. (For this purpose, the instruments of attack assessment must be secure.) Thus, the telephone must be spared. James Schlesinger has reflected rather straightforwardly that:

> . . . if we were to maintain continued communications with the Soviet leaders during the war, and if we were to describe precisely and meticulously the limited nature of our actions, including the desire to avoid attacking their urban-industrial base, that in spite of whatever one says historically in advance that everything must go all out, when the existential circumstances arise, political leaders on both sides will be under powerful pressure to continue to be sensible.[23]

[23] Cited in Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*, Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1984, p. 109.

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The telephone, however, must work. There is probably no more pressing need for American research and development than the creation of redundant lines of communication that will remain absolutely secure. We must be able to communicate not only with our enemy, however, but also with ourselves. A nuclear war must not be the work of the submarine captain who believes that deterrence has failed and has lost contact with his superiors.

VI

Having made the argument for war termination as the proper objective of nuclear strategy, I must make the apology for the argument. There are practical problems. The most formidable is that the Soviet Union may not cooperate. While Soviet strategists have devoted much more energy to the planning for the period after deterrence, there does not seem to be much in their planning about war termination. Quite the contrary; the Soviets seem to think (judging by what has been declassified and translated into English) that a nuclear war should be fought exactly like a conventional war. They are not against deterrence, as the evidence of our continued existence shows. Yet they are not particularly troubled by the conventional fallacy, either.[24]

The alarming asymmetry between the logic of counterforce and the logic of countervalue must be grasped in its full force. It takes two to restrain a war, but only one to go all the way. If the Soviet Union chooses to treat the failure of deterrence like the outbreak of a conventional war, if it strikes first and strikes massively, our own provisions for something different will not avail us. To be sure, we must do what we can to influence Soviet strategy; but beyond the influence of our ability to annihilate Soviet society, there may be little that we can do. We can persuade the Soviets to keep the peace much more easily than we can persuade them to fight a certain kind of war. This is one of the most sobering facts of strategic life.

There is another risk that must not be overlooked. It is that the adoption of war termination as a policy may weaken deterrence slightly, in the sense that the Soviets will fear the outcome of an armistice less than the outcome of mutual

[24] See Joseph D. Douglas, Jr., and Amoretta M. Hoeber, *Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979.

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destruction or fighting to "victory." Still, as Pierre Hassner has rightly observed, a certain loss in deterrence may be accepted for the sake of a certain gain in the possibility of terminating a war. The risk is probably justified, since (in Soviet eyes, too) the prospect of escalation continues, all plans of any kind notwithstanding, to do the work of deterring.

But the primary problem with the idea of war termination is not practical. It is philosophical. In the end, a faith in American rationality may be no more justified than a faith in Soviet rationality, since it is a faith in human rationality. Moreover, it is probably the most groundless faith in human rationality that may be imagined, since it follows upon the most irrational act in human history, which is the first use of a ballistic missile. Moreover, the second use of a ballistic missile, which the doctrine of deterrence demands, may be the second most irrational act in human history. For this reason I have assumed that the second use will occur (though an argument against it may be made); while it may have no rational reason, it may be counted upon to have an irrational reason, to wit, revenge. How we get into a nuclear war is a subject about which much has been written and thought. How we get out of a nuclear war, if indeed we do, is a different subject. It is against the third use, then, that I would want us to plan; and, if there is indeed a difference between the failure of deterrence and the end of the world, even more desperately than we have planned against the first.

It must seem like reliance upon a broken reed to recommend that the failure of deterrence will culminate in deterrence. But that is just the recommendation. "Intra-war deterrence," as we have seen, is the official idiom of war termination; and the title is apt. Certainly this constitutes an even wilder wager than deterrence itself. This wager assumes that there will appear an atmosphere of trust in the wake of a nuclear exchange. The credibility of the threat to escalate, to carry out the punishment of society that a more sensible strategy had put off, it is said, will persuade both sides to negotiate a cease-fire. But a cease-fire requires a promise. What about the credibility of the promise? Who will take the word of a nuclear warrior?

War termination, then, is finally an argument for the formulation of rules for nuclear combat: rules of nuclear engagement and rules of nuclear diplomacy. It is an expression of what Hans Morgenthau called "a humanitarian impulse within

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the framework of an utterly inhuman enterprise."[25] That is asking a lot. Still, the same may be said of the countervailing strategy, and of the prevailing strategy. They, too, are a call for rules, for some kind of mutual understanding that the worst strikes will not be made first, that retaliation will be proportionate to aggression, and so on. Except that they would take the outbreak of nuclear hostilities all the way into a nuclear war; and they would make no provision for a prompt attempt to limit the damage, not by quitting while we are ahead but simply by quitting. War termination, to be sure, is a version of restraint; but it turns out to be much less Panglossian than the other versions of restraint, since it abjures any notion of advantage. For that reason the idea of war termination casts an important light upon the idea of mutual assured destruction. It accepts calmly the strategic futility of MAD. But it does not reject MAD altogether. For, if MAD is a bad description of nuclear strategy, MAD is a good description of nuclear reality. Indeed, it is the accurate name of our condition. As long as we continue to possess this terrible power, we continue to live at the risk of mutual assured destruction. History may be periodized from the moment that the atom was split; and no refinement of counterforce technology can do anything about it. It is precisely because the world is MAD that war termination is the only morally and practically sound objective of nuclear strategy. As long as the possibility of escalation to extinction is present, a nuclear exchange must instantly be ended. The theory of war termination is not lulled by MAD, then, into ignoring the chance that deterrence may fail; but it insists, too, upon MAD's profound truth.

The theory of war termination has an interesting analytic role as well. It helps to show the sense in which the distinction between deterrence and war-fighting is not empty, as some have maintained. War-fighting means more than merely the use of nuclear weapons; war-fighting means the continued and purposeful use of nuclear weapons. There is a difference between a nuclear exchange and a nuclear war: a difference in the degree of damnation. The continued use of nuclear weapons constitutes a nuclear war. It represents a rejection of the fear that is implicit in both deterrence and war termination, in favor of a false ambition for military and political profit. The countervailing strategy and the prevailing strategy are not

[25] Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

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the dark side of deterrence, as their apologists claim, or its corollaries; nor are they historically inevitable when deterrence fails. They are conscious strategic choices based upon specific strategic assumptions. They may be challenged in the name of other strategic choices based upon other strategic assumptions. The theory of war termination makes such a challenge. It provides an opportunity to break the monopoly of the war-fighters on the operational dimension of the nuclear question. Not all the strategists who think about the failure of deterrence are nuclear war fighters. Only most of them are.

War termination may provide a solution to the intellectual perplexity of liberal strategists and to the strategic perplexity of nuclear use. It is indeed that rare species of nuclear speculation, a way of thinking about the failure of deterrence that cannot be accused of contributing to its failure. Unlike some of the fantasies that have settled comfortably in the seats of American and Soviet power, war termination is strenuously sober about the technological and strategic circumstances in which we live. It denies neither the reality of counterforce nor the reality of escalation.

To be sure, it may turn out to be a fantasy, too. If only because of the speed with which a nuclear war will begin—the speed that may prove to be the most disastrous dogma of strategy in the nuclear age—war termination may prove to be physically and psychologically impossible. The worst may not happen first, but it may happen fast. Perhaps the apocalyptics among us are right. But perhaps they are not. In any event, there is no reason to ensure that they are right. The requirements of war termination are worth a stupendous intellectual, technological and financial effort. The chance of putting an end to a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union may be slim, but it is all the chance that the rest of history may have.

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Richard Stubbing

THE DEFENSE PROGRAM: BUILDUP OR BINGE?

Over the past four years, President Ronald Reagan and his national security team have succeeded in rewriting the context of the defense debate. The need for a massive defense buildup has been accepted; the only open question is the future rate of growth. In budgetary terms, the impact of this buildup has been dramatic. Excluding inflation, the 1985 defense budget approved by Congress is 51 percent higher than five years ago, reflecting a remarkable $330 billion in cumulative real growth since 1980. During the same period federal support for domestic programs, excluding interest payments and entitlement programs (retirement, health care, unemployment), declined by over 30 percent. In the recently submitted budget request for 1986, President Reagan has proposed to continue this transfer of funds from domestic programs to defense. His budget accords the Pentagon a further increase of six-percent real growth—while many domestic spending programs have been slated for major cutbacks.

Following the election in November 1980, former Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird offered the following advice to the incoming Reagan team: "The worst thing that could happen is for the nation to go on a defense spending binge that will create economic havoc at home and confusion abroad, and that cannot be dealt with wisely by the Pentagon."[1] The Reagan Administration chose not to heed Laird's warning.

Rising defense budgets have been a major factor in the federal deficit crisis, and the defense program, together with its supporting rhetoric, has had some disturbing foreign policy implications. Relations with the Soviet Union in the last several years have deteriorated, and arms control negotiations came

[1] Melvin R. Laird, "Not a Binge, But a Build-up," *The Washington Post*, November 19, 1980, p. 17.

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to a standstill during the first Reagan term. Relations with our European allies have also been strained. It is the last part of Laird's warning, however—that our defense establishment could not manage rapid budget increases effectively—which is of concern in this article.

Since 1980 we have heard much discussion of the broad budgetary and foreign policy implications of the Reagan buildup, but too little attention has been paid to the real nuts and bolts of our defense program. Was the buildup militarily necessary or not? Are significant military improvements being attained or is our money being squandered? After $330 billion of real growth in Pentagon spending, these are legitimate questions.

II

The Reagan defense buildup formally began ten days after the inauguration, when Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Budget Director David Stockman acceded to the demands of powerful senators in the new Republican majority and added $32 billion to the outgoing Carter defense budgets for 1981–82 (which had already provided $20 billion in real growth over the two years). There was no justifying analysis or supporting programs; these were to be developed later. It was simply assumed that there was an urgent need and that the money would be efficiently spent on the areas of greatest military requirement.

In vivid contrast to the line-item pruning led by Mr. Stockman across the entire gamut of domestic and foreign aid programs, there was little Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or Defense Department review of the added funds. The task of adding $32 billion was assigned to the three military departments, which had long-standing shopping lists of unfunded programs. There was no time to balance individual department requests; potentially important national needs like sealift and airlift were not high on the Navy and Air Force lists and consequently received short shrift.

In contrast to its usual practice, the Congress proved remarkably amenable to the Reagan Administration's 1981–82 defense proposals. Despite the large add-ons and the fact that the normal budget review process in the executive branch had been truncated, Congress ultimately removed only one percent from the request (after President Reagan's downward budget adjustment in September 1981).

This was a halcyon year for defense. Since then, the Congress

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has returned to its more traditional practice of voting sizable reductions in the defense budget. The Administration, however, has anticipated these cuts and included a large "cut insurance" reserve for each year. The apparently significant reductions of $54 billion between 1983 and 1985 reflect congressional awareness that portions built into the budget could be skimmed off with no repercussions. Even with these cuts, the defense budget approved by the Congress grew by 16 percent, after inflation, in three years.

For instance, in 1983 and 1984, over $17 billion (ten percent) was slashed from the military procurement program alone. Yet the largest defense weapons procurement programs remained virtually unaffected. Of eight major Army programs, six never changed, one received all its funds but encountered cost increases which slowed production, and one slowed production due to technical problems discovered during operational testing. Six of the Navy's largest shipbuilding programs were unaffected by congressional action in 1983 and 1984, while the Trident submarine production schedule slipped slightly. And all of the Air Force's top aircraft and missile programs remained essentially untouched. How, then, did Congress cut $17 billion in two years without affecting major programs? The answer is straightforward: the Administration anticipated the congressional reductions and included numerous budget items that could be reduced in price or easily deferred to later years.

The 1985 budget request for the F-16 Air Force fighter shows how this happened. In the 1983 and 1984 budgets, the Air Force was buying F-16s for a unit price of about $16 million each year. In the 1985 budget request, however, the unit price inexplicably jumped to almost $24 million—adding well over one billion dollars to the cost of the program. In response, Congress quickly cut the F-16 unit cost to $20 million and reduced the appropriation by $800 million, but none of the requested F-16s was deleted from the budget. In effect, the "cut insurance" was removed without adversely affecting the F-16 program.

Thus, in the strange game of budgetary politics, all parties come out well. Congress appears to be trimming the defense budget, while the Pentagon ends up each year with robust increases. President Reagan also has been highly successful. His initial budget plan called for 1981–85 defense real growth of 55 percent—Congress has approved 51 percent. This is a

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remarkably large sustained increase for defense in peacetime—even in the post-Sputnik hysteria of the late 1950s the defense budget grew no more than ten percent over a five-year period.

Is the Reagan defense effort a carefully honed and well-managed response to real and serious threats facing the United States? Or is it, as Laird feared, merely a "defense spending binge?"

III

As a candidate in 1980, Ronald Reagan campaigned hard on the perception of a vastly weakened America. He scored well with blanket assertions of U.S. military inadequacy, caused by conciliatory détente policies and underfunded defense budgets of the 1970s. He portrayed President Carter as "soft on defense," asserting in April 1980 that: "In military strength we are already second to one: namely the Soviet Union."[2]

To Mr. Reagan, the need for a massive increase in defense was not a new idea—he had been preaching it for two decades. What was new was that the nation had begun to agree; public opinion polls showed that the majority of Americans supported an increase in defense spending. The late 1970s had seen a series of events which contributed to the general perception of a decline in U.S. power and will to fight; the Soviet bear had been unleashed in Afghanistan, and even Third World nations like Iran could defy the United States with impunity. At home, a growing conservative voice—centered around the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD)—exerted considerable influence over the national security debate, helping to sidetrack Senate ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) treaty in 1979.

The dramatic shift in public opinion between 1976 and 1980 had little to do with actual military capabilities. There is no evidence that higher U.S. defense spending would have deterred events in either Afghanistan or Iran (though better intelligence would have helped). The changing context of the debate over the U.S.-Soviet military balance was due far less to changes in military reality than to Soviet misbehavior and the effectiveness of one particular group—the CPD—and one man—Ronald Reagan—in making their messages heard. It was the perception of weakness, much more than any shift in

[2] George C. Wilson, "A Buildup in U.S. Forces: Reagan Advisors Urge More for Defense," *The Washington Post*, June 16, 1980, p. 1.

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the military balance, which drove the public to support a defense buildup in 1980.

This is not to say that all was well with the American military machine, which faced a number of serious problems in 1980. Among them were the inability of the all-volunteer force to provide the necessary numbers and quality of military personnel, and the low combat readiness of our forces. Only 69 percent of 1980 enlistees had received a high school diploma, a record low. Reenlistments of those already in the force, especially in highly technical areas, were also suffering. These personnel problems, along with spare parts shortages and maintenance backlogs, were contributing to low readiness levels.

In addition, there were growing doubts about the adequacy of U.S. forces to meet our future military needs. Soviet military power continued to expand through the 1970s, more than that of the United States and its allies; the Soviets also greatly increased their land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and sea-based strategic missile capabilities. In conventional forces, the Soviets maintained their numerical edge in ground forces and began to close the technological gap which has favored the United States since the end of World War II.

In seeking to justify a massive military buildup, Mr. Reagan sought to generalize these problems by portraying the U.S. military in a state of crisis, asserting in April 1980 that "we're in greater danger today than we were the day after Pearl Harbor. Our military is absolutely incapable of defending this country."[3] Yet the shifts in the U.S. military posture and in the U.S.-Soviet balance of power during the 1970s were far less one-sided and more complex than the President has ever acknowledged.

For instance, President Reagan has often categorized the 1970s as a decade of neglect for our armed forces—even going so far as to proclaim in a March 1981 interview "that it is rather foolish to have unilaterally disarmed, you might say, as we did."[4] These statements are quite misleading.

Our defense budgets did indeed decline between 1969 and 1975 under the direction of President Nixon, but these reductions were tied closely to the withdrawal of over 500,000 combat troops from Vietnam and a return to peacetime oper-

[3] Howell Raines, "Reagan's Campaign Style is Creating a Varied Coalition of 'Shared Values'," *The New York Times*, April 12, 1980, p. 10.

[4] Ronald Reagan, interview with Walter Cronkite, CBS-TV, March 3, 1981.

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ating levels. Even during this period of low budget levels, the services achieved modernization of combat equipment far faster than planned—particularly aircraft, helicopters, missiles and ammunition. As older weapons and munitions were lost or used up in Vietnam, they were replaced with the latest production models. When we left Vietnam the production lines were still pouring out new equipment at a high rate.

Since 1975 two of the military services—the Army and Air Force—have actually increased their conventional forces. The Army received approval to expand from 13 to 16 combat divisions, while the Air Force was given permission to expand from 22 to 26 tactical air wings. Only the Navy saw a major force reduction during the 1970s, due almost entirely to its own initiative in retiring several hundred aging World War II vessels. Under President Ford, the funds allocated for defense modernization accelerated after 1975 to provide the added equipment required for the new forces and to speed up the acquisition rate of new equipment. Excluding inflation, annual procurement funding increased 33 percent between 1975 and 1977, then remained at this higher level through 1980.

Funding for strategic forces declined in the 1970s after the unprecedented investments of the 1960s. Sizable increases in force capability were nevertheless achieved. After the heavy construction costs for strategic submarines and ICBM missiles and missile silos in the 1960s, the strategic programs of the 1970s could concentrate on less expensive upgrades using existing launching platforms. For instance, we replaced most of our submarine-launched and land-based ballistic missiles with much improved models. Each new Poseidon missile carried ten warheads compared to the single-target capability of the Polaris missile; each Minuteman III missile carried three warheads, replacing the older single-warhead ICBMs. The B-52 bomber also received substantial improvement to ensure its continued effectiveness—a new supersonic air-to-surface missile was added in the mid-1970s along with a major upgrade of the B-52 electronics systems. In addition, we launched new programs for the air-launched cruise missile, the MX missile, the Trident submarine and the Stealth bomber. In 1970, the United States had 4,000 strategic warheads—when President Carter left office we had over 9,000.

The United States was thus not "unilaterally disarming" over the course of the 1970s, and of course, neither was the Soviet Union. The key question was whether the United States

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and its allies could still deter or, if necessary, defeat potential military aggression. We will never be certain of Soviet military capabilities or, more important, their strategic intentions. Interpretations of the Soviet threat will be largely shaped by the long-standing mindsets of policymakers and will be colored by the latest displays of Soviet behavior or misbehavior. Nonetheless, a few general observations can be made.

IV

In strategic nuclear forces, the United States has today a decided, although narrowing, edge in deliverable nuclear warheads—reflecting U.S. emphasis on multiple warheads for its missiles since the early 1970s. The Soviets have a clear advantage in the size and the number of missile launchers, reflecting heavy Soviet missile and silo production since the mid-1960s; at the same time the United States ended its construction of new strategic submarines and missile silos. Our land-based missiles (about 25 percent of the U.S. strategic warheads) are growing more vulnerable, but the much more survivable air and sea legs of the strategic triad leave us with a substantial nuclear deterrent. The Soviets, on the other hand, maintain about 75 percent of their strategic power in land-based ICBMs; these missiles are also growing in vulnerability.

The capability of U.S. naval forces, with their massive edge in carrier forces, far exceeds that of the Soviet navy. The United States maintains 13 large deck carriers (65,000 tons or larger) equipped with the most modern aircraft in the world as well as 12 smaller deck carriers (under 40,000 tons). The Soviets, by contrast, maintain only five smaller carriers (under 45,000 tons). Like the smaller U.S. carriers (officially called amphibious assault ships), the Soviet carriers can only accommodate vertical take-off jets and helicopters. Overall, the U.S. surface navy has 206 combatant ships exceeding 2,000 tons—the Soviets have only 141 (a 46-percent U.S. advantage).[5] The Soviets do have a large numerical edge in attack submarines, but their submarines are much louder and more easily detected than U.S. counterparts; U.S. forces also have an overwhelming edge in antisubmarine technology. Soviet submarines, moreover, have limited access to the oceans from their naval bases.

[5] *Jane's Fighting Ships 1984–85*, New York: Franklin Watts, 1984, pp. 517–538, and *The Military Balance 1984–85*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984, pp. 7, 20.

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The naval balance tilts further in our favor when the allies of the two powers are considered; our European and Asian allies have large naval forces while the Soviet allies have almost none. Our greater naval capability must, however, answer to a larger mission—that of controlling long sea-lanes and projecting power ashore—than the Soviet mission of challenging that control.

The balance of ground forces in Europe favors the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies—although the wartime reliability of these East European nations is suspect. The Soviets derive their strongest military advantage from armor and continue to outproduce the West in tanks and other armored equipment. The United States and NATO forces, however, have superior antitank missiles, mines and tactical aircraft for use against Soviet tanks; NATO would also have the advantage of fighting from defensive positions. Predictions about the outcome of a Warsaw Pact conventional assault on Western Europe, of course, vary widely. Most experts agree, however, that the chance of such an attack is remote.

U.S. tactical aircraft remain at least one generation ahead of the Soviet Union in air combat and ground attack capability, but Soviet production of new aircraft in the past decade exceeds that of the United States. The qualitative advantage of U.S. equipment was clearly demonstrated in the 1982 Lebanon war where the Israelis, using American-supplied military equipment, shot down over 80 Syrian MiGs and destroyed 18 missile batteries—without losing a single aircraft themselves. (The skill of Israel's pilots was also a major factor in this record.) On the other hand, the loss of two U.S. Navy attack aircraft in one day over Lebanon in 1983 suggests a vulnerability problem for U.S. aircraft against surface-to-air defenses. The Warsaw Pact and NATO nations have roughly the same number of available tactical aircraft; NATO pilots receive more extensive training each year than their Soviet counterparts.

Given our inability to define a precise net military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, an undue amount of attention has been assigned to comparisons of estimated military spending levels. President Reagan has been particularly effective in using this argument to portray an aggressive Soviet military buildup. Spending comparisons contain several serious flaws, however, which tend to be overlooked.

Estimates of Soviet military spending reflect difficult assump-

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tions about the efficiency of Soviet weapons production and the pricing of Soviet military manpower; both of these factors are open to large uncertainties. In recent years, the rate of growth in Soviet defense spending has been a source of serious dispute within the intelligence community. Both CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency analysts now agree that growth in Soviet defense spending has been only two percent annually in 1976–82 (in parallel with an overall Soviet economic slowdown).

In addition, if the impact of defense spending by U.S. and Soviet allies is taken into account, the gap is completely reversed; the United States and its NATO allies have always outspent the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies, although the gap did narrow in the late 1970s. Meanwhile 10–15 percent of Soviet spending is directed toward defense of the 3,000-mile border with China. Such factors underline the limited value of simple U.S.-Soviet dollar comparisons—unfortunately they are seldom mentioned in the political rhetoric.

In summary, although the trends in recent years show that the Soviets have improved their military capability relative to the United States and NATO (primarily through higher production rates of new weapons than those of the United States), American military forces, together with those of our allies, continue to provide a powerful capability against our potential adversaries. The dire state of the military balance portrayed by the Reagan Administration was clearly overstated.

V

Over the past four years, President Reagan and members of his Administration have repeatedly tried to convince the American public that there is a coherent military strategy behind the defense buildup, and that significant military improvements are being obtained through our rising defense spending. For instance, in March 1983 the President told a national television audience: "These loud voices that are occasionally heard charging that the government is trying to solve a security problem by throwing money at it are nothing more than noise based on ignorance."[6] Yet there is increasing controversy over the extent to which our real defense capabilities have improved. Many experts, conservatives as well as liberals, have criticized the inefficiency of the recent defense buildup.

[6] Ronald Reagan, televised address to the nation, March 23, 1983.

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When the Reagan Administration took office, U.S. general purpose forces (which consume the lion's share of defense resources) consisted of 16 Army divisions, three Marine divisions, 26 tactical Air Force wings, and 13 aircraft carrier battle groups. Today, four years into the Reagan defense buildup, our force structure is almost exactly the same.

Moreover, force increases planned for the future—two new aircraft carriers and two new "light divisions" for the Army—are quite small given the expansion in defense spending since 1980. Instead of increasing our force structure, the Reagan Administration made a clear decision to concentrate on modernizing and improving the readiness of existing forces. Yet, even toward these goals, progress has been far from substantial. None of the services has seen a major increase in the rate of procurement—production of Navy combatant ships and Army land weapons systems has increased only slightly since 1980, while tactical aircraft production for the Air Force has actually decreased significantly. Similarly, with the exception of military manpower shortages, long-standing readiness problems have seen little improvement despite substantial added funding for readiness-related areas.

Just where has the $330 billion in real defense budget increases gone? Over half of the total growth ($191 billion) funded modernization, as seen in the budgets for research and development and procurement. Another $113 billion went to areas related to readiness, including military personnel, operations and maintenance, and replenishment of spare parts and ammunition. The remaining growth ($25 billion) went to increases in military retirement and construction costs. Table I summarizes the growth in these three broad categories since 1980.

Excluding inflation, the 1985 funding level for research and development and procurement of new weapons is 90 percent higher than in 1980. The added investments can be grouped into two broad categories—strategic and general purpose forces programs.

Strategic forces have been a major beneficiary of the budget increases. In the 1981–85 period, over one-fourth of the real modernization growth has funded the start of a simultaneous modernization of all portions of our strategic forces. The bulk of the funds go to three programs—the B-1 bomber, the MX missile, and the Trident submarine and missile. In 1985 alone,

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TABLE I

REAL GROWTH IN U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET AUTHORITY
(in billions of 1986 dollars)

	Base Year 1980	*1981*	*1982*	*1983*	*1984*	*1985*	*Cumulative Growth 1981–85*
Total Defense Budget	196.9	221.8	248.9	267.7	279.5	296.1	—
Investment	64.2	76.3	91.6	109.0	113.3	122.2	191.4
Readiness	110.6	119.5	130.2	132.5	138.4	145.8	113.3
All Other	22.1	26.0	27.2	26.2	27.8	28.1	24.8
Total real growth over 1980 (rounded)	—	24.9	52.0	70.8	82.6	99.2	329.5

SOURCE: Budget of the U.S. Government 1986, National Defense Budget Estimates for 1985. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 1984.

about $15 billion (five percent of the total defense budget) will be required for these three systems.

The United States will vastly increase its arsenal of strategic warheads and delivery vehicles over the next several years (many of these increases had already been planned by the previous Administration), but the essential problems which plagued our strategic posture in 1980 still remain. Despite a $30-billion MX missile program, our land-based ICBM force will remain vulnerable to attack—we still do not have a viable national plan to protect our ICBMs. Despite a planned $30-billion investment for 100 B-1 bombers, advances in Soviet air defense technology are still expected to threaten the ability of our bomber force to penetrate Soviet airspace beyond 1990. Billions more are going to develop the new Stealth bomber. Only the Trident II program, with its promised hard-target capability, represents a major advance in our strategic forces.

The Reagan Administration justified its support for this strategic force modernization as a counter to a declared Soviet superiority in strategic forces. The 1980 campaign and the 1981 defense debate emphasized a "window of vulnerability"—a short period of maximum Soviet strategic force advantage in the mid-1980s caused by the supposed vulnerability of our land-based missiles. Advocates of this theory downplayed the deterrent and possible wartime roles of our sea-based and bomber strategic forces. In 1981, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and National Security Adviser Richard Allen called the mid-1980s our most vulnerable period and claimed the highest priority would be assigned to closing this "window." Yet by 1982 the "window of vulnerability" had disappeared from the Administration's explanations, and in 1983 the pres-

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identially appointed Scowcroft commission quietly buried the "window of vulnerability" theory; its recommendation to deploy MX missiles in fixed silos refuted the underlying "window" argument that our land-based missiles were so vulnerable that they placed our entire strategic posture at risk.

There is also a clear contradiction between the stated concern over our strategic capabilities in the mid-1980s and the fact that none of the Reagan Administration's strategic initiatives will reach our operational forces until the late 1980s and early 1990s. The President took *no* action at all to enhance near-term strategic capabilities—a simple step such as higher alert rates for our current force could have greatly enhanced our force posture overnight. In fact, the Reagan Administration actually reduced our strategic forces during this period by phasing out older Titan II missiles and some B-52 bombers ahead of schedule.

Facing increasing public criticism of his aggressive strategic modernization program, President Reagan proposed a dramatic innovation in March 1983: "a vision of the future which offers hope."[7] This was the Strategic Defense Initiative, the development of defensive weapons capable of intercepting and destroying incoming nuclear missiles. As a political maneuver, this proposal was a great success. No longer did public debate center on the rapidly accelerating arms race and the lack of progress in arms control; instead it centered increasingly on the feasibility of such a strategic defense. As far as the budget was concerned, the President's strategic package, at the brink of large congressional cutbacks in 1983, escaped virtually intact. And as a potential bargaining chip in the new round of arms control negotiations with the Soviets, the Strategic Defense Initiative has already proved invaluable.

In terms of added military capability, however, the "Star Wars" initiative holds no promise for any real utility in the decade to come; even thereafter, the chances that a foolproof strategic defense network could be built seem slim. An attacker need only get a small percentage of missiles through the network in order to render the defense meaningless. In terms of its military significance, the importance of "Star Wars" has been overblown. The 1986 funding request of $3.7 billion (almost three times the 1985 level) constitutes only a small down payment on a missile defense system estimated to cost

[7] *Ibid.*

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anywhere from several hundred billion to a trillion dollars. Where these funds might come from, while we retain our current conventional and nuclear forces, is a question that has yet to be addressed.

General Purpose Force Programs. The remaining three-fourths of the 1981–85 real growth in investment has been allotted for general purpose forces (which include communications, intelligence and logistics). Although justified to narrow the gap between U.S. and Soviet weapons production, the changes in production rates of major weapons systems have been surprisingly small (with the exception of long-planned production increases for new Army equipment). Overall, the military force capability improvements derived from these added funds are limited.

As the Reagan Administration took office, the Army was beginning a near-simultaneous replacement of all its major weapons systems—a program long scheduled to reach maximum production rates in the early 1980s. Yet several of the new weapons were highly controversial. A new sophisticated air defense system, the Patriot, would cost $10–$20 billion, yet it consistently encountered performance difficulties and production delays. A new tank-mounted, computer-guided antiaircraft cannon—the DIVAD—lacked the capability to hit maneuvering aircraft, its primary mission; its unit cost soared to seven million dollars, making it the most expensive weapon on the battlefield. A new armored personnel carrier, the Bradley, cost over a million dollars—five times more than the M-113 troop carrier it was to replace—amid evidence that its aluminum armor was extremely vulnerable to common antitank weapons.

Yet Defense Secretary Weinberger opted not to delay or to cancel any of these troubled Army systems. Meanwhile, 11 other new Army systems—all of which relied heavily on new technologies and were several times more costly than their predecessors—also went forward, each receiving a major funding increase. Since 1981, only one major Army program has been cut back: the DIVAD, which had its production suspended for one year in 1985, after a major test failure. All of the other systems continue in production. Thus, while Army procurement funding has doubled since 1980, even beyond inflation, production rates of major weapons such as tanks and armored personnel carriers have increased at a far slower rate. Even with our buildup, the Soviets still produce three times as many

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tanks and seven times as many armored fighting vehicles as the United States each year.

The Navy procurement account also grew during the first Reagan term—again with a limited return on its added investment. Completing the shipbuilding plan laid out by the Carter Administration, the Navy purchased 12 major combatant ships in 1981 for a total of $6.2 billion. During the Reagan Administration, the Navy has never exceeded this 12-ship total (even including the reactivation of World War II battleships)—yet prices have soared. From 1982 to 1985 the Navy has been building 11–12 combatant ships per year at an average annual cost of $10 billion. At the same time, unit prices in several programs have risen dramatically. The Navy's new attack submarine, the SSN-668, has seen its cost rise from $450–500 million per submarine in 1981–82 to $650–700 million in 1983–85. The Trident submarine also saw a 30–50 percent price hike in the last few years.

Almost all the ships purchased by the Navy are of the extremely large, complex, and expensive variety—for instance, the two $3.5-billion nuclear aircraft carriers purchased in 1983. Navy Secretary John Lehman has justified these purchases with the Navy's traditional argument that our ships need the flexibility to perform all potential missions—including, he suggests, an attack on the home ports of the Soviet Union. But given the massive firepower advantage the Soviets would have in such an attack from their land-based missiles and aircraft, our carrier task forces—each a $15–18 billion investment—would be placed in grave risk. Meanwhile, less demanding but more realistic naval missions—peacetime presence as an extension of U.S. diplomacy, control of shipping lanes in war, and force projection against more lightly defended areas—could all be better served through the purchase of greater numbers of smaller, less expensive ships equipped with offensive missiles, and improved antisubmarine warfare capabilities.

Air Force tactical aircraft purchases have fared worst of all. In President Carter's last three defense budgets, the Air Force purchased an average of 227 fighter planes per year—figures which the 1980 Reagan campaign condemned as dangerously low. Yet, in the first four Reagan defense budgets (1982–85), Air Force purchases of fighter aircraft averaged only 172 per year, a drop of 24 percent. Meanwhile unit costs of the F-15 and F-16 Air Force fighters jumped 50 percent beyond inflation in just four years—generating almost two billion dollars

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in added costs for these aircraft in 1985 alone. A substantial portion of the lower aircraft production reflects an Air Force decision that it needs no more A-10 attack aircraft in support of the Army. In fact, production of attack planes has been reduced from an average of 116 per year in the last three Carter budgets to ten per year during the Reagan Administration. As a result, total production of Air Force tactical combat aircraft is down 47 percent below the Carter levels.

The last aspect of general purpose forces is lift. As the 1980s began, the United States had only a limited capability to transport our forces to a distant trouble spot on short notice—the need for sealift was particularly severe, since 90–95 percent of all military cargo would be moved by sea in time of war. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, the Carter Administration launched a major initiative to redress this lift shortfall, announcing programs for enhanced sealift and airlift, as well as a new proposal to pre-position marine equipment on cargo ships in the Indian Ocean.

Since assuming office, the Reagan Administration has maintained the commitment to enhanced lift, but the funds have been misallocated. Billions of dollars are being spent each year to purchase C-5B transport planes—despite their limited capabilities—while the Navy has not acquired any modern sealift vessels beyond the eight ships initially ordered by President Carter in 1980. Thus, over the course of the 1980s we will spend over $15 billion to enhance our lift capabilities (almost all for airlift) and still we will not meet our overall needs. The purchase of an additional 12–20 fast sealift ships—at a cost of only one to two billion dollars—would have allowed us to meet or exceed our rapid deployment goals.

VI

Readiness is an often misunderstood term. Almost impossible to quantify, it ultimately comes down to the personal judgment of a military commander about whether his unit is ready to fight. In the late 1970s, many field officers complained loudly that their units were not receiving adequate funds to maintain combat readiness. The incoming Reagan Administration quickly sought to improve the situation by directing a substantial infusion of funds to each of the readiness areas. Since 1980, 35 percent of the real growth spending in defense has been allocated to readiness-related areas.

Military manpower is probably the single most important

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factor in combat readiness. Administration officials rightly point to manpower as an area of great improvement since 1980—both the quantity and quality of new recruits is up, and critical shortages in several high-skill areas have been alleviated. Was this improvement achieved at the lowest possible cost?

Excluding retirement, military personnel costs increased from $31 billion in 1980 to about $51 billion in 1985. Only two billion dollars of this increase supports higher troop levels—the rest has gone to across-the-board pay increases, leaving the average soldier's pay 55 percent greater than in 1980 (an increase far greater than inflation over this period). For some enlisted personnel, especially skilled technicians who could receive high wages in the private sector, a large pay increase was probably needed in 1980. But the pay hikes have been extended to all military personnel, including the officer corps which had no trouble attracting or retaining good people in 1980 (other than in a few specialties such as submarine nuclear engineering officers and, more recently, navy pilots). Fully one-fourth of the pay increases over the past four years has gone to officers, raising their average pay and allowances to over $38,000 in 1985, not including a large tax advantage on housing and food allowances, medical and dental care, commissaries, and an extremely generous military retirement system. The use of across-the-board pay increases to solve selective enlisted personnel and officer problems is costing billions more annually than was necessary to address the shortages noted in 1980. Selective raises and judiciously applied bonuses could have solved these problems at a far lower cost.

Spare parts inventories were identified as a major impediment to combat readiness in 1980. Distributional shortages existed throughout the military logistical system. Aircraft spare parts quickly became the focal point. The Reagan Administration has almost tripled the annual budget for replenishment spares since 1980 (from $2.2 billion to $6.4 billion) to alleviate the identified shortages, but even allowing for inflation the cost has definitely been excessive. Many of the shortages were one-time in nature (to replenish pipelines and restore inventory levels), but spare parts budgets show no sign of declining. The management of this spare parts buildup has been poor, with numerous instances of routine items—hammers, light bulbs and such—priced at astronomical figures.

Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds support combat forces as well as U.S. bases and facilities around the world.

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While much of the O&M funds go directly to combat readiness, large portions (up to half the O&M total) go to the general upkeep of worldwide bases, support and administrative facilities, and other noncombat-related areas. In constant dollars, O&M spending has risen from some $58 billion in 1980 to $79 billion five years later—an increase of 37 percent. As a result, O&M is now at a higher funding level (in constant dollars) than it was in 1968 at the peak of the Vietnam War, when our combat forces were one-quarter larger and operating at high-intensity wartime rates. Thus, when measured in terms of support per combat unit under peacetime conditions, the 1985 O&M level is impressive even when the added complexity of new weapons is factored in.

Much of the added O&M money is directed to non-readiness areas (known in the military as "quality of life" improvements). Spending for the care of domestic military bases is up sharply as are a multitude of other non-readiness improvements, including recreational facilities and military bands. Meanwhile, despite the infusion of funding, combat readiness indicators such as operational training time and equipment readiness have been—according to the Pentagon's May 1984 readiness report—only "steady or improving slightly."[8]

The last input to readiness is combat sustainability, measured in terms of the stockpiles of munitions and related equipment the forces have on hand at the outbreak of any hostilities. Traditionally these war reserves receive low priority in defense spending, leaving the services with only a fraction of their self-determined "needs." (We do, however, maintain a greater stock of war reserves than our NATO allies who would be fighting alongside our forces in a European war.) Since 1980, spending for munitions has more than doubled beyond increases for inflation, reflecting ten billion dollars of cumulative real growth in munitions purchases over the five years. Even with these increases, however, sustainability problems remain. Only the Army will have more than half of its war reserve requirements by 1986, while the Navy has a serious inventory deficiency of Phoenix missiles for the F-14 fighter (considered vital to protect our carriers from enemy air attacks).

A number of defense critics have argued that readiness needs have been underfunded in the Reagan defense buildup; this

[8] "Improvements in U.S. War Fighting Capability FY 1980–84," Department of Defense Report, May 1984.

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contention is not valid. In 1985, the Pentagon has $141 billion for military manpower and other readiness-related spending, a real increase of 32 percent above 1980. The tragedy is that these funds have not been spent more efficiently in improving combat readiness.

In summary, while there have been improvements in our defense capability since 1980, a wide gap exists between the $330-billion cumulative real growth in defense funding in 1981–85 and the benefits achieved or planned for our forces. The defense budget for 1985 is 50 percent greater, after inflation, than in 1980, yet our military force structure is not even close to 50 percent greater—in fact, it is almost identical to 1980. Nor are we producing anywhere near 50 percent more weapons than in 1980. Nor do we appear to be 50 percent more combat-ready. Yet the Pentagon asserts: "The defense portion of the President's [1986] budget reflects a continuation of the improvements made over the last four years. . . . The foundation of this Administration's defense program is in place."[9] Thus, American taxpayers are being asked to fund more of the same.

VII

Why is our defense effort so inefficient? Some reasons are quite familiar to many Americans—cost overruns, political interference, counterproductive military service rivalries, and "gold-plated" weapons have received wide attention. Other causes are more obscure. In general, the problems can be placed in two categories: management and leadership.

The weapons acquisition process is the area of defense spending where management problems are most widely recognized. A brief look into the acquisition process reveals deep-rooted and serious problems which help generate the cost overruns and below-par quality control which have been routine for many years.

Once a military service decides on the requirements for a new weapon, the next step involves the selection of a contractor team to do the work. A formal competition usually ensues among a few major defense firms for a development contract, with each proposal officially judged on its technical design and cost estimates.

[9] "FY 1986 Department of Defense Budget," Department of Defense News Release, February 4, 1985.

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Several problems, however, interfere with this orderly process. Technical merits of weapons proposals are extremely hard to judge since the technologies are often highly uncertain; the edge in technical designs often goes to the firm which—through better relations with government engineers—has had a greater hand in developing the "requirements" for the new system. Cost estimates are equally problematic. Since only the development and initial production are usually included in the proposal, the cost estimates exclude much of the ultimate anticipated costs, including the bulk of production as well as modifications and spare parts. Contractors often submit unrealistically low bids to enhance their chances of winning the competition, with high confidence that they will be able to recover their costs later. Finally, political and economic factors can play an important role in source selection, directing contract awards to powerful congressional districts or ailing defense firms.

Once a defense firm wins a development competition, it can usually count on being the monopoly supplier of the weapon—plus its modifications and spare parts—for 20 years or more. During this time, most systems encounter cost, performance and schedule problems. Contractors are able to deal with these setbacks by charging them off to the U.S. government through a variety of means: changes in weapon system design provide numerous opportunities to recover losses, and reallocation of corporate overhead (to increase the government's share) is also common. "Excessive inflation" is a third claim used by contractors to recover their costs. There is little chance that a large firm will lose money on its production contracts; thus the incentives to minimize costs are not strong. Follow-on contracts for spare parts and systems modifications then provide a steady flow of business in a sole-source environment. In some cases contractors are actually rewarded for poor performance, as they are awarded large contracts for additional spare parts and modifications to make up for the shortcomings in their initially produced hardware.

The problem with the weapons acquisition system is basically one of incentives. To industry, "low-ball" contract bids, poor performance, and large cost overruns have become common because the system rarely penalizes such practices. To government officials, the incentives are equally poor. Congressional representatives are rewarded for providing jobs and dollars in their districts, regardless of efficiency. Within the military, the

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emphasis is clearly on fielding weapons quickly, with financial control a lesser concern. Individual program managers, who preside over weapons programs for only a short time (one to three years) before moving on to a new assignment, clearly are motivated to keep their programs funded and on schedule, not to challenge the status quo or allow negative publicity.

The weapons acquisition business is only one area of the defense budget where money is poorly managed. Of the over $185 billion in the 1985 defense budget for purchasing equipment and services from the private sector, only one-fourth goes for major weapons. The remainder—over $140 billion—funds a variety of smaller procurements, research and development programs, and purchases for current operations. These non-major weapons purchases—along with the $100 billion paid annually to military and civilian Defense Department employees—comprise the "soft underbelly" of defense which affords numerous opportunities for savings.

The Pentagon buys more than half of the typewriters, calculators, paper products, pencils and other office equipment used by the federal government, yet an OMB study several years ago found that only one-third of these items—purchased government-wide by the General Services Administration—was acquired through competition. The result is premium prices for commonplace items.

Contracts for spare parts and follow-on modifications are another largely noncompetitive aspect of defense purchases. Most often these awards are simply negotiated with the firm which produced the weapon originally—allowing them to overcharge substantially for this work. Overall, spare parts and modifications represent about $15 billion of the defense budget this year—almost all of which is negotiated without the benefit of competition.

Serious flaws also exist in the military compensation system. For active duty military personnel, the numerous forms of compensation received are so varied and confusing that the current assistant defense secretary, Lawrence Korb, once concluded: "Most members of the armed forces are unaware of how well paid they are."[10] Moreover, because the military is paid by rank and not by job, shortages within one rank are often created in some skilled positions where comparable civil-

[10] Lawrence J. Korb, *The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon: American Defense Policies in the 1970s*, Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1979.

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ian pay is high, while in other areas of lesser skills at the same rank many soldiers are considerably overpaid.

The retirement system is another area of great concern. Tens of thousands of career officers and enlisted men leave the military each year after 20 years of service, receiving a minimum of half their basic pay—for life—while denying the military experienced employees at the height of their productivity. Moreover, retirement benefits are fully indexed to keep pace with inflation.

The typical officer retiring today after 20 years is only 43 years old. He will draw an annual annuity of $20,500 and can anticipate receiving $1.7 million over the next 34 years. The typical 20-year enlisted retiree is only 39 years old; he can anticipate immediate benefits of $9,600 per year and total retirement payments of almost $900,000 over 35 years. Today, the total unfunded liability for military retirees already on the rolls, plus those active military personnel planning to retire, is a staggering $532 billion. The Grace commission reported that the military retirement system is *eight* times the cost of comparable private sector retirement plans.

VIII

There is often a wide disparity between national defense strategies and the specific programs implemented by the military departments. Strategy is dictated "top down" from the White House and the National Security Council, whereas specific programs tend to "bottom up" from the individual military services. The parochial interests of the military services and pork-barrel politics in Congress often become the dominant factors in the defense decision-making processes.

Within the U.S. military, an aversion to change has been evident for decades. Even such obviously beneficial weapons as the airplane, the armored tank, the aircraft carrier and the nuclear submarine all faced stern opposition from the services when first introduced because they challenged existing doctrines and weapons preferences. Today, each of the services relies basically upon the same weapons and doctrines which won World War II—the fighter plane and the penetrating strategic bomber for the Air Force, the tank for the Army, and the aircraft carrier for the Navy. Both the Navy's carriers and the Air Force's bombers have grown increasingly vulnerable to modern weapons. A number of critics argue persuasively that these weapons, if not obsolete today, soon will be. Simi-

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larly, the Army's continued reliance on heavy, armored divisions to defend Europe and other regions has also come under criticism from those who believe that lighter, more transportable, maneuverable and sustainable forces are necessary to meet future threats.

The Pentagon has also been highly criticized in recent years for its approach toward technology, advocating ever-increasing technological complexity in its weapons—so long as the weapons serve to justify entrenched military doctrine and strategy. Thus, for example, the Navy relies on the ultra-complex Aegis air defense cruisers and F-14 fighter planes equipped with long-range, precision-guided missiles to defend its carriers, and the Air Force has invested billions in "stealth" technologies and penetration aids to enable its strategic bombers to penetrate Soviet airspace.

The military services justify advanced technology weapons to offset the Soviet numerical edge in troops and weapons. U.S. weapons *are* generally superior technologically to Soviet equivalents. Yet, while our military continues to buy the most sophisticated and theoretically capable systems possible, the key question, too often ignored, is whether these new weapons are worth the added cost and the risk of low reliability when simpler, less expensive weapons could be purchased with only marginal decreases in performance. Many defense experts argue that, instead of concentrating on "drawing-board" capabilities, the emphasis should be on the real battlefield utility of weapons, meaning the ability to adapt to hectic wartime conditions without excessive maintenance and support.

Rivalry among the military services is another factor which limits the overall effectiveness of our military. Combat mission responsibilities often cross services lines, but the compartmentalized decision-making processes of each military service inhibit real cooperation. The three military branches—Air Force, Army and Navy (which includes the Marine Corps)—tend to be strongly independent fiefdoms, each dedicated to attaining the complete capability needed for the accomplishment of its assigned missions.

The reason that the services choose to fund redundant programs instead of relying on their sister services is clear—they all have a poor record in providing for each others' needs. For instance, when the separate Air Force was created in 1947, it was assigned the mission of providing air support to the Army; indeed, the Army was precluded from buying its own

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fixed-wing attack aircraft. Over the years, however, the Air Force gave this mission low priority—preferring to concentrate on strategic bombing and air superiority "dog-fighting." As a result, the Army has built its own fleet of expensive yet vulnerable attack helicopters to provide its own air support.

IX

Critics of wasteful defense spending practices were encouraged in 1981 when Caspar Weinberger was appointed secretary of defense. Weinberger had a reputation as a tough manager and budget trimmer. Thus, improving the Pentagon's management process seemed a major part of the incoming Reagan Administration's defense program.

After four years, the Administration's record in improving planning and management in the Pentagon has been poor. The current leadership has been hesitant to interfere with or override the budget decisions of the military services. In April 1981, Deputy Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci issued a set of 31 initiatives to reform the weapons acquisition process. As a political device, the initiatives were successful in aiding the 1981–82 budget increases as they sailed through Congress. In their stated goal of improving the acquisition process, however, the initiatives have been unsuccessful.

When it comes to dealing with the larger issues of Pentagon management, Secretary Weinberger's laissez-faire leadership style has allowed major problems to go unchecked. Weinberger has declined to require or motivate the services to redress the problems of antiquated doctrines, overreliance on high technology weapons or interservice rivalries. Instead, the services have largely been given a free hand in their rapidly increasing budgets; much of the money has gone toward buying marginal programs, which were not approved in days of tighter fiscal discipline, and to higher prices for the items being purchased.

The Reagan Administration has emphasized dollars as the medium for countering a perceived Soviet military advantage. Yet, if there was a window of vulnerability in 1980, it had little to do with ICBMs and nuclear blackmail; instead it lay in our disturbing inability to compete with the productivity of the Soviet defense effort. While the United States and its NATO allies continue to outspend the Soviet bloc, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies have clearly outperformed the United States and NATO in weapons produced over the last decade. While perceptions in the United States have been of an ag-

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gressive Soviet military buildup, the real source of danger—the real window—has been the serious internal managerial, leadership and political problems which continually sap our military strength, leaving us spending an ever-increasing portion of our budget on defense with far too few defense posture improvements from the effort. These problems have received little attention in the Reagan defense program.

Fortunately, concern about the effectiveness of U.S. defense spending has been growing among prominent defense experts outside the Reagan Administration. Many congressional representatives and defense analysts, as well as a growing number of former secretaries of defense and military service chiefs, have begun to argue in recent years that spending alone cannot cure the military problems we face.

A number of proposals have emerged in the current defense debate, including:

—reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to increase interservice cooperation and to improve the quality of military advice provided to civilian leaders.

—reform of the defense budget process, with increased cooperation between Congress and the executive branch in the early stages of the budget process. As a first step, the president and the Congress should agree to shift the defense budget cycle from an annual to a biannual process.

—measurement of the budgetary trade-offs within the varied programs affecting national security; additional increments for budgetary programs such as intelligence or economic assistance might be more effective than added military spending in reducing tensions or preventing future crises.

—reexamination of the fighting doctrines of the military services; the future roles of aircraft carriers, strategic penetration bombers and any heavy, versus light, divisions all need to be thoroughly reviewed.

—increasing competition in defense purchases; no more than one-third of defense contracts is awarded in a truly competitive manner. The techniques are clear: more prototype competitions for new weapons, buying a single weapon from two separate contractors, and forcing recompetition in follow-on contracts for spare parts and modifications.

—reexamination of manpower requirements, the military pay and retirement systems, the unneeded domestic bases and the vast array of small procurement programs, which

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all offer a multitude of opportunities for savings with no adverse impact on U.S. military capabilities.

Inevitably such proposals challenge powerful and entrenched interests in the military services, the Congress, the civilian Defense Department bureaucracy and the defense industries. Positive changes are difficult to implement—but certainly not impossible. The answer lies in strong leadership.

While the Pentagon's internal problems did not begin with the Reagan Administration, the current team has largely failed in its efforts to address them—mainly through a lack of effort. The President and Secretary Weinberger have chosen to give first priority to increasing the Pentagon's budget—with resource allocation decisions and management responsibilities delegated to the services. In choosing this direction, they have badly misread the problem. The Soviet threat, while serious, was nowhere near grave enough to warrant the furious budget buildup the nation saw in 1981–85, and by ignoring internal management issues in this era of rapidly rising defense budgets, they have allowed fiscal discipline in the Pentagon to erode. The result has been that Americans are paying far too much for defense and receiving far too little security in return.

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Paul H. Kreisberg

INDIA AFTER INDIRA

Indira Gandhi's assassination on October 31, 1984, marked the passing of the generation that brought India to independence. Mrs. Gandhi was nourished, almost from birth, on the Congress Party's struggle against the British, and was particularly influenced by her party's close links with British socialism in the 1930s. She was deeply suspicious of the business class, even though it supported her with millions of rupees. She was convinced that only if the nation's industry, agriculture and services were closely guided by the state would equity and justice be assured. Wary of "imperialist" pressures on India—political, educational and economic—she never relinquished her belief that "foreign hands" sought to undermine not only Indian stability and independence but her personal political power as well. Although the United States seemed most often to be the target of her concern, the Soviets, British, Chinese, French and most of her South Asian neighbors were also frequently suspect.

Mrs. Gandhi shared the concern of her father's generation that India's unity and integrity were fragile and under continuing threat. The partition into two states, India and Pakistan, was the first great trauma for the independence politicians. Then, in the 1950s, came the integration of hundreds of small princedoms of the old British Raj and the struggle to prevent India from collapsing into a babel of independent linguistic and ethnic states. In the 1960s and 1970s, Mrs. Gandhi fought against political rivals at the national level, and sought to weaken and destroy politicians with strong regional bases who threatened to shift the political balance of power from New Delhi to the state levels; such a shift, she believed, would inevitably weaken the unity and authority of the central government.

Mrs. Gandhi was proud of India's technological progress but

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remained close to the traditions and customs of the countryside. Unlike her father, who openly disdained traditional religion, she regularly visited and worshipped at temples and shrines, and privately sought the counsel of astrologers. Her empathy was strong for the concerns of ordinary villagers, even though she herself never lived in rural India. Only once did she lose her grip on the pulse of her country, when a mass compulsory sterilization campaign got out of hand in 1975–76, arousing popular fears and anger, and resulting in her overwhelming defeat at the polls in 1977.

The confusion, division and incompetence of Mrs. Gandhi's political opponents (despite their strength in some regions), her determination to ensure that one of her sons would succeed her, her drive for vindication, and her sheer political grit and shrewdness, all led Indira Gandhi back to power in 1980. But her last four years were difficult, marked by growing internal political unrest, increasing public cynicism about politics and politicians, and the dangerous religious violence which ultimately took her life.

II

Rajiv Gandhi, who succeeded his mother as prime minister only hours after her death, was three years old when India became independent in 1947. For most of his life, politics and foreign policy seem to have held no interest for him at all. His view of the broader world is hard to trace, but his interests and priorities seem quite different from those of his predecessors. He expressed great suspicion of outside interference in India during his 1984 election campaign, but this seemed more tactical than (as with his mother) a residue of a lifetime of political conspiracy and anti-imperialist liturgy. He appears committed, in a personal sense, to the modern world and to reform and change in a way his mother was not. Religion, superstition and the life of the peasant have no place in his experience or interest.

He may wear a shawl and dress in plain white Indian pajamas in public, but in private he is a man of jeans and polo shirts. His career was aviation; his closest friends, young businessmen; his most persistent theme in speaking to national or grass-roots audiences is the importance of technology and modernization. Appalled at the garbled, disjointed records of the Congress Party, he put them on computers. He influenced his mother's decision to begin to liberalize the internal economy three years

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ago and to open up Indian economic development increasingly to the use of electronic communications and computer technology.

In his first two rather reluctant years as an apprentice politician after the death of his younger brother Sanjay—whom Mrs. Gandhi had originally seen as her political heir and for whom politics was life itself—Rajiv shied away from the older generation of Congress Party political figures and from the caste and religious politics that Mrs. Gandhi understood so well. He left visitors with a general impression of diffidence and lack of self-confidence. But, thrown suddenly onto center stage by the death of his mother, he instinctively rose to dignity, tranquility, firmness and a willingness to exercise power. These are the characteristics Indians want above all from their leaders; indeed, they are the characteristics that Indians associate with the gods. The underlying strength of the republic and its democratic constitutional system once again enabled India to make a smooth, essentially peaceful transition to a new national leader. The character of that new leader reinforced the support of the Indian people for the system.

In his first months as prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi made not a single false step. Indian voters rewarded this performance with an overwhelming vote of confidence in the national elections in December 1984, and with almost the same enthusiasm in the more complex state-wide elections in March. Like fairy dust, charisma has graced Rajiv's head, where no one had guessed it would settle.

In selecting Congress Party candidates for the December elections, Rajiv boldly tried to sweep away great numbers of venal, sycophantic and traditional politicians, pulling back only when it was clear that a frontal assault would tear his party apart. But his enormous victory at the national polls—he won 80 percent of the seats contested, giving the Congress Party its first clear popular majority since Indian independence—gave him great bargaining power to strike more effectively at these targets, and he did so before the subsequent state elections by refusing party endorsements to 40 percent of the Congress members seeking reelection to state legislatures. He has thus begun to generate new life in the Congress Party at lower levels, a vital step for future vigor in Indian politics.

To be sure, his post-election national cabinet is not brilliant; it is not markedly different in character from his mother's last cabinet. But he chose a number of new junior ministers of

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state, and pointedly told *all* his ministers that they would be judged promptly and finally by their performances. For the first time, there were junior ministers in their thirties, and even if the assortment of caste, religious and regional politicians which India's diversity and social complexity demands is still there, the older ministers can see all too clearly that new and younger substitutes are ready and in training to fill their shoes should they falter.

Rajiv feels most comfortable with his own generation and with individuals whose backgrounds are similar to his own. His closest advisers and the key managers of his election campaign were his classmates at the elite Nehru Dun boarding school for boys or friends from his years as a pilot for Indian Airlines. But he has also promoted more traditional politicians in his general age bracket, such as V.P. Singh, an attractive and shrewd Congress Party member of parliament in his mid-forties. Singh, Rajiv's finance minister, held several cabinet positions in Mrs. Gandhi's post-1980 cabinets and organized the Congress victory at the recent elections in the vital north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, which has 119 million people and 84 parliamentary seats. He has the grass-roots links which Rajiv Gandhi still lacks, despite the prime minister's demonstrated appeal to the Indian voters, and yet is fully committed to honest, efficient and modern government. Singh is a man to watch for the future.

Simplifying the operations of government, speeding up the decision-making process and eliminating dead wood are Rajiv's central governing priorities. He has tried to shake up the 16 million bureaucrats of the country, condemning sloth and laziness, and demanding hard work. The objectives are impeccable, but Rajiv will find—and probably already knows—that their realization will be enormously difficult.

III

The major issues facing the new government are overwhelmingly internal, as would be the case for any Indian government. But India's relations with its neighbors—particularly Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh—cut deeply across Indian domestic political sensitivities about national unity, and affect a wide range of political, military and economic options for New Delhi. Despite efforts to lead the nonaligned movement and excursions into global politics (more frequent in the 1950s and 1960s than later), events in South Asia have always been at the heart

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of India's foreign policy. These are the issues that affect most powerfully the political forces within India itself.

The collapse of law and order in the Punjab in 1984 clearly illustrates the point. Virtually all of India's attention and energy was focused for most of the year on the tensions between Sikhs and Hindus in the northwest Indian state. The Punjab, bordering on Pakistan and lying only 60 miles from New Delhi itself, is India's richest state, the breadbasket of the country and a center of modern industry and military facilities. Indian national security and the safety of the capital depend on the stability and security of the Punjab. No Indian government could tolerate a breakaway movement there.

It is true that despite occasional bursts of rhetoric, even during the worst of the violence between radical Sikhs and government authority in 1984, few Indian Sikhs sought an independent state. But another assassination or further acts of terrorism could arouse a new wave of violence by Hindus against Sikhs of the Punjab and elsewhere, with dangerous consequences for Indian stability, religious peace, and confidence in the army and civil service, where Sikhs hold many senior positions.

Indian strategic planners have always feared that Pakistan might take advantage of domestic Indian religious or social strife to weaken Indian unity and encourage dissidence. Some Indians strongly believed this was happening in 1984, but evidence for official Pakistani support of Sikh dissidents is fragile. In his December election speeches Rajiv Gandhi repeatedly struck the theme that India would exert every power at its disposal to ensure stability in the Punjab, vaguely but ominously warning against any outside involvement.

Pakistan's leaders consistently and indignantly denied any involvement with the Sikhs; since Mrs. Gandhi's death they have expressed strong and repeated interest in improving relations with New Delhi and with its new prime minister. Rajiv Gandhi responded warmly, but nearly 40 years of bad blood must be overcome, and hardly a month goes by in which there is not some expression of suspicion and fear by India or Pakistan about activities directed by one at the other: troop movements, alleged border incursions, negotiations for new arms, inflammatory radio or press broadsides. These suspicions can gradually be eased by efforts on both sides, but will swiftly revive if there is new internal unrest in either Indian or Pakistani border areas.

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Thus, regardless of Pakistani professions of friendship and denials of interest in destabilizing India, Indian leaders cannot rest easy until political stability is fully restored in the Punjab. Reconciliation with the Sikhs and an easing of tensions in the Punjab are the most urgent internal tasks facing Rajiv Gandhi and, at the same time, key elements for peace in the subcontinent.The new prime minister is not without assets in facing this challenge. It was Mrs. Gandhi, not Rajiv, whom most Sikhs held responsible for the Indian army's seizure last summer of the Golden Temple, the sacred center of the Sikh religion. It was she, not he, who imprisoned or banned from political activity most of the leaders of the Sikh community. Emotions have cooled since then and Rajiv handled well the rioting in New Delhi after Mrs. Gandhi's assassination. Hindus and Sikhs alike were stunned by the looting and vengeance killings that followed the assassination, and Rajiv's calls for calm, unity and justice were welcomed by opinion leaders on all sides. Most of the issues under dispute are not that intractable, leaving aside the extreme claims of a handful of Sikhs committed to separation or radical reforms to distinguish a Sikh Punjab from the rest of India.

Rajiv, therefore, can start with a relatively clean slate, and moderates among the Sikhs are likely to be eager to try to work with him in the coming year. His release of key Sikh leaders in March 1985 was an important first step. Next would be a judicial inquiry into the rioting in New Delhi and the killings of Sikhs on Indian railways in the same period, but the prime minister has hesitated on such a step, possibly for fear of uncovering culpability among both police and Congress Party officials.

The Punjab, of course, is not the only domestic Indian area affected by relations with Pakistan. The shifting of millions of people during partition, as well as three Indo-Pakistani wars and the fact that India has the fourth largest Muslim population in the world, have produced intense sensitivity to any Pakistani developments. India's Muslims have shown themselves over the years to be genuinely Indian in their national loyalties, but they are also attentive to their Islamic neighbors. Many are deeply religious. Hindu-Muslim tensions have never been totally eliminated, and no year passes in which serious violence with religious overtones does not occur somewhere in the country. In 1984, hundreds died in such incidents in Bombay and Hyderabad. Indian government sensitivity to Pakistani ac-

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tions—external or internal—that Indians believe might feed such violence is high and, while rarely the subject of direct diplomatic exchanges, remains just under the surface for politicians and officials of both countries.

IV

India's current problems with Sri Lanka stem from similar cultural, racial, economic and religious causes of long standing. The largest Sri Lankan minority, Tamils who emigrated from southern India to Ceylon as tea and rubber plantation workers in the nineteenth century, is Hindu; Sri Lanka's ruling Sinhalese are primarily Buddhists, with significant Christian and Muslim minorities. Hostility to the Tamils is strong among both the Sinhalese poor and middle class.

In Indian tradition, Sri Lanka was a land of demons and of the ogre king, Ravanna, who kidnapped and raped the bride of India's greatest hero, Rama. Even today, Ravanna is burned symbolically as the personification of evil by millions of Indians in India's most important annual religious festival. At the same time, he is portrayed as a national hero in Sri Lanka, and Sri Lankan folk tales abound with memories of the defeat of past Tamil invaders.

Indian-Sri Lankan diplomatic negotiations over the Tamil minority problem go back to the 1950s, but relations were generally amicable and cooperative until Tamil-Sinhalese tensions erupted into brutal violence two years ago. Moderate voices—Tamil and Sinhalese—were muted, and half a dozen Tamil "liberation" groups proliferated in Sri Lanka, dedicated to independence or total autonomy for Sri Lankan Tamils. The violence and political activity of these Sri Lankan Tamil groups aroused strong sympathy among the 50 million inhabitants of the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, including, inevitably, many of the state's political leaders. New Delhi would probably like to halt the training of Sri Lankan Tamil guerrillas in "secret" camps in southern India, but it has felt compelled to deny even the existence of these camps, despite widespread and detailed reporting on their activities in the Indian press.

Initially, Rajiv Gandhi had little room for diplomatic or political maneuver. Now that the state elections have been concluded, he may be willing to risk restraints on the Tamil "freedom fighters"; in any event, he has firmly rejected Sri Lankan Tamil appeals for Indian troops to come to the aid of their brothers in the south. India has repeatedly offered its

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good offices in resolving tensions and avoiding any escalation between India and Sri Lanka. Mediation efforts came close to success in the first half of 1984, but ultimately foundered on resistance by some influential Sinhalese nationalists to major concessions for local Tamil autonomy and participation in a proposed national conference of reconciliation.

Prospects for easing tensions or averting a new outbreak of violence in Sri Lanka are not promising, and would be worsened should Sri Lankan Tamils formally declare independence for their northeastern region of the island. Should that occur, a conflict similar to the decade-long tragedy of Cyprus could be replayed in the midst of the Indian Ocean. Internal Indian political tension would be heightened, and Rajiv Gandhi's current rejection of intervention would be gravely tested.

Bangladesh is the third major intersection of India's domestic and foreign policy concerns. Indian interests focus on the millions of illegal Bangladesh migrants who have streamed into the northeast state of Assam over the last decade and more. This has aroused growing resentment over land, jobs and political power, as many of the migrants sought to vote in Indian elections and Assamese fought back to prevent being overwhelmed at the polls. Large-scale violence between Assamese and Bengalis—mostly from Bangladesh but some from India's own state of West Bengal—began to erupt four years ago. Assam is India's primary source for onshore oil, and violence halted production at one point. India has begun building hundreds of miles of high fences to keep out Bangladesh border-crossers, a move bitterly criticized by the Bangladesh government in terms reminiscent of similar U.S.-Mexican exchanges. Political life in Assam has been disrupted to the point where, as in the Punjab, neither the 1984 national elections nor the local elections of 1985 could be held.

The aura of good will between India and Bangladesh, dating from India's role of "godmother" to Bangladesh independence from Pakistan in 1971, has long since faded. Not only the border migration question looms as an irritant; there are also intense disagreements over the allocation of river waters flowing through India's northeastern states into Bangladesh, conflicting claims to potential offshore oil in the Bay of Bengal, and smuggling of rice and jute between the two countries. Indian weariness over persistent internal Bangladesh political instability is growing. The problems intensely affect political

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and economic debate in the poorest and most volatile of India's states, West Bengal, Assam and Bihar.

The policies Rajiv Gandhi has adopted on these regional foreign policy problems do not yet differ significantly from those of his mother. This is not surprising, since his mother's foreign policy advisers still remain in place. More important, India's policies toward its neighbors are so closely related to difficult domestic issues that options for sudden or fundamental changes are almost nonexistent. But nuances in style on Rajiv's part may yet appear—perhaps a greater willingness to avoid confrontation, to deal with problems quietly and with at least the appearance of understanding, and greater seriousness about strengthening the fabric of the nascent South Asian Regional Cooperation grouping established four years ago by all the states in the area. Formed without a secretariat, primarily as a forum for discussing issues rather than implementing programs, SARC has accomplished little so far. But if Rajiv is serious about a new Indian opening to his neighbors, the SARC summit planned for the fall will offer him the opportunity.

The key to better relations in the region is greater trust of India by the smaller countries, a trust Mrs. Gandhi did not engender. Like the "Widow at Windsor," of whom Kipling warned one should "walk wide," Mrs. Gandhi's forceful and, at times, abrasive assertion of a preeminent position on the subcontinent antagonized and alarmed bordering states. Rajiv may venture a smoother, softer stance. Even if much of the substance of Indian policy does not change, a shift in style would be welcomed by all the countries of the region.

V

Relations with the major powers have been heavily influenced by their respective policies toward India's regional interests. Indians have seen the Soviets as friends, the United States and China, more often than not, as adversaries, and Japan, France and Britain primarily only as trading partners.

Since independence, India's prime ministers have nourished relations with the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. has supported India on the Kashmir issue and in every other Indian conflict with other states. Since the mid-1960s, the Soviets have been India's primary source of military equipment and have alternated with the United States as India's primary trading partner. India has purchased military equipment—helicopters, ships, tanks, artillery and aircraft—from the French, British and

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others, but most imported Indian military hardware comes from the Soviet Union. Thus, for a sample four-year period (1978–82), of the $3.6 billion in India's foreign military purchases, $2.8 billion (77 percent) came from the U.S.S.R.

In a rare concession, the Soviets agreed many years ago to allow the Indians to manufacture analogues of almost all the equipment they purchase. This has enabled India to become both self-sufficient in basic arms and a potential exporter. India now places this condition on any military equipment it negotiates to buy; both France and Britain have reluctantly agreed.

In the last three years, India has taken some steps to diversify its sources of modern weaponry. Soviet prices, however, remain lower than those of any other suppliers, and can be paid in rupee-denominated exported goods rather than in scarce foreign exchange. This was enormously helpful when India was able to export to the U.S.S.R. low-quality goods for which international buyers were scarce. But now India wants fewer nonmilitary modern high-technology products from Moscow, and as its own exports become more sophisticated, the appeal of the Soviet market is declining. Indians have begun to worry about large ruble trade balances which are useful only for arms purchases.

After long estrangement on the matter, India and the United States have begun discussions about military sales in recent years. Each round has failed because of various Indian conditions: New Delhi has sought guarantees that supply will not be interrupted by U.S. political decisions; assured delivery of large quantities of spare parts; promises of technology transfer and indigenous production in India; relaxation of U.S. export controls; and other arrangements that the United States found objectionable. A recent sale of sophisticated American electronic equipment for tanks may be a harbinger of things to come. It is very unlikely, however, that the United States or any other Western country will supplant the Soviets as India's primary source of modern supply in the military field.

India has been sensitive to charges that this arms relationship produces political dependence on the Soviet Union. The Indians do permit Soviet ships to refit and refuel at Indian ports, but they note that the same benefits go to British and French ships. The Soviets sought to use Indian airfields for Indian Ocean reconnaissance flights in the early 1970s, but this was denied. And Indians insist that the Russians have no special access to Indian defense or production facilities once initial

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training and production technology transfer has been accomplished. There are no regular Soviet training or advisory teams with Indian military forces, other than when new equipment is phased in, and Indian officers are fiercely independent of any foreign military strategic or tactical advice.

Moreover, with only occasional exceptions, India's positions on most foreign policy issues, as measured by rhetoric and voting in the United Nations, have not differed significantly from those of Indonesia, China, or even Pakistan. (It is the occasional exceptions, including votes on Afghanistan, Kampuchea and the Korean Air Lines incident, which most irritate Washington.)

The Indians are particularly sensitive to Soviet activities in India's domestic life because of the sizable communist parties in the country. Indians are well aware of continuing Soviet disinformation tactics designed to implicate the United States in supporting Sikh nationalists, opposing India's leaders, and even being involved in Mrs. Gandhi's assassination, as well as encouraging Sri Lanka and generally interfering in India's internal affairs. Few senior Indian officials have believed such stories over the years, but they have had a cumulative political impact on many ordinary Indian newspaper readers.

India has felt free, or at least inclined, to criticize American foreign policy more than Soviet. Partly this continues a persistent and often sincerely voiced refrain from Indian intellectuals, since Nehru's days, that Indians expect more from a democratic than a totalitarian power. During the 1950s and 1960s, moreover, the Soviets were the main international proponents of anticolonialism, an issue to which Indians were instinctively drawn—and on which they often found themselves at odds with the United States, as they admit, whether fairly or not.

Most important, however, is the Indian perception that American policy has favored India's adversaries—with the sole exception of the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962. Indian suspicion of China and of Pakistan—and of U.S. links to both countries, and those between the two—and unease over American naval might in the Indian Ocean have led Indians, for the last two decades in particular, to look to the Soviets for tacit balancing support against the United States and those states with which the United States seemed to have favored relationships.

The Indians are themselves uneasy about Soviet actions in Afghanistan since 1979. While Indian rhetoric has been constrained in public, Indians have privately made clear to Moscow

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their strong distaste for the presence of Soviet troops on the fringe of the subcontinent. Mrs. Gandhi bluntly and publicly told her Soviet hosts during a visit to Moscow in 1982 that Soviet troops had to leave Afghanistan. But the issue is complicated for New Delhi policymakers; they are uneasy that the primary guerrilla resistance to the Soviets in Afghanistan comes from fundamentalist Muslim groups, and they are even more uneasy that Pakistan is justifying a buildup in its military forces by emphasizing the Soviet threat on its border.

India is faced with a strategic dilemma: it does not want Soviet forces in the region, nor does it want the United States to send forces or military aid to Pakistan to resist Soviet pressures. While it is unable to reach an agreement with Pakistan that would enable both countries to present a joint front to all outside powers, India is unlikely to play a major role in persuading the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan.

VI

Relations between India and China have eased over the last five years. Rajiv Gandhi was a young man of 15 when the two Asian powers went to war in 1962, and it would not be surprising if he were willing to look toward the settlement of minor territorial disputes on the Sino-Indian border that Mrs. Gandhi still had difficulty contemplating. At issue, after all, are nothing more than impenetrable gorges, unclimbable peaks and four-mile-high Himalayan tundra where nothing grows and breathing is painful. India's national honor as the party defeated in the war has left it reluctant to relinquish territory without compensation. Negotiations are likely to continue to be protracted, but are not critical for either state.

India and China differ strongly on other issues, including Vietnam and Kampuchea. Indira Gandhi harbored strong feelings about Vietnam, dating back to Hanoi's struggle for independence from France and to her father's—and her own—admiration for Ho Chi Minh. Since the early 1960s, India has also seen a strategic interest in encouraging an Indochinese "buffer" between China and eastern India, barely 500 miles away across Thailand and Burma. The Indians held no brief for Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea, but when balanced against Pol Pot's rule, and strong Chinese backing for the Khmer Rouge, India has been content to back the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea until Pol Pot can be eliminated and Chinese influence in the area reduced.

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Indonesia is the only country of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to have sought out good relations with India, primarily because Indonesia shared India's concern that China might be an active expansionist threat in the Indian Ocean region. The attitudes of other ASEAN countries toward India range from indifference to active dislike. But if Indian economic initiatives show promise of bringing trade and technical benefits to the countries of the region, and if Indo-U.S. relations improve, ASEAN self-interest is likely to lead these states to take another look at India and its new prime minister. Rajiv Gandhi's decisions on how to deal with ASEAN sensitivities over Vietnam and Kampuchea will depend primarily on how much room he decides he has in dealing with the Soviets. It would be surprising, however, if he wished to commit himself deeply on behalf of the Vietnamese; the "buffer" argument has long seemed somewhat limp, and Vietnam would seem to hold little appeal for someone dedicated to modernizing India. Rajiv's interest in mutual trade and technology cooperation within the region could be a new element. Japan, as usual ahead of most others, has been wooing India precisely in this way for the past three years. This may thus be an ideal time for moderate Asians—ASEAN and the Republic of Korea—to express an interest in improving ties with India.

Often heard in private conversation, but rarely in public speeches, is Indian resentment that the United States (and other Western countries) seem far more interested in China than in India. Many Indians compare the constant stream of businessmen visiting China with the still modest flow to India, and are skeptical that Western expectations for the China trade will materialize. At the same time—and this is only rarely articulated—they seem worried, with good reason, that China may penetrate international markets and preempt opportunities for Indian exports. Rajiv Gandhi may well use the goad of Chinese competition to drive his own business and bureaucratic communities to greater efforts.

VII

There is no evidence that Rajiv Gandhi holds any of Mrs. Gandhi's old personal suspicions of the United States, although he seems to have had few close relationships with Americans. He was sharply critical of alleged U.S. support for, or at least indifference to, the activities of Sikh nationalists in the United States last year. But he has also made plain to a variety of

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visitors that he would welcome friendlier and more active bilateral ties, particularly in science, technology and trade.

His government's handling of the aftermath of the disaster in Bhopal, in December 1984, in which over 2,000 persons died from poisoning after an accident in a Union Carbide plant, has been marked by concern to avoid damage either to Indo-American relations or to the prospects for future American investment in India. He has scheduled two visits to the United States in 1985—one in June and another to attend the U.N. General Assembly in October—and although he has also accepted invitations to visit China and the Soviet Union (thus demonstrating that India's nonaligned policies remain unchanged), the possibility of a new opening in U.S.-Indian relations seems enticing.

To be sure, the last four decades have seen other "openings" for improved relations, particularly under Ambassadors Chester Bowles, during the Truman Administration, and John Kenneth Galbraith, in the Kennedy Administration. Both proved short-lived because of tensions over American policies toward the region as a whole.

It was, of course, American links with Pakistan that were the central points of controversy both times. The U.S. bilateral security agreement with Islamabad and Pakistan's membership in pro-Western security treaties (the now defunct Southeast Asia and Central Treaty Organizations) in the 1950s, U.S. arms sales to Pakistan in the last 20 years and, above all, the Indian conviction that the United States has backed Pakistan in each of its conflicts with India remain constant themes in Indian political discourse. U.S. rationales, focused on the global balance and on Soviet threats to the Middle East, have held no persuasion for India. Indian resentment of the United States on these issues is deeply felt and broadly based, and is almost certain to infuse some of Rajiv Gandhi's thinking, as well as that of his advisers. It can be diminished in prominence; it can even be submerged if other aspects of Indo-U.S. relations develop. But the suspicion and its potential to emerge suddenly to impair bilateral ties remain under the surface and should not be ignored.

If large, currently planned increases in U.S. assistance to the Afghan guerrilla opposition materialize, Soviet air incursions and bombings inside the Pakistan border may become more intense. Mikhail Gorbachev took little time after assuming leadership in Moscow before warning Pakistan of the risks that

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support for the Afghan Mujahedeen might bring. The Indians are rightly concerned about the broad threat to subcontinental and, above all, Indian security that these developments pose. They are likely to oppose strongly Pakistani requests for stepped-up military assistance if Soviet pressure along the Afghan border mounts. And more direct U.S. efforts on behalf of Pakistan could easily lead to a replay of past deteriorations in Indo-U.S. relations.

At the very least, U.S. planning for Afghanistan, and for Pakistan, could well take much closer account of what the cumulative consequences of U.S. policy may be for India than has been the case thus far. Such cautions have been offered in the past but rarely have been heeded. Rajiv Gandhi's trip to Washington in June offers an ideal opportunity for the United States to listen to Indian concerns as well as to try to persuade the Indian prime minister of U.S. views. The key problem is whether the remainder of this decade will see a significant rapprochement between India and Pakistan. It would be an act of great strategic courage for Rajiv to seek such a real, long-lasting understanding with Islamabad, and for Islamabad to reciprocate. But, even if an effort to relax tensions is on his and Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq's mutual agendas for the next year or so, innumerable domestic and external hazards lie in wait to trigger tensions. The United States can do little to help change this state of affairs. But careful consideration of how U.S. policies—on arms, on help for the Afghan guerrillas, on nuclear proliferation and on aid—toward India and Pakistan may affect the other country is essential if the United States is to avoid being one of these hazards.

Any period of worsening Indo-Pakistani relations is also a bad period for Indo-U.S. relations. The real challenge for Rajiv—and for American leaders—will be to try to avoid such periods or to try to manage them when they occur.

Although the United States has wisely assured India it supports Indian efforts to seek a peaceful resolution in Sri Lanka, tensions between India and Sri Lanka are a lurking problem for the United States. The United States, sensibly, has made clear to both countries that it does not want to become involved. It has ignored recent Sri Lankan hints that the U.S. navy is welcome to call at the superb harbor of Trincomalee, which lies close to the area of heaviest Tamil population concentration on the island. A curious array of outside parties are already engaged in the Sri Lankan imbroglio, with China, Israel

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and Jordan quietly helping Sri Lanka, and the Palestine Liberation Organization and Libya assisting the Tamils. India, as usual, is suspicious of any outside moves in the area, and were Rajiv Gandhi not making a strong effort to keep the situation under control, it could easily boil over into generalized verbal attacks on "foreign intervention" that invariably would implicate the United States—even if only through Soviet disinformation efforts.

By building a broader framework for Indo-U.S. relations, both sides may have a stronger interest in minimizing the kind of damage to political confidence, and thereby to economic relationships as well, that has often occurred in the past. This is the strategy which the State Department, with support from the White House, is now following. The Indian government seems fully in support as well. It is a good policy but it cannot replace a strategy designed to avoid heightened military and political confrontation in the region.

VIII

For all the prime minister's zeal for modernization, development challenges for the Indian economy remain immense. Population growth continues to far outstrip the creation of new employment opportunities and services. The economy has been growing at four to five percent a year, but urban and rural poverty levels remain almost as high as they were 30 years ago, despite the rise of tens of millions of Indians into the ranks of the middle class. The economy is still heavily overregulated, and bureaucratic control remains stultifying. Industry is inefficient and increases in productivity are almost nonexistent. Power, transportation and communication are all in short supply, as are external and internal capital resources. New technologies will help, but they are costly for a country already facing mounting debt repayment challenges later this decade.

In contrast to all these elements is an enthusiastic, ingenious and entrepreneurial labor force with large numbers of high school and college graduates, including many engineers, doctors and accountants. The internal market is vast and, like the Chinese market, anxious for diverse, high quality, reasonably priced goods. If India's political and economic leaders can steadily hack away at the obstacles to growth—and that will require all the enthusiasm and commitment Rajiv Gandhi can summon—India's economic rate of growth might rise to six or

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seven percent over the next decade, probably not more. Ideally, New Delhi would like to attract development aid, but will probably have to make do with enhanced opportunities for trade and investment from abroad. Japanese, American and European businessmen who, with Indian counterparts, become part of this development process could reap great benefits if they are willing to take the risk and if the Indian government provides the incentives for them to do so.

Until very recently, the Indian attitude toward American investment and trade has been that the initiative was up to the United States—unlike, for instance, China's recent efforts to seek out, encourage and woo foreign investors, technology transfers and trade. Individuals and officials of India and the United States often grate on one another, in ways which Americans and Chinese seem to be able to avoid. The image of Indians has languished in the United States, though polls since 1983 show India beginning to move up in the general esteem of most Americans. The successful film *Gandhi* and positive reactions to *A Passage to India* and the television series *The Jewel in the Crown* seem to have helped foster an increasing interest in India among Americans.

The Year of India, scheduled to start in June 1985 and to be opened by Rajiv Gandhi and Mrs. Reagan, may build on this base and strengthen both real interest and sympathetic curiosity. American banks and major corporations have started looking more actively into India as a site for overseas expansion. They have been encouraged by the relatively buoyant Indian economy since 1982, India's strong credit rating, new investment in telecommunications and, probably, Japanese success in trade and investment ventures (five major Japanese car-makers plan to assemble and manufacture automobiles and trucks; other Japanese companies intend to produce electronic components). U.S.-Indian trade has been growing, and small but potentially significant contracts have been concluded for high technology transfers including computers, silicon wafers and telecommunications equipment between business firms. In November 1984, India and the United States concluded a memorandum of understanding on technology transfers, which may help further broaden cooperation and strengthen the hand of American businessmen in matching or beating European and Japanese competitors for the Indian market.

U.S. investment in India has grown steadily but slowly in recent years, mainly through technology licensing contracts.

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Total U.S. investment in India by the end of 1983 was $463 million, and was probably about $475 million at the beginning of 1985. As in China, the primary attraction for foreign investors has been the huge, relatively untapped domestic market and low wage rates. The overregulated character of the Indian economy, on the other hand, and uncertainty about the stability of the Indian labor force and political tranquility in the country, have argued for caution.

The liberal and rational economic policies of the last few years, on which the new Gandhi government seems determined to build, could ease the concerns of American companies and result in a significant upturn in Indo-U.S. economic ties.

IX

India has shown itself to be remarkably stable, despite the constant iteration of threats to national unity and integrity. Such warnings are echoes of past fears, not current realities.

A long list of challenges to this statement could be drawn from the preceding pages—economic, social, political, religious, sectional. But India's stability lies in its very size and complexity, and in the fact—and it is truly a fact—that, regardless of their diversity and of the tensions that exist as a result, Indians from the southern tip of Kanyakumari to the Himalayas *do* think of themselves as "Indians" with a common nationhood, and they are proud of it.

Instability in the Punjab is serious but, demonstrably, it does not generate weakness everywhere. If India's efforts to develop an electronics industry were to falter, this would be serious for some major Indian development objectives but would go almost unnoticed by most of India's 765 million people. The failure of the monsoon is always serious for millions of Indians, but monsoons rarely fail three years in a row and agriculture has become strong enough to produce significant surpluses in the good years.

Regardless of how bad the government in New Delhi may be or who rules there, the inertial weight of 3,000 years of history and custom, two centuries of British rule and 40 years of independent government, of well-established patterns of local village and district administrations, and of the myriad interwoven threads of Indian society, has proven a tremendous force for stability. If India is hard to move and to change, it is equally resistant to transient threats. A former member of the Indian Communist Party summed it up: "I left the Party forty

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years ago, since Revolution in India seemed impossible. And nothing has happened to change my mind since."

India remains the anchor and bulwark of South Asia against outside invaders or aggressors. India has the strongest motives for joining with Pakistan in resisting full-fledged Soviet aggression, just as it would resist with vigor a Chinese, U.S. or any other "threat" to the region. There can be no doubt that on this issue Rajiv Gandhi, Indira Gandhi and any prospective Indian leader would stand as one.

The core of an effective American strategy in this region should be good relations with India. This does not entail an Indian veto on U.S. relations with Pakistan or other countries in the area, or require that those relations track at all times with those of New Delhi. Indo-U.S. relations are not likely to run smoothly and calmly at all times. But, in the long run, American interests will not be served by good relations with other countries of the subcontinent if its relations with India are poor. There will be hard issues on which American presidents and Indian prime ministers may have to agree to disagree, but close consultation and genuine concern for the interests of India may help to build bridges over these difficult issues.

This is likely to require the United States to take a less dogmatic view of Indian relations with the U.S.S.R. than has sometimes been the case in the past. But if Washington can show tolerance on this issue, and if Rajiv Gandhi is ready to look seriously and sympathetically at the broad American interests in Asia, the new Indian government could be the best thing that has happened for the United States, and for other friends of the United States in the region, in decades.

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Barbara Insel

A WORLD AWASH IN GRAIN

This is a strange and painful year to talk about grain. Our televisions bring us pictures of starving African children, but world grain stocks exceed 190 million tons—a record surplus. Federal subsidies for agriculture will total nearly $19.5 billion in 1985, but U.S. farming is in a historic recession. Ironically, the most important customer for U.S. grain exports is the Soviet Union; the United States and its allies now must compete for the privilege of selling to our chief adversary. It is a curious year indeed.

It is time to put to rest many of the myths we have long cherished about agriculture. We had come to believe that America could feed a hungry world, and we debated how much leverage this power would give us. We believed that we not only should, but could, protect farm incomes and rural lifestyles through public policies that manipulated supplies and demand. We believed, moreover, that these differing goals could be achieved at the same time—and, with little effect on our other interests, economic, financial and diplomatic.

What happened is that American agriculture—and that of many of our friends and neighbors—has succeeded all too well. The heartbreaking scenes of famine in the Sahel notwithstanding, the world is learning how to feed itself. And, like the United States, the world has also learned how to protect its farmers by supporting grain prices artificially, stimulating still higher levels of production. As a consequence, we have entered an era of permanent grain surpluses, of a buyer's market for grain exports, where the United States can no longer set the rules. We now find ourselves in a world awash in grain, with ever-increasing bills for producing, maintaining and storing the unwanted product of our labors.

How did we get here? Why is the world's new ability to feed itself not an opportunity but a crisis? What does this mean for the United States and its allies? One thing is certain: agricul-

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tural policy will never again be only a domestic issue—or only an agricultural issue.

II

To begin to understand the problem, let us see what has happened to world agriculture over the last decade.

Table I tells much of the story. It gives us a picture of a growing number of exporters, a shrinking set of food-importing nations and, despite repeated efforts to reduce them, a growth of surplus stocks to nearly insupportable levels. What is most interesting about these trends is not the absolute change in numbers but the market shifts they imply: a redistribution of who produces, who buys, who sells and who holds stocks. The United States is essentially competing with its close friends to sell to a smaller number of less-good friends. We are losing, perhaps inevitably, in that competition, and as a result are paying the bills for the world's grain surplus.

Worldwide production of wheat and feed grains has grown 20 percent since 1974, 100 percent since 1964. Between 1960 and 1980, food production grew slightly faster than population, yielding a net increase in food supplies per person of 0.8 percent per year in the first of the two decades and 0.5 percent in the second. The major source of this growth has been improvements in technology, which have led to a 60-percent increase in average yields. Also important have been policy reforms—principally in the form of price guarantees for producers and improved domestic marketing environments—which have provided new incentives for production.

Some examples are striking. In China, the introduction of market incentives has produced a 15-percent expansion in corn production, a 20-percent expansion in rice production and a 40-percent expansion in wheat production just since 1982. Chinese wheat production grew from 41 million metric tons in 1977 to 85 mmt in 1984—and yields doubled from 1.46 metric tons per hectare to 2.90 tons. By comparison, total U.S. wheat production in 1984 was 70 mmt, at average yields of 2.57 tons/hectare. In 1985 China is expected to produce the largest wheat crop in the world. China's total production of feed grains, aided by improved yields, increased from 71 mmt in 1977 to 95 mmt in 1984—about 40 percent of U.S. feed grains output.

The situation in Western Europe is equally instructive. If there were ever any doubt that agricultural production re-

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TABLE I

WORLD WHEAT AND COARSE GRAINS TRADE 1974/75 TO 1984/85

(totals in millions of metric tons)

	1974/75	*1979/80*	*Estimated 1984/85*
TOTAL WORLD PRODUCTION	976.8	1164.7	1295.1
United States (as % of total)	20.4%	25.5%	23.4%
Other major exporters[1]	9.8	7.9	8.7
Western Europe	14.5	12.6	14.6
U.S.S.R.	18.8	14.7	12.3
Eastern Europe	9.3	7.8	8.4
China	10.0	12.5	13.9
Others	17.1	18.9	18.8
TOTAL WORLD CONSUMPTION	987.0	1184.9	1273.9
United States (as % of total)	14.2%	15.4%	14.6%
Western Europe	15.8	13.8	12.5
U.S.S.R.	19.5	18.1	16.4
China	10.5	13.2	14.9
Others	39.9	39.4	41.4
CUMULATIVE SURPLUS STOCKS	115.1	172.0	190.6
United States (as % of total)	23.5%	44.9%	43.9%
Foreign	76.5	55.2	56.0
TOTAL TRADE (in mmt)	127.6	186.8	206.0
EXPORTS:			
United States (as % of total exports)	48.9%	58.2%	49.9%
Other major exporters[1]	34.4	29.7	30.6
Western Europe	10.0	8.9	13.9
U.S.S.R.	3.9	0.3	0.5
Others	3.4	2.8	5.0
IMPORTS:			
Western Europe (as % of total imports)	25.7	16.4	7.3
U.S.S.R.	4.1	16.3	23.8
Japan	14.5	13.1	13.1
Eastern Europe	8.7	9.4	3.7
China	46.9	5.8	5.0
Others		39.0	47.1

[1] Other major exporters are Argentina, Australia, Canada, South Africa, and Thailand.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture.

sponds to price increases, the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Economic Community should forever banish those doubts. The CAP has dramatically increased farm incomes; in Great Britain, for example, participation in the CAP has brought about an estimated 40-percent increase in prices received by British farmers. As a result, the EEC farmers now produce 75 mmt of wheat, as compared with 40 mmt in 1977; EEC wheat yields have increased from 3.66 mt/ha to 5.52 mt/

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ha this year, substantially above U.S. levels. Although European feed grain production has increased more slowly, from 67 mmt to 74 mmt in the period, yields have grown from 4.1 mt/ha to 5.24 mt/ha, the only region to approach U.S. levels. The United Kingdom has gone from being a net importer of wheat and barley to a major net exporter in little more than four years. Those who have concluded that Europe is not a competitive producer need think again.

There are many comparable if less dramatic cases. India is now effectively self-sufficient, thanks to the technological advances of the so-called Green Revolution, and Pakistan is almost so. Argentine wheat production has nearly doubled, Thailand's feed grain output nearly tripled, and both Canada and Australia have had major output increases.

In producing countries, with the exception of China, this recent growth in output has brought with it only small increases in grain consumption, focusing new attention on export markets. A country which produces more than it can consume is the proud proprietor of an agricultural export industry. Not only have the numbers of exporters multiplied, but the importance of these exports in both domestic economies and trade accounts has increased.

The importance of agricultural trade for the United States is obvious. Agricultural exports make up one-fifth of overall U.S. foreign exchange earnings, and produce one-fifth of total U.S. farm income. At least one-third of U.S. farmland is harvested to provide grain for exports. Figures for other producing countries are equally striking. Thirty-five percent of EEC wheat is exported—and, if French wheat exports to its EEC neighbors are included, exports claim nearly two-thirds of the French wheat harvest. Canada and Australia continue to export the great bulk of their grain, and neither Argentina, which exports two-thirds of its grain, nor Brazil, for whom soybean exports alone constitute almost 12 percent of its foreign exchange earnings, could meet their foreign exchange obligations without the "green account."

As the number of exporting nations has grown, the grain importing market has become increasingly concentrated. The Soviet Union now consumes 20 percent of all imports, with China consuming 5 percent. Western Europe, which for years was the American farmer's best overseas customer, has become nearly self-sufficient, and the traditional South Asian markets are no longer growing. Japan, a major U.S. market, has hardly

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increased imports in several years. Uneasy with dependence on foreign grain, Japan has begun to invest directly in production projects, particularly in Brazil, and has also begun to look to its East Asian neighbors for some of its supplies.

The only other significant markets for the United States are in the Middle East, and in developing countries, which now claim about one-third of all grain imports. Many developing nations, however, are increasingly unable to pay for their needs. Imports by sub-Saharan African states, for example, have barely increased over the decade, despite rising population and declining local production.

Not surprisingly, competition in the grain export market has become increasingly aggressive. Weapons in the competition include a variety of export incentives and subsidies, such as differential export taxes, tax rebates, direct support payments to allow lower export prices, subsidized domestic credits, subsidized export credits and "food aid." Agricultural subsidies and other aggressive trade practices have become a regular feature of international trade: Argentine and Brazilian soybean export incentives, EEC export subsidies ("restitution," in the language of the Community), and various forms of import constraints and preferences. While the Europeans long had a special celebrity for manipulating export credit terms to attract markets, fiscal constraints forced the reduction or elimination of most of these programs in recent years. And the United States, long a minor player in the great export subsidy war, has now become the principal source of subsidized agricultural export credits.

U.S. agricultural policy has for 50 years focused on supply management and demand development in order to support higher farm prices. Generous financing was provided for storage on farms and by third parties, to allow farmers to hold their crop off the market until they received an attractive price, with the option of selling it to the government if no better alternative presented itself. Such support was supplemented by "deficiency payments," paying the farmer directly for the shortfall in prices below an agreed "target price."

These policies soon built up large American surplus stocks: total U.S. grain stocks reached a high of 115.7 mmt in 1961–62, falling to as low as 27 mmt in 1975–76, before rising again to 136 mmt in 1983–84. The expense of maintaining such surpluses thus became a major new incentive for the develop-

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ment of "food aid" programs aimed at disposing of accumulated grain through concessional sales to needy countries.

The single most important U.S. surplus-disposal effort has been the "Food for Peace" program, known as PL-480, which since 1954 has provided very long term interest-free loans, and a lesser amount of grants, to foreign countries for acquisition of grain from U.S.-owned stocks. A sister program, the so-called GSM credits, provides for partially subsidized, three-year renewable export financing. Despite the high cost to the United States of such concessional arrangements, they are still less expensive than the alternative of storing the surplus.

Such programs also earn the United States substantial political and charitable benefits, although their long-term effect on recipient countries is a matter of serious debate. The expansion of these schemes—which are almost always negotiated at the governmental level—often undermines emerging local agricultural markets and discourages local production. More important, both PL-480 and GSM credits are explicitly political in their orientation, giving priority to shipment of aid to countries considered friendly to the United States, and posing serious obstacles to aid for such nations as Ethiopia. In fact, of the sub-Saharan African countries most vulnerable to the current drought and food crisis, only the Sudan and Zaïre are included on the list of congressionally approved PL-480 beneficiaries.

Still, such programs do accomplish their primary objective of developing markets for the U.S. grain surplus. And the United States is certainly not alone in such practices. As a budget category, food aid falls under the general heading of "surplus disposal" for the EEC as well—as do export development programs. PL-480 loan and grant allocations have grown from $1.1 billion in 1970 to $1.8 billion in 1984–85. GSM credits in 1984–85 total $5 billion, as compared with $1.4 billion in 1982. EEC food aid in 1984 totaled approximately $465 million and is forecast to be larger in 1985.

III

The U.S. share in world grain trade grew throughout the 1970s, from 40–41 percent in 1970 to more than 58 percent of total world exports by 1979–80. Between 1980 and 1984, however, the U.S. share fell sharply to less than 49 percent of world exports, and is expected to rise only slightly to about 51 percent in 1985. Part of the U.S. loss is explained by the 1980–81 embargo on sales to the Soviet Union, but that business has

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largely been reclaimed, and is largely responsible for the small recovery expected in 1985. The more significant causes for the loss of U.S. markets are structural: 1984–85 U.S. grain prices are at least 20 percent higher than those of foreign competitors, and there are many more competitors in the market than there were five years ago.

It is frequently argued that U.S. prices only appear higher, because of competitors' export subsidies and dumping practices. But such assertions are not supported by the evidence. In early March 1985, U.S. hard red winter wheat was selling for $144 a ton, EEC wheat for $120, and Argentine wheat for $114. Canadian and Australian wheat prices, which are generally determined through long-term sales agreements, are less easy to compare, but both countries will match U.S. prices if market conditions permit. EEC prices, without any export subsidy and measured in U.S. dollars, have been significantly below U.S. prices since September 1984. These price disparities were responsible for the startling picture in December 1984 when China sold corn it had bought from the United States, replacing it with Argentine corn whose low price, even after all transaction and logistics costs, netted China a significant saving.

Underlying the high relative prices of U.S. agricultural goods are several important elements, including unfavorable exchange-rate trends, high domestic support levels, and shrinking technological advantages. By their nature, price comparisons imply a given set of exchange rates, and the rise of the dollar on foreign currency markets has severely damaged U.S. grain exports. The level of domestic price supports paid by the U.S. government has also played a major role in keeping U.S. export prices high. The "loan value" determined by Congress (the price at which U.S. farmers can store their grain and receive federal financing) has set a floor under U.S. prices, allowing farmers to take crops off the market as world prices in dollars declined, and creating what is generally called an "umbrella" for U.S. competitors. Legislation adopted in 1981 significantly increased both the "loan value" and target price supports for American farmers. The United States has also begun to lag behind its most aggressive competitors in technology and efficiency—a difference which cannot be attributed solely to lower costs for land and labor in competing countries. Both China and the EEC have higher grain yields than the United States; Brazilian yields in soybeans and corn, where they are grown

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with modern techniques, also often exceed those in the United States.

The area in which the United States is unquestionably more efficient is in its system of domestic logistics—transport, communications, storage management, organization, paperwork—which moves the crop from the farm to the shipping port. Differentials in these costs, in the highly competitive world market, have an enormous impact. For example, to move a bushel of French wheat from a Paris Basin farm to the port of Ghent or Rotterdam costs about 90¢. To move a bushel of U.S. wheat from Minnesota to New Orleans—nearly twice the distance—costs about 34¢. The U.S. Department of Agriculture several years ago estimated that it cost Brazilian farmers about eight times what it would cost their U.S. counterparts to move a bushel of soybeans from farm gate to port.

The superior U.S. logistics system cannot forever be expected to protect declining U.S. agricultural efficiency from having its impact on U.S. export sales. Awareness of the importance of infrastructure development and logistical management is rising among competitors. Anyone in doubt need only observe the Chinese organization of their exports—or the priority being accorded to their infrastructure renewal. The French have deregulated rail rates to improve export logistics. Massive grain infrastructure investments are underway in the United Kingdom, and the Brazilians are discussing a grain export rail line.

Two other major factors in competition for grain sales are location and international freight costs. China's substantial advantage in shipping freight to Japan can overcome, to a significant degree, a competitor's initial price advantage. The United States needed to offer substantial credit concessions to overcome France's freight advantage in shipping wheat to the countries of North Africa. The proliferation of exporters with such advantages challenges the oft-repeated assumption that the United States would be the least-cost supplier in nearly all markets if competitors did not pursue unfair trade practices.

The net effect of the market shifts described thus far has been a redistribution of stocks. As production has grown and U.S. export opportunities have shrunk, the United States has become the repository of the world's grain surplus. In 1974, the United States held less than 25 percent of total stocks; in 1984, it held 45 percent. The United States is now storing and financing about 46 million tons of coarse grains and 38 million

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tons of wheat—about 35 percent of its total annual grain production. The second-largest stockholder is the European Economic Community, which, by the end of this crop year, will hold almost 8 million tons of feed grain and 14 million tons of wheat—more than double its 1981–82 levels, and nearly 18 percent of its yearly production. Total world stocks are expected to reach 105 million tons of wheat and 86 million tons of feed grains by the end of the 1985 crop year.

The cost of this accumulation and its associated subsidy programs is staggering. U.S. agricultural subsidies, which averaged about $3 billion a year in the 1970s, averaged $19 billion a year over the last three years. EEC subsidies—export subsidies, deficiency payments, public stocks—totaled $16 billion in 1984, or 79 percent of the European Community's entire budget.

IV

The kind of market shifts implied in these figures are not likely to be reversed. Indeed, aside from small distortions due to bad weather or other temporary problems, future grain markets are likely to be characterized by continued increases in world supply, with relatively minor growth in demand.

In the past, the key to America's prominence was its almost unique status as a surplus producer in a world of countries with major grain deficits. As we have seen, changes in technology and policy have begun to correct that imbalance and, over time, fewer and fewer countries will depend on the United States to feed their people and livestock.

Advances in agricultural technology will continue to increase grain yields. The Green Revolution grew from the identification of new wheat and rice varieties capable of absorbing and responding to fertilizer increases to improve yields dramatically. Adoption of such varieties in the uniform, controlled ecological environments of large irrigation projects, such as in India's Punjab province, ultimately allowed India to end years of famine and to cut its massive import bills. Further research is underway to develop comparable varieties of grains for the more ecologically varied rain-fed and semi-arid regions, although commercial results in those areas are perhaps ten or more years away.

Developments in biogenetic engineering, the newest area of plant research, are expected to further accelerate the growth of crop yields, leading to new refinements in fertilizer and

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herbicide use, and to improvement of protein content and other crop qualities. In perhaps 20–30 years, bioengineering may allow the development of crop varieties that are more resistant to poor weather and soil conditions, helping to expand production in what are now marginal regions such as the African Sahel.

Technological improvements are now largely built into the cycle of production expansion. Investment in new technologies and yield-improvement practices is especially stimulated by public policies which ensure high, stable prices for farm output. But even without—or in spite of—government intervention, the expansion of productivity seems destined to continue or even accelerate, as the European Economic Community learned this past year.

Like the United States, the EEC has been seeking to reduce its farm budget without provoking an excessive political or social backlash. For the first time in the Community's history, the nominal prices guaranteed to European wheat producers were actually reduced in 1984 in an effort to discourage production—but technology overcame policy. The effects of the price reduction were outweighed by an unexpected 30-percent increase in yields, producing record output levels and a net increase in most farm incomes. Unless European farmers come to believe that these productivity increases are a short-run phenomenon—and that their governments will persevere with price reductions, even to the extent of reducing incomes of key political groups—planting will continue to expand.

The EEC dilemma is compounded by another important paradox common to grain production sectors in many industrial countries. Many EEC farmers—particularly the smaller, more traditional producers, the French and German equivalents of "family farms"—are marginally efficient and deeply in debt. As lower prices begin to force them out of business, their land is not generally taken out of production; it is merely transferred to more efficient users, with a net increase in productivity and output. The newer farms are large enough to take advantage of economies of scale and expensive new technologies, and as a result are efficient enough to operate profitably, and compete internationally, at much lower price levels than their predecessors. Such structural change is already evident in southwest England, in the Paris Basin, in Landes in southwest France. Thus it is incorrect to assume that reduced price supports, in themselves, will lead to dramatic production

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cuts. On the contrary, after a brief period of adjustment, they may lead to just the opposite result.

In contrast to the relentless growth of production, the demand side of the world grain market is likely to be characterized by only modest increases in overall imports, unless income increases far more quickly than agricultural production in several of the larger developing countries.

World population growth will, of course, remain a key variable in determining aggregate demand, although, as mentioned earlier, production growth has outpaced population growth over the last 20 years. Technological breakthroughs on the horizon could accelerate this trend, especially if the "delivery system" for this technology—agricultural services, infrastructure, credit, fair-pricing policies—is improved at an equal pace in developing countries.

The relationship between population growth and increases in effective demand is complex. Population growth does not necessarily bring with it an increase in either food-production capabilities or the means to finance food purchases from outside suppliers. From the standpoint of world agricultural markets, the practical effects of population growth on demand are limited. Indeed, in the poorest countries, the growth of population may actually reduce effective food demand by straining local resources and draining the foreign exchange necessary for food imports, thus setting the stage for tragedy.

Income growth, on the other hand, will play a more direct role in shaping future demand. Here the distinction between food grains (primarily wheat) and feed grains (corn, rye, barley and oats) becomes essential. As a basic staple, wheat is especially important in low-income diets. But demand for wheat is quickly saturated; as income increases, consumption moves toward higher-cost, higher-protein meat products—which are produced with feed grains. Wheat consumption is thus likely to increase only as fast as population, while feed grain demand is closely linked to income. (However, if feed grain prices rise sufficiently, wheat regains interest as a feed grain substitute.)

The industrialization of poultry production has accelerated this movement from bread to higher-protein meat products by introducing a low-cost major protein source that can be produced almost anywhere. The extraordinary worldwide expansion of the poultry industry has been the engine behind the growth of feed grain trade—especially corn, proteins and processed protein substitutes. Forecasts of feed grain demand

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become forecasts of poultry and beef consumption as income increases, and feed grain imports are thus determined by the extent to which domestically produced output will satisfy that demand.

In assessing future demand trends, it seems clear that the Soviet Union will remain the single most important market for U.S. grain exports. Soviet production levels are expected to continue to deteriorate, and long-term improvement is unlikely without major agricultural policy reforms, including production incentives such as those that have proved effective in some East European nations. But even with such reforms, Soviet agriculture will remain hindered by technological backwardness and poor soil and climate conditions, and is not likely to keep pace with domestic demand.

Nearly all Soviet grain imports are negotiated through long-term purchase agreements, under which the U.S.S.R. tends to be a very price-conscious and professional customer. Aware of their nation's status as the largest single buyer in a surplus market, Soviet buying agents are sensitive to their impact on the market and distribute their purchases among several sellers. Their return to the U.S. market, despite high U.S. price levels, has been interpreted as an effort to keep commercial ties open, but also may reflect a recognition that a stable, long-term relationship with the world's largest exporter is essential in view of the U.S.S.R.'s enormous requirements. Sales to the Soviets now represent 15 percent of all U.S. grain exports, while purchases from the United States represent about one-third of Soviet grain imports. Other principal sources of Soviet crop imports are Argentina, France, Canada and Australia.

The European Economic Community, as shown above, can no longer be seen as a major market for U.S. grain production. Imports into the Community have been essentially limited by CAP protective barriers to proteins (soybeans, corn gluten and other products), feed compounds and certain varieties of corn. The international farming and trading community has proved itself enormously creative in working around the rigidities of EEC regulation to find markets for new products, and potentially profitable niches in this business will probably continue to be found. However, Europe is not likely to become a major import growth area.

All the major exporters are looking to the developing countries as a major outlet for their surpluses—particularly the growing populations and economies of East Asia. Those expec-

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tations, however, must be tempered by a realistic appreciation of the growing agricultural potential of the East Asian region. Reasonable production policies and improved farming practices should turn many of these countries into net exporters—particularly of corn—in the reasonably near term. Relatively few developing countries are now using the higher-yielding corn varieties, hence their adoption could rapidly expand output. Increased production will, however, be offset to some degree by increases in local consumption, spurred by income growth, and improvements in local infrastructure and logistical management.

Within East Asia, China could, with improved internal logistics, absorb its entire corn and soy production even as output continues to grow, and may therefore choose not to export, except for political or foreign-exchange reasons. Korean consumption will continue to exceed production, bringing it closer to Japanese importance as an importer. Indonesia, on the other hand, could approach self-sufficiency in some products, and the Philippines could become a major corn exporter. Thailand can also be expected to increase its feed grain export sales.

Thus, it is possible to imagine that within five to ten years the entire East Asian market will be served primarily by exports from Asian producers—with Thailand, China and the Philippines filling the import needs of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and others hovering close to self-sufficiency. Such market arrangements would not only reflect freight and cost advantages but also local political realities. However, Japan's continuing efforts to diversify its sources of production suggest not only further exploitation of the Chinese export market, but also that of Brazil and other countries.

In South Asia, India and Pakistan could be—and are from time to time—significant exporters, thanks to Green Revolution technologies. Although there is enormous potential to expand the Indian internal market, income, marketing and political constraints make that unlikely. Bangladesh will remain a major, and dependent, importer.

In Latin America, reasonable internal policies could lead to dramatic expansions in production of some grains, especially corn, in Brazil and Argentina. Brazil and Argentina will also continue to seek to expand their low-cost soy exports, and Argentina its low-cost wheat.

North African grain consumption is growing steadily, but while policy reform and agricultural development can expand

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production significantly, this region will also probably remain a significant importer for some time.

Sub-Saharan Africa, where famine persists despite surpluses elsewhere, is the most painful case, illustrating the continuing importance of political and logistical questions in determining food availability. The entire shortfall in Sahelian grain this year has been estimated at three to four million tons, while the world holds grain surplus stocks of nearly 190 million tons. The African famine, while an enormous human tragedy, is by no means an international agricultural production crisis. With a world almost as afloat in subsidized grain export credits and food aid as in grain, it should not even have become a financial issue. Financing the whole shortfall would cost perhaps $500 million, barely a footnote to U.S. export credits and food aid totaling $7 billion, and to comparable European programs now approaching $1 billion yearly.

As a long-term problem, the famine must also be seen as a local planning, policy and management failure of enormous proportions. Local policies discouraged production. Essential agricultural services were ineffective or unavailable. Local marketing arrangements had been repressed or undermined by inefficient bureaucracies. Policymakers did not respond quickly enough when localized food deficits became evident, and were unable to organize the movement and release of food supplies efficiently or plan for likely future needs. As the scale of both human migration and emergency crop distribution requirements grew, the long neglect and mismanagement of basic infrastructure and public services brought them to collapse.

An end to the current drought may reduce the scale of suffering in Ethiopia and other affected areas, but it will not solve the long-term crisis, which will require far-reaching institutional reform, infrastructure development and the development of human capital. Many sub-Saharan countries are therefore likely to remain dependent on imports of foreign grain for many years to come, although continued poverty and low foreign-exchange reserves will ensure that for most affected nations those imports will have to come in the form of humanitarian aid rather than market purchases.

V

The combination of growing international competition and weakening demand has dealt a body blow to the American farm sector, which is now experiencing one of its worst reces-

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sions in memory. Since one of every five American jobs is linked to farming, that recession has become a national problem of major proportions.

The numbers tell the story. Farm income averaged $23 billion in 1983 and 1984. Farmers' debt service during those years averaged $21 billion. Federal farm subsidies averaged $19 billion in the same period, with most of these funds directly or indirectly supporting farm income. At some points, farm income would have been negative in the absence of federal subsidies. Farm bankruptcies more than doubled from 1983 to 1984, and are now occurring at an even faster rate.

Compounding the changes which have occurred in international markets is the growing debt burden of the farm sector. Agriculture in the United States, as in most of the world, is characterized by large capital assets—land and equipment—and a very meager cash flow. The financial return on farming assets is often not very attractive relative to other sectors, but the government has used subsidies in an attempt to make income flows reasonably stable, and the farmer's rural way of life has often been viewed as a compensating benefit.

In the mid-1970s, stirred by the apparently permanent export boom and a seller's market in farmland, some banks began to make major loans based on farming assets rather than cash flow. Farm debt rose from $50 billion in 1970 to $132 billion in 1979 to $216 billion in 1983. Farmers who either bought land or borrowed for major capital investments based on high nominal land values found themselves with large debt service bills just as interest rates began their climb and the export market for U.S. grain began to slump. Land values that rose from an average $374 per acre in 1970 to $1717 per acre in 1981 have fallen by nearly one-third nationwide, and will be further depressed by the accelerating farm recession. New planting credit is being denied to many small producers—possibly as many as 13 percent of all producers.

U.S. policymakers are under enormous pressure to find some way to rescue the farmer from the deepening crisis, either through debt relief, price improvements or a combination of both. The motivations for such efforts are not just political, but stem from a deeply felt desire to protect America's rural traditions, and to help hard-working individuals who are faced with grave economic distress. For more than 50 years, in response to similar concerns, farm prices have been subsidized; storage, equipment and exports have been financed on subsi-

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dized terms; credit has been subsidized; and lending resources have been expanded. And Congress' most recent actions to subsidize, liberalize and guarantee credit, to protect beleaguered small farmers so they may further expand our grain stocks, is entirely consistent with the history of American farm support policies.

However attractive they may seem, such traditional approaches to our farming problems have lost their economic justification. Even though the recipients of such support work hard for their livelihood, the decision to sustain their income and way of life in the face of overwhelming market forces can no longer be viewed as an economic investment—it has become a social welfare program of enormous proportions.

VI

There are almost no policy scenarios—for any of the major exporters—that allow one to escape certain inevitable conclusions. World grain production will continue to grow, export competition will increase, price levels will continue to fall. Thus, surpluses in those countries that continue to apply traditional policies to try and protect domestic producers from world prices will continue to grow as well, along with the cost of such policies. The producers will in the end benefit very little—unless policymakers consciously attempt to stop the cycle, define their objectives more clearly and find new means to achieve them.

It is fashionable these days in some agricultural circles to talk of the four- to five-year farm cycle. The boom days, we are told, will come back in a year or two if we can just hang on. One gets the impression that many in the U.S. farm sector are waiting to re-live 1974–81, when world grain trade grew by 60 percent and U.S. exports increased by 80 percent, with prices keeping pace, helped by the weakness of the U.S. dollar.

But the lesson of that era is not that prices rise, that agriculture is "green power." The lesson is more subtle and universal: when prices rise, production eventually rises, almost everywhere and probably too much. The system is dynamic, if a little clumsy and given briefly to over-reaction. As soon as everyone sees the winning trick, the game has probably changed. Competition is relentless.

Thus, any unilateral action to try to manipulate the global market is almost certain to be self-defeating. This includes all the usual strategies of unilateral production controls or price

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cuts. Production controls do have the advantage of controlling domestic surplus stocks. But efforts to use production controls to force prices up will have only a negligible impact because of the scale of surplus stocks overhanging the market. Moreover, any perceived price movement or shortfall in product that might affect the market will quickly induce expansion by other producers or even encourage new players to enter the market, absorbing any price effect that was achieved.

The most common production control technique, especially as productivity improves, is to reduce planted acres, usually through acreage control programs. However, the history of acreage control programs suggests that they have only marginal effect on long-term output, as farmers put their lowest-value land under control and production continues unabated. Ironically, the most effective means of production control may be the withholding of planting credits by bankers attempting to control their exposure on heavily indebted farms.

Allowing domestic price levels to fall on a short-term basis is also likely to do little to solve the production problem. As marginal producers are forced out of business, as demonstrated earlier, average yields are likely to improve. Lower prices will reduce output only if they are maintained long enough to change farmers' long-term intentions and if price declines exceed productivity increases. Thus, domestic prices would have to decline severely to affect production.

A decline in U.S. export prices—if only through lower exchange rates—would somewhat assist the U.S. agricultural sector by spurring U.S. grain export sales and reducing U.S. subsidy bills. It would, however, be a fantasy to presume that permitting U.S. prices to fall would, in itself, automatically allow the United States to recover, or even increase, its export market share—or to retain any short-term market growth that did occur. Competitors would inevitably respond: several could sell below U.S. prices, others would increase or introduce subsidies or other export incentives. Lower prices, moreover, will not re-open markets in nations that have little hard currency to spend for imports, or that have recently arrived at self-sufficiency and are determined to protect their internal markets. Lower prices would increase the European Economic Community's cost of competing with the United States or excluding U.S. imports, but they have the similar option of reducing prices. And lower prices would be only one factor in

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political marketing arrangements—as the United States, which has long been a high-price seller, has frequently proved.

An effort to organize international production along the lines of the once-successful oil-producers' cartel would be self-defeating as well. It is impossible to organize any cartel without major constraints against entry into the business, a means of enforcing discipline and some common interests among the producers. World grain producers are far too numerous and diverse to allow development of such an organization. Nearly every country either is already in the grain business or, with emerging technologies, soon will be.

What is remarkable in looking at today's agricultural situation is the degree to which the interests of the wealthy surplus producers diverge from those of the new, developing-country exporters. Notable as well is the degree to which interests other than economic ones are involved in this relationship. The agricultural policies of wealthier producers—the United States, the EEC, Canada and Australia—are really driven more by the need to protect a major domestic economic, social and political interest than by the need for foreign exchange produced by these exports, no matter how significant those trade earnings may be. The new producers often must export these crops to survive, or they see agricultural expansion as their only feasible vehicle for development or link to a world economy.

The United States has serious national interests in the political and social stability of many poor producing nations, and also has major economic concerns other than agricultural trade—banking and other economic interests, as well as exports of other products, and imports of raw materials. A strategy based on coercing poorer countries to restrain their own production to protect American social interests will not only provoke hostility and conflict, but will almost certainly backfire. A reduction in Brazilian or Argentine grain exports, for example, would reduce the foreign exchange those nations so badly need to repay their debts to American banks. Similarly, China's exports to Japan are a critical part of a new political as well as economic relationship with Japan—a relationship with important implications for the whole of Asia.

Rural traditions and values are important non-economic issues in most countries, just as they are in the United States. There is, moreover, a widely held, perhaps fundamental, conviction that access to food is too critical to a society's survival to be left entirely to market forces. Agriculture is a strategic

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good, and there is no country that is willing to be entirely dependent on another for its sustenance. As a long-term surplus producer, we often forget this essential reality—and the fact that our own very efficient market, and those of most wealthier producers, operate in a very fortunate and protected context. It was, of course, this reality that ultimately made our expectations of "green power" so illusory.

The questions with which we are then left are quite different from the questions we are accustomed to facing in our agricultural policy making: to what degree must the larger exporters accommodate the new, poorer producers? How are we to adjust our own policies and resolve our domestic agricultural conflicts? What price are we willing to pay for these social values? What are the common interests among the more prosperous exporters? Does that commonality suggest any direction for resolution of our problems or alternatives to our conflicts?

We have clearly underestimated the extent to which our principal competitors—particularly the European Community, which is emerging as our most powerful competitor—share our problems. We have let our battles over agricultural trade often obscure our mutuality of interests. The cost of the EEC's agricultural subsidy is at least as insupportable as our own. The constant debates over its cost can continue to dominate the EEC agenda only at great expense to other critical problems. The attachment to a nostalgic agrarian idealism is perhaps even stronger on the eastern side of the Atlantic; the demise of a deeply loved culture and society is at least as wrenching. What does a society do when faced with unacceptable and critical social, political and economic changes, and not only finds it difficult to continue to pay the price for protecting itself from those changes but discovers that, despite the enormous price being paid, those changes are coming anyway?

Multilateral discussions are underway, through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, to begin acknowledging the domestic implications of, and constraints on, international agricultural trade policies. If we are genuinely to seek resolution of these issues, however, we must at the same time acknowledge the international constraints on our domestic agricultural policy making and the international implications of the policies we have pursued for so long. There will obviously be major domestic, social, political and economic consequences to such a change in policy direction. And we will have to

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determine how great a share of our limited national resources we are willing to invest in protecting our rural values.

The point of this discussion is not to insist on any specific strategy, but rather to force a clear look at the underlying dilemmas of today's agriculture. These problems and choices are universal. Agriculture in the United States, in the EEC, and in most of the world has long been treated as a domestic political issue. But the fundamental changes which have taken place in world agriculture must now be matched with equally fundamental changes in world agricultural policy.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER: BETWEEN STATE POWER AND HUMAN JUSTICE. By Julius Stone. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1984, 237 pp. $26.50.

A distinguished jurist takes an overall look at contemporary international law. He is concerned not just with the rights and duties of entities called states, but with "the credentials of international law as a whole to be regarded as an order dedicated to the maximum degree possible to the satisfaction of human demands." He examines the work of McDougal, Jenks, Falk and others, which he tends to find utopian, but he does see some encouraging trends in recent years. He looks at the issues of war and human survival and of the international economic order from the double standpoint of political realism and mankind's eternal search for justice. Throughout, the writing is marked by incisive thinking and the wisdom of experience.

INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS. Edited by Hedley Bull. New York: Clarendon Press/Oxford, 1984, 195 pp. $19.95.

Although the subject is one on which there would appear to be little new to impart, the authors of this study (originally a series of lectures at Oxford in 1982) examine it from all possible political and legal angles and find many perceptive things to say. Despite many instances of intervention by the superpowers and others since World War II, the principle of nonintervention remains a fundamental rule as long as the international system rests, in theory and in most practice, on sovereign and independent national states. The key question is what to do, if anything, about violations. Among the contributors are Stanley Hoffmann, Rosalyn Higgins, Richard Falk and Evan Luard.

UNITED NATIONS LAW MAKING. By Edward McWhinney. New York: Holmes & Meier/Paris: UNESCO, 1984, 274 pp. $34.50 (paper, $19.50).

At this stage of transition in international relations the old "classical" international law of European origin is being subjected to review, adaptation or rejection as governments proclaim new principles or grope their way toward a new consensus. Professor McWhinney, a Canadian jurist with United Nations experience, defines the problems and traces the process as U.N. bodies, goaded by new Third World members, have undertaken to write the codes for "a new international order." He sees this demonstration of lawmaking opportunities and accomplishments, including those decided by votes in the General Assembly, as an irreversible constitutional trend providing an optimistic vision of the world community of the future. Thus the book, though primarily a treatise for lawyers, has a political slant (some would say bias) and a political message.

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TOTALITARISMES. Edited by Guy Hermet with Pierre Hassner and Jacques Rupnik. Paris: Economica, 1984, 254 pp. Fr. 125 (paper).

If totalitarianism in its classic Stalinist form no longer exists, is this book too late? Not at all, for historical perspective makes it possible for Guy Hermet and his colleagues the better to define, analyze and assess the nature of the beast, to look at it over time and in space. The most interesting pieces are those by Hassner, who writes on changing fashions among Western (chiefly French and American) Sovietologists in explaining the nature of the system in the U.S.S.R., and by Rupnik, who speaks for those in Eastern Europe who find their liberty stifled by a totalitarianism as effective as ever even though no longer ruling by terror.

CONTRASTS: SOVIET AND AMERICAN THINKERS DISCUSS THE FUTURE. Edited by Wiktor Osiatyński. New York: Macmillan, 1984, 219 pp. $19.95.

These are interviews which an enterprising Polish journalist held with some prominent scientists and intellectuals in the U.S. and in the U.S.S.R. Covering topics such as the evolution and future of man, genetics and experimental medicine, and the potentials of technology, the interviews are interesting in themselves, provide some points of comparison between Soviet and American approaches, and give indications, as the author sees it, of a new infusion of human values into scientific thought. For the most part the distinguished participants stay away from current topics of international relations—which is somewhat surprising considering that the American contributors include Linus Pauling, Noam Chomsky and J. K. Galbraith.

General: Military, Technological, and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

THE PENTAGON AND THE ART OF WAR. By Edward N. Luttwak. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985, 333 pp. $17.95.

Edward Luttwak has a strong claim on being the most provocative military analyst of our times; this book will be no disappointment on that score. With verve and style he dissects the American military establishment, finding it top heavy with senior officers, rewarding incompetence, inefficient in its operations and unable to develop a coherent military strategy because of competing military bureaucracies. Some of the most interesting passages deal with the alleged debacles of U.S. military operations from Vietnam to Beirut to Grenada. The armed forces have failed us, Luttwak argues, and his remedy is a National Defense Staff of officers, not representing individual services, who can steer a "rudderless Pentagon." One can wonder whether Luttwak would ever be satisfied; nevertheless, this is a stimulating and controversial work.

CITIZENS AND SOLDIERS: THE DILEMMAS OF MILITARY SERVICE. By Eliot A. Cohen. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1985, 227 pp. $22.50.

After myriad studies on military manpower policies, especially on conscription versus volunteer service, this excellent study brings something new: a historical, philosophical and geopolitical approach that goes well

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beyond the policy issues of the day. The author, a professor at Harvard, has done a superb job in identifying the cross-cutting foreign policy constraints, military requirements and ideological assumptions which have made it almost impossible for the United States (unlike many other Western nations) to settle on a durable system of peacetime military service. Cohen argues that for the U.S. a successful military manpower system must be consistent with "liberalism" and "egalitarianism," i.e., service should be limited in duration and required of all. But it also has to provide effective forces for large and small wars. This is a difficult circle to square.

US TROOPS IN EUROPE. By Phil Williams. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1984, 87 pp.

The Nunn-Roth Amendment and the current debate over improving the conventional defense of Europe through the use of "emerging technologies" and the adoption of "deep strike" military strategies are all related to a basic issue: U.S. troop levels in Europe. This is an excellent and timely study of the issue—substantively sound, mature in judgment, concise and easily read. Williams sees the possibility of some reductions in the American presence without deleterious consequences, but it would have to be done carefully within a comprehensive reappraisal of respective European and American roles and responsibilities, including a reexamination of NATO's military strategy. The major ideas in the continuing debate among politicians and experts are properly identified and well discussed.

EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION. By Trevor Taylor. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1984, 97 pp.

An excellent companion to the book above, this short volume reviews all the considerations involved in, and proposals already made for, the growth of a greater European identity in defense within an overall alliance framework. Taylor is well aware of the real difficulties in organizing intra-European cooperation and the danger of encouraging an American withdrawal. But he sees opportunities for European consultation in such areas as nuclear weapons strategy, arms control policy, conventional force improvements and "out-of-area" activities. The various possible institutional arrangements are discussed. Some European cooperation already exists—more than many Americans are aware of—so that the real question is what further evolution is desirable.

THE FALLACY OF STAR WARS. Edited by John Tirman. New York: Vintage Books, 1984, 293 pp. $4.95 (paper).

This book brings together two important studies conducted by the Union of Concerned Scientists, one on anti-satellite weapons and the other on space-based missile defense. The conclusions of this group of experts are unambiguous and have already played an important role in the defense debate. Without a treaty soon forbidding testing, the authors foresee a destabilizing new arms race in space. As to a space-based missile defense, after a good deal of technical evaluation the report concludes that it would not be successful in halting incoming missiles—and in any case the Soviets could overcome it with additional ICBMs and more submarine-based cruise missiles. This is, of course, only one side of the debate, and a quickly shifting one at that, but it presents an argument which the proponents of the

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Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative have yet to successfully refute.

SPACE WEAPONS—THE ARMS CONTROL DILEMMA. Edited by Bhupendra Jasani. London and Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis (for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), 1985, 255 pp. $36.00.

Anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, rather than ballistic missile defense, is the main focus of this volume, prepared by SIPRI. There are many authors from the West and the East, making for a sometimes too brief and contradictory analysis of complicated issues. Nevertheless, the volume as a whole argues a consistent case for a bilateral moratorium on the testing and development of ASAT weapons, to be followed by a complete ban.

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES. By the National Academy of Sciences. Washington: National Academy Press, 1985, 378 pp. $16.50 (paper).

This book is proof that the complexities of arms control can be successfully explained in a nontechnical, and even more importantly, nonpartisan manner. Sponsored by a distinguished committee of the National Academy of Sciences, it presents the key issues in a clear, thorough and remarkably up-to-date way, giving equal space to the principal opposing sides of the debates on such questions as strategic offensive and defensive arms control, intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations, the nuclear test ban and nonproliferation. It can be strongly recommended as a primary source for classroom and public discussions, although it should be supplemented by statements of opinion on the various issues.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TODAY: THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1984. By Leonard S. Spector. New York: Vintage, 1984, 478 pp. $4.95 (paper). A Carnegie Endowment Book.

Announced as the first of a series of annual reports on the spread of nuclear weapons, this endeavor of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace may stimulate increased public awareness of this critical topic. It will be interesting to see, however, how the momentum of the series is maintained, for a good part of the book contains the historical setting of the nuclear issue in the eight most likely proliferators, and presumably this will not be repeated. The history is already well known to the specialists but can be useful for others; more recent events and data, which seem quite accurate, will be most helpful for those trying to keep up.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

PIONEERS IN DEVELOPMENT. Edited by Gerald M. Meier and Dudley Seers. New York: Oxford, 1984, 372 pp. $29.95. A World Bank Publication.

Ten authors of "seminal works in development economics" were asked by the World Bank to "reassess" and "reconsider" their theories and prescriptions. Some do this more gracefully than others. Some have something new to say. Some familiar ground has to be covered. But the idea has been well carried out and makes as interesting a book as one would expect from Peter Bauer, Colin Clark, Albert Hirschman, Arthur Lewis, Gunnar

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Mydal, Raul Prebisch, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Walt Rostow, H. W. Singer and Jan Tinbergen.

THE SPIRIT OF ENTERPRISE. By George Gilder. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984, 384 pp. $17.95.

Believing that an entrepreneur's smile is "a better leading indicator of economic prospects" than gloomy economic statistics, Mr. Gilder tells in a vivid and interesting manner the stories of people who have been successful in a variety of fields, from fried potatoes to electronic chips. Most have been mavericks; some have made mistakes. Their enemies abound in government, big business, banking and the conventional wisdom. The reader is left with a question: If "a key principle of contrarian entrepreneurship" is that "the crowd is always wrong," can this kind of wealth creation sustain the world?

U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY. Edited by Bruce R. Scott and George C. Lodge. Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1984, 512 pp. $32.50.

According to this challenging book, Asian economic strategies that create dynamic comparative advantage are one main source of the decline of the place of American manufacturing in world markets. Much of the rest of the trouble stems from American policies that enhance consumption and distribution at the expense of competitiveness. Studies of a few industries and of several elements of the American system back up the forcible arguments of the editors and their colleagues at the Harvard Business School.

SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE. By Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Joanna Shelton Erb. Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1984, 304 pp. (Cambridge: MIT Press, distributor, $30.00).

The improved handling of subsidies is vital to continued cooperation in international trade. This succinct and well-argued essay gives an authoritative account of American practice and existing international arrangements. Guidelines for future action and some specific measures are suggested, but the authors leave some ragged edges as they quail before the variety and ubiquity of subsidies. They are realistic in arguing that further definitions of "troublesome" subsidies and what to do about them will come from the interplay of national moves, but one wishes they had provided more guidance on how to cope with the clashes that seem inescapable between American ideas of "fair trade" and the views of the rest of the world. This is a convenient collection of documents but lacks an index.

THE INTERNATIONAL URANIUM MARKET. By Thomas Neff. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1984, 360 pp. $32.50.

Shortages, glut, political manipulation and worries about security have all marked the international trade in uranium. In this valuable book, the director of the International Energy Studies Program of the MIT Energy Laboratory sorts out these factors, looks closely at the position of a number of countries, and speculates on the future of a market in which supply will exceed demand, costs will vary widely, and governments will continue to be directly involved for as far ahead as anyone can see.

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TRADE LIBERALIZATION AMONG MAJOR WORLD TRADING AREAS. By John Whalley. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985, 304 pp. $30.00.

To build a bridge between theory and policy, Professor Whalley of the University of Western Ontario uses two quite sophisticated models of international trade. He meticulously explains their limits but argues strongly for the novelty of some of his findings and the need for decision-makers to broaden their approaches. The book is not for the general reader, but if the models are subjected to the scrutiny of specialists, they yield pointers for policy on a number of issues—terms of trade, long-run adjustment costs, and the advantages of opening up the approach to trade liberalization.

MARKET INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. By Jacques Pelkmans. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984, 366 pp. $46.50 (paper, $24.90).

Integration cannot be measured by trade alone, or even freedom of investment. This valuable study by a Dutch economist combines trade theory, empirical analysis of industrial organization, and a candid review of national and Community policies to reach the conclusion that "there is no such economic thing as a 'common market' in the European Community."

MULTINATIONAL EXCURSIONS. By C. P. Kindleberger. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984, 269 pp. $22.50.

So long as publishers are willing, readers can benefit from what the prolific author calls his "inability to resist the temptation to gather papers emitted . . . over the years. . . ." The twenty gathered here deal mostly with international investment and the multinational corporation, about which the none-too-retired and highly emeritorious professor has had many clarifying, acerbic and often original things to say over the years. A few of the papers have not been previously published and a number have appeared only in out-of-the-way places. They include the famous "GATT For Investment" and the less-well-known "Further Reflections" on the same subject.

OPEC'S INVESTMENTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM. By Richard P. Mattione. Washington: Brookings, 1985, 201 pp. $26.95.

The best sections of this book analyze the different investment strategies of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. There are useful chapters on the size and composition of the foreign assets of OPEC countries, the foreign aid they give and the rise of Arab banks. Other interesting political and economic issues are dealt with unevenly, or not at all.

INTERNATIONAL DEBT: SYSTEMIC RISK AND POLICY RESPONSE. By William R. Cline. Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1984, 320 pp. (Cambridge: MIT Press, distributor, $25.00).

These days publication cannot keep up with negotiation in the rescheduling of international debt. Still, this good book justifies its existence by looking at continuing problems of maintaining the flow of funds, strengthening the banking system, and adapting obligations to circumstances that the author confidently expects will improve.

UNCERTAIN FUTURE: COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THE THIRD WORLD. Edited by Richard E. Feinberg and Valeriana Kallab. New

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Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books (for the Overseas Development Council), 1984, 129 pp. $12.95.

These are useful short papers by people of differing backgrounds who make quite different kinds of suggestions about how banks, governments and international bodies ought to behave in the face of the continuing debt difficulties.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

STRATEGIC STALEMATE: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARMS CONTROL IN AMERICAN POLITICS. By Michael Krepon. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 191 pp. $25.00. A Council on Foreign Relations Book.

A concise analysis of the American debate over arms control measures from the atmospheric test ban treaty of 1963 to the present. The author demonstrates the continuity of positions held by the participants throughout. There are two "camps": those who stress security through military means and those who believe above all in arms control or disarmament. The camps in turn, contain "operationalists," who pursue arms control but with differing emphases, and "ideologues," who reject arms control in favor of superiority, at one end of the spectrum, or in favor of disarmament, at the other end. The book makes sense out of what is a very complex business.

THE GOOD NEWS IS THE BAD NEWS IS WRONG. By Ben Wattenberg. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984, 416 pp. $17.95.

A zestful and entertaining exercise in Monday-morning quarterbacking. The author derides those who have predicted dire events, mostly environmental, which have not come to pass (yet). He uses census data to show how American life is getting better and better. The book is a good example of the "positive thinking" fashionable in the U.S. at the beginning of 1985.

REPRESENTING AMERICA: EXPERIENCES OF U.S. DIPLOMATS AT THE UN. By Linda M. Fasulo. New York: Praeger, 1984, 337 pp. $27.95.

Oral history interviews with 32 people who held assignments at the U.N. either as permanent representative (ambassador) or in other capacities. Although no secrets are revealed, the collection is interesting for what it says about American policy toward and in the U.N. Among those represented are Averell Harriman, Philip Jessup, Arthur Goldberg, George Bush, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Andrew Young, and Jeane Kirkpatrick.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN TURKEY: MEMOIRS OF AN AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY. By James W. Spain. New York: Praeger, 1984, 252 pp. $31.95.

The author, a career diplomat, served as American ambassador to Turkey from February 1980 until August 1981. His memoirs combine a conventional description of what it is like to be an ambassador with interesting material on U.S.-Turkish relations in general and the military coup of September 1980 in particular.

NEMESIS: TRUMAN AND JOHNSON IN THE COILS OF WAR IN

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ASIA. By Robert J. Donovan. New York: St. Martin's/Marek, 1984, 216 pp. $14.95.

The distinguished chronicler of the Truman presidency describes the similar ways in which two presidents led the country into the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Although for the purposes of symmetry he may exaggerate the negative consequences of Korea, the moral of the story is sound enough: the use of military power to resolve political or ideological problems "is treacherous indeed."

NO MORE VIETNAMS. By Richard M. Nixon. New York: Arbor House, 1985, 240 pp. $14.95.

The former president reviews the Vietnam war and concludes that it was "winnable," had the U.S. pursed the proper military strategy—at least in the period prior to his own presidency. He sounds a note of regret that his administration did not seek a military victory, but he doubts this was feasible: the American public would not have sustained such a policy in 1969 and, he insists, it would have undercut his efforts to open relations with both China and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he also believes that the war was "won" when the Paris Accords were signed. He holds the Congress responsible for the final defeat because supplies were withheld from the South Vietnamese and the threat of American retaliation was no longer credible. He concludes that Vietnam was a Soviet victory, and in this light advocates no more Vietnams, by which he means no more losses—not that the U.S. should never intervene in Third World crises. The reader will have to judge whether the loser, the U.S., is in better shape ten years after than the winner, the Soviet Union and North Vietnam. W.G.H.

THE UNITED STATES AND NATO: THE FORMATIVE YEARS. By Lawrence S. Kaplan. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984, 276 pp. $30.00 (paper, $12.00).

The core of this book is an excellent five-chapter section, based on archival research, on the diplomatic history of NATO from its origins in 1947 through the Korean War. There are also several broad interpretative essays written by the author at various times since 1954 and usefully collected here.

HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. VOL. I: THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1947–1950. By Steven L. Rearden. Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984, 667 pp.

This hefty, deeply researched, and well-written official history treats the 30 months between the establishment of the Department of Defense in September 1947 and the drafting of NSC-68 in the Spring of 1950—James Forrestal's secretaryship and the first part of Louis Johnson's. Although the author is restrained in his comments on individuals, the book is rich with material on China policy, NATO, military aid, atomic weapons, inter-service rivalry, and other subjects.

CHURCHILL AND ROOSEVELT: THE COMPLETE CORRESPONDENCE. VOL. I: ALLIANCE EMERGING. VOL. II: ALLIANCE FORGED. VOL. III: ALLIANCE DECLINING. Edited with a commentary by Warren F. Kimball. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 3 vols. $150.00.

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Although a large amount of Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence has been previously printed, this magnificently edited work is indispensable for the researcher and good reading for anyone interested in the principals and their leadership during World War II. Professor Kimball has located many unpublished items, gives full and corrected texts of others, and holds everything together with informative headnotes. He also includes the enclosures which the two leaders sent to each other.

THE ABANDONMENT OF THE JEWS: AMERICA AND THE HOLOCAUST, 1941–1945. By David S. Wyman. New York: Pantheon, 1984, 444 pp. $19.95.

The callous neglect by the Roosevelt Administration of the fate of European Jewry through the Nazi holocaust lingers to haunt one's faith in the abiding humane traditions of American foreign policy. The late Arthur D. Morse first conveyed the enormity of the diplomatic cynicism in 1968, based on evidence then available, and as each new archive has opened, the picture of prejudice and craven officialdom has been refined without relief. Professor Wyman of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, is the most professionally competent analyst and chronicler of this sorry record to date; his new book, rich in detail and complex cross-currents, continues his definitive study *Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938–1941.* The author is as diligent and thorough in his research as he is relentless in his retrospective moral judgments, having no stomach for an attempt to convey contemporary attitudes and circumstances which might help explain, though not excuse, decisions of otherwise humane officials. P.G.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. STRATEGIC THOUGHT, 1936–1940. By David G. Haglund. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984, 280 pp. $19.95.

This well-researched monograph argues convincingly that American leaders feared that a Nazi victory in Europe would threaten United States security in Latin America. More than any other factor this fear undermined the isolationist posture. This is a useful corrective to historical accounts of the Second World War written as if Latin America did not exist.

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

DISTANT NEIGHBORS: A PORTRAIT OF THE MEXICANS. By Alan Riding. New York: Knopf, 1985, 400 pp. $18.95.

This is the way country descriptions and analysis should be written. The political, economic and social highlights receive full treatment, as well as cultural and psychological aspects usually overlooked, all with great sensitivity. Of particular interest is the account of the Mexican family, viewed both as "the single most powerful reason why economic crisis has not translated into social unrest," and as the source of insularity that leads Mexicans to distrust society as a whole. Corruption, in every niche and level, is impossible to eradicate since it sustains the entire system of alliances. As for the future, the author sees stability endangered less by left-led rebellion by the masses than by mutiny of the middle classes led by the right.

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MEXICO'S DILEMMA: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF ECONOMIC CRISIS. By Roberto Newell and Luis Rubio. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1984, 319 pp. $38.00.

The central proposition here is that the ruling party, afflicted by a vanishing consensus, has ceased to be an effective mechanism for handling bureaucratic and social conflict, and that "thorough transformation of Mexico's political and economic structure" is necessary to attain economic well-being within a framework of pluralism and social peace. No problems in regard to control of the masses are envisaged.

A HOUSE DIVIDED: ARGENTINA, 1880–1980. By Eduardo Crawley. New York: St. Martin's, 1985, 472 pp. $35.00.

The author, an Argentine journalist based in London, has combined secondary and media sources, interview materials, and well-selected anecdotes to produce an interesting account of a century of troubled history in a troubled country. Not a work of scholarship, since archival records have not been used, nor have various respected secondary works, so that some opinions or interpretations will seem questionable to specialists, who would also have appreciated footnoting.

DISCREET PARTNERS: ARGENTINA AND THE USSR SINCE 1917. By Aldo Cesar Vacs. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984, 154 pp. $14.95.

A short and well-presented study of a topic seldom treated. It focuses on the Argentine side, and the thesis argues that the relations between the two countries are based on complementary needs in trade and production. Diplomatic and military ties came later, but are increasing.

DEMOCRACIES AND TYRANNIES OF THE CARIBBEAN. By William Krehm. Westport (Conn.): Lawrence Hill, 1985, 244 pp. $19.95 (paper, $9.95).

Published originally in Spanish in 1948, this book fell victim to the author's dispute with *Time* and only now appears in English. It recounts the personal adventures and observations of the writer, a Canadian journalist, in Central America and the Caribbean during the 1940s. Extended and colorful portraits of Jorge Ubico, Tiburcio Carias, Tacho Somoza, Rafael Trujillo, Elie Lescot and others are well worth reading.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

HOW DEMOCRACIES PERISH. By Jean-François Revel. New York: Doubleday, 1984, 376 pp. $17.95.

A bitter indictment of Western democracies, especially Europe's, for failing to understand and to counter Soviet expansionism. Revel, a well-known journalist and analyst of the totalitarian temptation, believes that both systems, Soviet communism and Western democracy, are probably doomed: "but [the Soviet] corpse . . . can drag us with it into the grave." According to Revel, the Soviets have the will to dominate the world, will use every instrument at their command and, in addition, can count on Western complicity or acquiescence. He doubts that democracy can defend

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itself—a pernicious sentiment, proven neither by the historical record nor by close analysis. There is much to ponder in this book about the Soviets and our difficulties in countering them, but apodictic statements about the self-destroying passions of the West seem overdone. In the Reagan-Thatcher-Kohl era it seems odd to conclude: "Unlike the Western leadership, which is tormented by remorse and a sense of guilt, Soviet leaders' consciences are perfectly clear, which allows them to use brute force with utter serenity both to preserve their power at home and to extend it abroad."

For so pessimistic a theme, the book is remarkably sprightly, a premature, sardonic obituary. Facile, alarming, probably symptomatic, the book should provoke readers to look for other works that help to clarify what Revel rightly diagnoses as the central problem of the next decades: Will Western democracies survive, will they escape war and servitude?

THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEST GERMANY AND ISRAEL. By Lily Gardner Feldman. Winchester (Mass.): Allen & Unwin, 1984, 330 pp. $35.00.

An unusual, cautiously daring book on a unique subject: the development of what Feldman, a historian, claims is an enduring "special relationship" between the two countries, based initially on mutual need of a wildly divergent kind. Feldman sees the beginning of the relationship with the Reparation Agreement of 1952, when Israel needed economic aid and Germany a moral rehabilitation that only Israel could extend. Throughout her thorough discussion, Feldman traces the interplay of moral and pragmatic considerations and insists that, despite all the changes since 1973, a special tie continues, both institutional and personal. A revealing book, at once informative about defense and economic aspects of German aid to Israel and endeavoring to establish a theoretical basis for a discussion of "special relationships" among nations. A valuable book—and, perhaps, given the ambiguities and complexities of the subject, a book with a benevolent bias, sometimes accepting public statements as political truths.

GESCHICHTE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND. BAND I: JAHRE DER BESATZUNG, 1945–1949. By Theodor Eschenburg and others. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt/Wiesbaden: Brockhaus, 1983, 627 pp.

Another important sign of a new self-consciousness in the Federal Republic, this is the first of a projected five-volume series on the history of the FRG, the provisional state that has lasted longer than any other German state in this century. Written by several outstanding scholars, this volume examines the years when divided Allies improvised the division of what was left of Germany. It is a thorough, fair-minded appraisal of the actions and motives of occupiers and occupied, and also a fine evocation of the cultural and political life in the Western occupation zones.

WAR DIARIES: THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1943–1945. By Harold Macmillan. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 804 pp. $29.95.

On Churchill's orders, Macmillan was sent out as Minister Resident at the very end of 1942, attached to Eisenhower's North African Command. Supplementing the earlier memoirs, the diaries give a marvelous day-by-day account of English calm and chitchat while crises popped up every-

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where—from Darlan to the Greek civil war. Initially, his chief mission was to unify the French factions: a trying business. At times he wonders what the army "will make of England after the war. Will they all be soothed in the syrup of Beveridge?" Rather more here on his way of wartime living (well) and his reading (extensive) than on his political judgments. But in many places there is excellent source material for the historian and the book is highly readable throughout.

TOO SECRET TOO LONG. By Chapman Pincher. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 637 pp. $19.95.

Was there a Soviet mole in the highest reaches of the British secret service? British journalist Chapman Pincher thinks so, and he thinks it was Roger Hollis, who was head of MI-5 from 1956 to 1965. Pincher takes some 600 pages to weave his web of circumstantial evidence, and in doing so takes us once again through all the now familiar but still engrossing cases of British spy-traitors—Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt, George Blake, Gordon Lonsdale (the list is very long). The evidence is indeed suggestive, but Sir Roger has been dead since 1973. One wonders if there is much more to mine in this vein. But still the drilling goes on. L.D.

SOCIALISM IN WESTERN EUROPE: THE EXPERIENCE OF A GENERATION. By Steven Philip Kramer. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1984, 229 pp. $18.50 (paper).

A series of revealing interviews with Socialist leaders, all of whom came of age in the 1920s and faced the trials of Fascism and war in the 1930s. Valuable vignettes of individual leaders and of the socialist milieu.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

RETHINKING THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE: POLITICS AND HISTORY SINCE 1917. By Stephen F. Cohen. New York: Oxford, 1985, 240 pp. $17.95.

Professor Cohen takes out after a whole generation of fellow Sovietologists and their latter-day followers for their one-dimensional, grey consensus on the nature of the Soviet polity—in brief, the totalitarian model. He castigates their neglect of the relevance of history to politics, which would have shown the variety of political aims, the clash of opposing views, and the continuing choices which were and are the actuality. He illustrates his argument with discussion of Bolshevism vs. Stalinism in the 1920s and 1930s, reform vs. neo-Stalinism in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, and the contention of conservatism and reformism in the present day. This is revisionism with a vengeance, and Cohen has his own bias, but he is a solid and careful scholar, and his book is a challenge to others to do some rethinking of their own.

SOVIET POLITICS 1945–53. By Timothy Dunmore. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 167 pp. $27.50.

Timothy Dunmore's study of Stalin's later years takes a revisionist approach not unlike that of Stephen Cohen (see above). He rejects the model of totalitarian dictatorship for that of factional politics in the Polit-

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buro and interest groups within the system, with Stalin having to maneuver and manipulate and sometimes retreat. The argument, in general, is well developed, but there are interpretations and conclusions, particularly as regards Stalin's foreign policy in Eastern Europe and toward the West, which seem to outrun the evidence as presented.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN EUROPE, 1933–1939. By Jonathan Haslam. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 310 pp. $29.95.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE FAILURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY, 1934–1938. By Jiri Hochman. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1984, 253 pp. $29.95.

Two talented historians, using much of the same source material, reach rather different conclusions on the policy of collective security and alliance with Paris and Prague, of which Maxim Litvinov was the protagonist and symbol. Haslam, whose narrative is generally more detailed, sees it as a serious commitment undercut by Anglo-French appeasement and by domestic opponents. Hochman, who focuses on the position of Czechoslovakia and the road to Munich, finds it more of a charade and always second best to the desired deal with Germany. Both document the continuing Soviet-German contacts after Hitler took power. Avid students of the period will have to read both books.

THE JEWS OF HOPE. By Martin Gilbert. New York: Viking, 1985, 237 pp. $15.95.

A British historian, official biographer of Winston Churchill, writes with deep feeling of the courage of Soviet Jews in withstanding persecution and maintaining their resolve to emigrate to Israel. The book is based on personal encounters with "refuseniks" met during a visit to Russia.

THE SOVIET UNION AND REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. By Aryeh Y. Yodfat. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 168 pp. $25.00.

An Israeli scholar's survey of Russian-Iranian relations from the 19th century to the present, concentrating on the years since the fall of Shah Mohammed Reza in 1979. It is a convenient summary, without unusual insights, but making full use of the Soviet press and other sources.

THE EAGLE AND THE SMALL BIRDS: CRISIS IN THE SOVIET EMPIRE FROM YALTA TO SOLIDARITY. By Michael Charlton. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, 192 pp. $14.95.

The eagle is the U.S.S.R., the small birds the satellite states of Eastern Europe. Michael Charlton, a commentator for the BBC, interviews a galaxy of former officials and experts who can speak with authority on what happened at Yalta, on the Sovietization of Eastern Europe, and on the crisis of yesterday, today and tomorrow. Oral history at its best, largely because of Charlton's skillful guidance of the conversations.

CARDINAL WYSZYŃSKI: A BIOGRAPHY. By Andrzej Micewski. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984, 496 pp. $17.95.

This first full biography of Wyszyński by a Polish journalist is a hymn to his greatness as churchman and statesman, and at the same time a remarkably full account of his life and thought. In many ways the story of his dealings with the Communist regime and of his resistance to it on matters

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of principle reveal the essence of his country's dilemma, and its survival, over his more than three decades as primate of Poland.

A PRISONER OF MARTIAL LAW: POLAND, 1981–1982. By Jan Mur. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984, 336 pp. $19.95.

A journal written in internment camp by a Solidarity activist after the imposition of martial law in December 1981 and continued for several months after his release in August 1982. He describes conditions in the camp, his thoughts and conversations there, and his reflections on the closed chapter of great hopes (1980–1981). Hatred and contempt for the authorities are here, of course, but also candid criticism of Solidarity.

POLAND'S POLITICIZED ARMY: COMMUNISTS IN UNIFORM. By George C. Malcher. New York: Praeger, 1984, 304 pp. $32.95.

It is the interesting thesis of this book, by a Polish-born author who has lived in Britain since World War II, that Poland's military leadership over the years has created its own "military Communist party" with the capability of exerting influence and control far beyond the confines of the army itself, in the service of communism and of the U.S.S.R. Accordingly, it was well prepared to take power in 1981, to suppress Solidarity, and to replace the faltering civilian Communist leadership. The book will win no literary prizes and does not stop to weigh controversial points, but the profusion and marshalling of data is impressive.

The Middle East

John C. Campbell

ERROR AND BETRAYAL IN LEBANON. By George W. Ball. Washington: Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1984, 158 pp.

Outspoken as usual, George Ball reviews the Lebanon imbroglio of 1982–83 and U.S.-Israeli relations in terms which concede only the barest minimum of honor and wisdom to those in charge. To underline his plea for new U.S. policies in the Middle East which will serve American interests and not just those of the government of Israel, he appends to his narrative a detailed list of "errors and betrayals" which have produced bitter fruit for all concerned. Bluntly stated or overstated as they may be, these are home truths which deserve attention in Washington, although there seems little chance they will get it.

THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW LEBANON: FANTASY OR REALITY. Edited by Edward E. Azar. New York: Praeger, 1984, 302 pp. $32.95.

This book addresses questions which are constantly changing their shape with the course of events. Nevertheless, the authors know the Lebanese scene uncommonly well. The chapters on the Lebanese army and the sectarian militias are outstanding. The conclusions are generally pessimistic. The old Lebanon is beyond revival, and whether there will be a new one at all is open to serious doubt.

BEGIN: THE HAUNTED PROPHET. By Eric Silver. New York: Random House, 1984, 278 pp. $17.95.

Eric Silver, who spent ten years in Israel as correspondent for *The Guardian*, makes no claim to have written the definitive biography, but he

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writes with objectivity and critical understanding of this dedicated, stubborn, complex and, to many who had to deal with him, exasperating man. Good use is made of Begin's own writings as well as many interviews with people close to him in public or private life.

A CHANGING ISRAEL. By Peter Grose. New York: Vintage, 1985, 129 pp. $4.95 (paper). A Council on Foreign Relations Book.

Progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process will require keen understanding of the politics behind the decisionmaking of each party which faces critical choices. Making those choices will bare nerves which reach deep into each party. It is all too often assumed by those engaged in the peace process that Israel is a monolith. Peter Grose, author of *Israel in the Mind of America* and managing editor of *Foreign Affairs*, has done a superb job of explaining the deeply divided society from which Israel's leaders must marshal political support in dealing with peace proposals from any quarter.

Harold H. Saunders

THE LAND QUESTION IN PALESTINE, 1917–1939. By Kenneth W. Stein. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984, 314 pp. $29.00.

During the period of the Mandate, the Jewish community in Palestine steadily and resourcefully increased its purchases of land as a basis for the future Jewish state, despite Arab objections and British restrictions. Kenneth Stein, making use of the British archives and of mountains of material covering thousands of real estate transactions, has written an objective and comprehensive history of this question. Zionist tenacity, British ambivalence, and Arab individualism and weakness all contributed to the outcome.

CYPRUS. By Christopher Hitchens. New York: Quartet Books, 1984, 192 pp. (Salem, N.H.: Merrimack, distributor, $15.95.)

This book on the fate of Cyprus from 1960 to 1974 is written in sorrow, in anger, and in black and white. Among the victims are Archbishop Makarios, the people of Cyprus, and the Greek democrats who opposed the colonels' junta; among the villains are the British governments of the time, the Greek junta, Turkish generals and politicians, the U.S. government under both Johnson and Nixon, and especially Henry Kissinger. Some of the author's arrows are well aimed and strike home, since much of the record is indeed a sorry one, especially the failure to forestall or immediately reverse the coup of July 15, 1974. But couching it in the terms of a morality play does little to add to the understanding of the interests and policies of the nations concerned.

ECONOMIC AID AND AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD EGYPT, 1955–1981. By William J. Burns. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985, 285 pp.

This is a splendid book on two counts. First, it carefully examines how well or ill economic aid serves as an instrument of foreign policy, drawing salutary lessons from the American experience with Egypt. It treats not only the relevance of aid to foreign policies but also the question of whether the policies themselves were well conceived and carried out. Second, it provides the most complete and accurate account yet published on the course of U.S. relations with Nasser's Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s,

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drawing on recently available primary material. The coverage of the period of massive aid during the Sadat regime is more in the nature of a summary but still productive of useful conclusions.

MIDDLE EAST CONTEMPORARY SURVEY. VOL. V: 1980–81 & VOL. VI: 1981–82. Edited by Colin Legum, Haim Shaked and Daniel Dishon. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982 & 1984, 2 vols. $198.00 each.

The first part of this annual survey, substantially (although not entirely) the product of the Shiloah Center in Tel Aviv, gives a comprehensive account of the year's developments in the Middle East with additional essays on specialized subjects. The second part is a country-by-country survey of each of the Middle East states. This annual, which began with the year 1976–77, has by now become an essential resource on the Middle East for scholars and journalists.

IRAQ: EASTERN FLANK OF THE ARAB WORLD. By Christine Moss Helms. Washington: Brookings, 1984, 215 pp. $28.95 (paper, $9.95).

If Western attitudes and policies suffer from ignorance of Iraq's realities, a quick but partial corrective is available in this background course. It is sound and objective in presenting the permanent factors affecting Iraq's conduct and contributing to its vulnerabilities, and also sympathetic in the treatment of the current leaders (some of whom the author has interviewed). Everything is at stake in the war Saddam Hussein started in 1980. Ms. Helms lays out the possible consequences, which are numerous.

IRAQ AND IRAN: THE YEARS OF CRISIS. By Jasim Abdulghani. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1984, 270 pp. $28.50.

An excellent, well-documented study of the background of the Iraq-Iran war. Events since September 1980 are covered in more summary fashion in the final chapter. Although the author has a surer touch with Iraq than with Iran (which was closed to him anyway), he is reasonably objective, showing the depth of the historic antagonism between the two peoples, and the reasons why the conflict, even if stopped on the battlefield, will continue in one form or another for a long time to come.

OCCIDENTOSIS: A PLAGUE FROM THE WEST. By Jalal Al-i Ahmad. Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1984, 160 pp. $5.95 (paper).

A forerunner of the Khomeini phenomenon, Al-i Ahmad came to Islamic traditionalism after a detour through Marxism and the progressive nationalism of the Mosaddeq movement. This biting criticism of the Westernization of Iran and other Eastern societies, written in the 1960s, was published posthumously in its complete form only after the revolution in 1978. The argument is shrill, often puerile, but it is a sobering one for Western readers, who have been hearing its echos on many occasions.

ISLAM AND POLITICS. By John L. Esposito. Syracuse (N.Y.): Syracuse University Press, 1984, 273 pp. $29.00 (paper, $12.95).

At last a single-author book on a subject to which so many recent conferences and collections of papers have brought confusion as well as clarification. This general survey begins with the time of Muhammad, describes Islam as political and social force, the issues of reform and revival before and after contact with the West, and the role of Islam in the contemporary politics of key countries (Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, Libya).

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Throughout his discussion the author makes clear where the political reality is at odds with the normative ideal.

THE ARAB GULF ECONOMY IN A TURBULENT AGE. By Hazem Beblawi. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 241 pp. $27.50.

A collection of pieces by a distinguished economist who has served in several capacities in Kuwait and is now chairman of the Export Development Bank of Egypt. His main contributions in this volume are a survey of Kuwait's economy, a detailed history of its stock market, and a cool appraisal of the "predicament" of the oil-producing states of the Gulf, particularly as to investment policy.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

TO GET RICH IS GLORIOUS: CHINA IN THE 80's. By Orville Schell. New York: Pantheon, 1984, 210 pp. $15.95.

The author, once an enthusiastic supporter of Mao Zedong's efforts to revolutionize China, is clearly unsettled by the breathtaking pace of change in post-Mao China and, at least by implication, he questions the direction in which China is now heading. He quotes one Chinese friend: "First the Party spends 30 years tearing down the bourgeoisie because they are supposedly hindering the Chinese Revolution. Now it is going to spend 30 years building them back up to help carry out the Chinese Revolution." Still, this is the most vivid account yet written of the decollectivization and decentralization of the Chinese economy and of the efforts to lure foreign business and tourism to the country.

WAR AND PEACE: THE VIEWS FROM MOSCOW AND BEIJING. By Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1984, 151 pp.

This monograph by two young scholars addresses the somewhat neglected matter of Soviet and Chinese perceptions of each other. It is based on interviews in Moscow and Beijing as well as analysis of Soviet and Chinese periodicals. The authors conclude that the Soviets believe that the conflict with China is persistent because it is based on a geopolitical configuration of power that is unlikely to change. The Chinese view, also unlikely to change, is that the much stronger Soviet Union has long sought hegemony over China and this has forced China to seek counterbalancing ties with the major powers in the West. Thus, a seemingly permanent impasse.

CHINA AND THE WORLD: CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-MAO ERA. Edited by Samuel S. Kim. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1984, 354 pp. $42.50 (paper, $16.95).

In a collection likely to be mainly of interest to academics, there is an exceptionally good chapter by Michael Ng-Quinn on the constraints on China's capacity to pursue a truly independent posture toward the superpowers. The author also convincingly refutes those who try to characterize the international system primarily in economic rather than political-strategic terms. Another strong entry is Chi Su on Soviet perceptions of China. Su's

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basic point is that Soviet writing on China reflects a deep-seated and long-standing distrust of Chinese nationalism and an unwillingness on the part of the Soviets to accommodate "national communism" on a more or less equal basis.

CHINESE DEFENCE POLICY. Edited by Gerald Segal and William T. Tow. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1984, 286 pp. $29.95.

The last comprehensive analysis of Chinese defense policy is well over a decade old and, although there have been good articles on the subject, a broad survey of the issue has been missing. This collection of essays goes some way toward filling the gap. There are informative chapters on the Chinese ground forces, the navy, the air force, the nuclear forces, strategic doctrine, the military industry, and other such subjects.

CRISIS IN THE PHILIPPINES: A THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS. By A. James Gregor. Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1984, 110 pp. $6.00 (paper).

This is one of the best short accounts of the developments leading up to the crisis sparked by the assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983. There is a reasonably balanced treatment of the accomplishments and failures of the Marcos administration and a list of recommendations for American policy. What is misleading, however, is the author's insistence on lumping together all the elements of the moderate opposition and his argument that the two basic positions of this opposition are to restore a "nationalist" economic program and to abrogate the U.S.-Philippine military base agreement. In fact some of the opposition leaders have refused to sign a recent statement calling for abrogation, and even among the signers there are differences of view. Moreover, it is not clear what economic policies the opposition leaders are likely to pursue if they ever come to power. The evidence is more ambiguous than the author suggests.

AUSTRALIA'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS IN THE 1980s. Edited by Paul Dibb. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 227 pp. $25.00.

This very useful volume is the result of a conference that brought together leading Australian academics, industrialists and public officials. In a very stimulating essay, Ross Garnaut points out that the fundamental link between economic and political factors in Australia's foreign policy is the powerful interest in maintaining a liberal international trading system. The degree of liberalism that has been maintained in international trade since World War II represents, in his view, a significant achievement for the world community, and is now in danger. There is also an excellent assessment of the major world political and strategic trends by Paul Dibbs.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

THE STATE-SOCIETY STRUGGLE: ZAIRE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE. By Thomas M. Callaghy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984, 560 pp. $45.00 (paper, $16.00).

This impressive study surveys Zaïre's progress toward patriarchal absolutism through both ends of the telescope: from the distance of a comparison

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with the 17th- and 18th-century French monarchy as well as through a close scrutiny of local bureaucratic pulling and hauling in the mid-1970s. As Callaghy tells it, the Zaïrean state's development under Mobutu more closely resembles that of pre-modern Europe than of Third World analogues in our time (even in Latin America, where significant parallels do exist). In his examination of events in three local areas, he shows how central government operatives fight (often to a draw) with "traditional" authorities. The goal is, as in pre-modern Europe—control over extraction of wealth from the populace.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ZIMBABWE. Edited by Michael G. Schatzberg. New York: Praeger, 1984, 288 pp. $29.95.

A number of scholars, American and Zimbabwean, look at Zimbabwe's delicate balance between ideology and pragmatism, equity and productivity. Downplaying the country's ethnic conflict, the authors focus on the need for Mugabe's regime to bring Africans in much more fully to the productive sectors or risk erosion of popular support. Most illuminating is David Gordon's assessment of what has and has not been delivered in terms of available resources and operative constraints.

THE FIRST DANCE OF FREEDOM: BLACK AFRICA IN THE POST-WAR ERA. By Martin Meredith. New York: Harper, 1985, 412 pp. $23.95.

A veteran journalist in Africa sums up the quarter-century of independence. Unfortunately his penchant for the short narrative take leads to a seemingly endless catalogue of conflict, coup, catastrophe. With events in 53 countries to reckon with, one soon loses the forest in the trees and grapples vainly for cause and effect. It all just seems a terrible mess.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA. By William Tordoff. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985, 352 pp. $25.00 (paper, $10.95).

A British political scientist hazards an overview of African governance after 25 years of independence. Describing himself as a democratic socialist, he compares the performances of various African regimes on rather pragmatic criteria, within a schema leaning heavily on that set forth by Crawford Young in *Ideology and Development*; like Young, he finds that the "African capitalist" states have by and large outperformed the others. Tordoff's analysis is most useful for its reasoned examination of various fashionable political and developmental theories in terms of current facts.

BUSINESS IN THE SHADOW OF APARTHEID: U.S. FIRMS IN SOUTH AFRICA. Edited by Jonathan Leape, Bo Baskin, and Stefan Underhill. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1985, 242 pp. $26.00.

An American banker, a lawyer, and an economist provide a platform here for a group of influential South Africans reflecting on the need for more constructive action by foreign investors. Most thoughtful is an argument by Afrikaner political scientist Hermann Giliomee for business support of "the free movement of labor." As the authors seem to recognize, the book is seriously deficient in omitting the arguments for disinvestment. It also cries out for an assessment of how U.S. businesses have or have not helped their black workers since the advent of the Sullivan principles in 1977.

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Edited by Janet Rigney

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

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